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Evaluation of environmental policy instruments
– a case study of the Finnish pulp & paper and chemical industries
Mikael Hildén1), Jukka Lepola1), Per Mickwitz1), Aard Mulders2), Marika Palosaari1),
Jukka Similä1), Stefan Sjöblom2) and Evert Vedung3)
1) Finnish Environment Institute, P.O. Box 140, FIN-00251 Helsinki, Finland
2) Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 16
FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland
3) Uppsala University, Institute for Housing Research, P.O. Box 785,
SE-801 29 Gävle, Sweden
Hildén, M., Lepola, J., Mickwitz, P., Mulders, A., Palosaari, M., Similä, J.,
Sjöblom, S. and Vedung, E. 2002. Evaluation of environmental policy instruments
– a case study of the Finnish pulp & paper and chemical industries, Monographs
of the Boreal Environment Research No. 21, 2002.
This research-based evaluation of environmental policy Instruments in Finland is focussed on
regulatory instruments based on the Water Act, the Air Pollution Control Act and the Chemi-
cals Act, on electricity taxation and on voluntary environmental management systems. The
examined policy instruments have had several positive effects. They have directed major in-
dustrial point source polluters towards solving environmental problems. The transparency has
been an important factor ensuring the success of the policy instruments and in avoiding the
regulatory capture that could have thrived in a system largely based on negotiations between
operators and authorities. The transparency has made it easy for Finnish firms to adopt envi-
ronmental management systems and an open attitude to environmental reporting.
The permit conditions have not directly resulted in innovations, but they have contributed
to the diffusion of end-of-pipe technology and have contributed to innovations by expanding
the market for environmentally better technical solutions. The permit systems have also indi-
rectly contributed to innovations by creating a demand for environmental experts and envi-
ronmental education.
Networks have clearly developed as a consequence of and in response to regulatory instru-
ments. These networks appear to have had their greatest significance prior to the permit pro-
cedures. The trend has been towards a greater emphasis of the communication in the networks
prior to the presentation of an application in order to ensure a smoothly functioning permit
process. In the networks contributing to innovations and the diffusion of innovations authori-
ties have largely been outsiders, except when an innovation has become a de facto standard
for permit conditions.
The different kind of effects, the complexity of consequences and the uncertainties with
respect to causes and effects mean that studies aiming at evaluating the overall worth and
merit of an environmental policy instrument should never be structured from a single point of
view using only one method. Multiple criteria should be used. The drawback of the multiple
approach principle in evaluation is that the evaluations will run into data problems and all the
difficulties of multi- and transdisciplinary research, but the multidisciplinarity is a necessary
condition for developing an informed view of the functioning and effects of environmental
policy instruments.
Keywords: environmental policy, evaluation, environmental management, regulatory systems,
permits, environmental legislation, industrial pollution, pollution control
10 Mikael Hildén et al. Monographs of the Boreal Environment Research No. 21
1 Introduction
Despite the importance of environmental policy
instruments for the development of several sec-
tors in society, few systematic evaluations have
been carried out of environmental legislation in
Finland. In a recent comparison of the state of
evaluations in different countries (Furubo and
Sandahl 2000), Finland was categorised as a coun-
try with strong external pressures for evaluations
(mainly from the European Union) as well as
strong internal pressures. The present state of eval-
uations was ranked twelfth of twenty-one coun-
tries.
Evaluations of policy instruments have
emerged gradually; in 1998 the interest in evalu-
ating the effects of acts appeared to be lowest in
the Ministry of Justice and in the Ministry of the
Environment (Harrinvirta et al. 1998). This sug-
gests a lack of balance between the effort spent
on developing policy instruments and the exami-
nation of what actually has been achieved. Since
1998 the situation has changed. The Ministry of
the Environment has commissioned a review of
issues related to environmental policy (Sairinen
et al. 2000), studies of the historical development
of environmental policy have been published
(Laakkonen et al. 1999, Sairinen 2000) and a study
on waste policy has been completed (Melanen et
al. 2002).
Interest in the evaluation of policy instruments
is broad (Scriven 1991, Vedung 1997, Bartlett
1994, Nagarajan and Vanheukelen 1997, Davies
and Mazurek 1998, Ahonen 1998), but there is
no standard method for carrying out evaluations.
Instead there are many different definitions of
evaluations and various possible approaches to
them. Our starting point is Scriven’s (1991) broad
definition that evaluation is about assessing the
merit, worth or value of something. To this we
add Vedung’s (1997) requirement that it is a care-
ful and systematic analysis of the implementation,
actions and results of public policy.
We have focused our study on public policy
instruments that have been used to direct and reg-
ulate the environmental impacts of the Finnish
pulp and paper and chemical industries. The em-
phasis has been on regulations for pollution con-
trol, because this is the form of policy instruments
that has been used the most, in Finland as well as
in other industrialised countries (OECD 1997). In
the evaluation we will nevertheless consider a
broader range of policy instruments. Different
instruments can have synergistic or antagonistic
effects. Furthermore markets, which in their turn
are influenced by other policy instruments, give
signals to companies that either enhance or atten-
uate the signals of the environmental policy in-
struments. Neglect of other instruments and mar-
ket signals would thus probably lead to incorrect
conclusions.
The influence of environmental policy instru-
ments on environmental know-how and environ-
mental technology within companies and sectors
is a particular aspect that has received increasing
attention in recent years (Carraro and Siniscalco
1994; Porter and van der Linde 1995a; Palmer et
al. 1995, Jaffe et al. 2000). Some of these effects
are direct and intended, whereas others are unin-
tended or even unanticipated (Wolf 1996, Fung
and O’Rourke 2000). In some cases these other
effects of instruments can be as important as the
main effects and this will be taken into account
in our approach to evaluation.
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2 The purpose of the study
The aim of this study was to contribute to discus-
sions on the use and development of environmen-
tal policy instruments. For this purpose we have
examined examples of policy instruments and their
application in the pulp and paper and the chemi-
cal industry sectors. The Water Act, the Act on
Air Pollution Control and the Chemicals Act have
regulated several of the companies in the studied
sectors. The Electricity Tax is an economic in-
strument that affects all branches of industry, and
voluntary environmental management systems are
increasingly adopted within both sectors.
We have approached the aim by specifying four
main objectives for the study:
• To undertake a general evaluation of
specific environmental policy instru-
ments
How do the selected environmental poli-
cy instruments meet a set of evaluation
criteria in the case of the Finnish pulp and
paper and chemical industries? What in-
tended as well as unintended effects have
occurred in and outside the target area?
• To investigate the relationship between
the environmental policy instruments
and innovations
Have the selected environmental policy
instruments fostered or hindered environ-
mental innovations and their diffusion?
• To explore the role of interorganisa-
tional networks
What interorganisational networks have
the environmental policy instruments
changed and created, and how have these
networks affected the implementation
procedures of the policy instruments?
• To examine evaluation methods
What are the special features that should
be taken into account when evaluating en-
vironmental policy instruments?
The main findings of our inquiry will be sum-
marised in this report, while the detailed results
are presented in a series of papers and reports
(Kiviluoto 1999, Luoma 1999, Hildén 2000, Mick-
witz 2000a,b,c, Similä 2000, Similä 2002, Sjöb-
lom 2001, Sahala 2001, Mulders 2001, Palosaari
2001). This report also examines relevant litera-
ture in the field and uses both primary and sec-
ondary material for the evaluation of the exam-
ined policy instruments.
The report is organised as follows. In Section
3 we present the theoretical background of the
study. Section 4 contains an overview of the ma-
terial and the methods that we have used. In Sec-
tions 5 and 6 we have compiled background in-
formation on the sectors, the administration, the
instruments and the environment. The main re-
sults of the investigations are presented in Sec-
tions 7 to 9, and these findings are discussed in
Sections 10 and 11. Section 12 summarises the
methodological aspects and Section 13 presents
the key conclusions with respect to the four main
objectives specified above.
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PART 1
THEORY AND APPROACHES

15Evaluation of environmental policy instruments
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Evaluation of environmental policy
3.1.1 Evaluation approach
Environmental problems have features which
make them particularly difficult to solve. Laffer-
ty and Meadowcroft (1996b, p.4ff) list the follow-
ing: the knowledge deficit, including complexi-
ty, technical difficulties and uncertainty; complex
geographical patterns of impact and causation,
links between regions that are geographically but
also socially remote; redistribution of losses and
gains, actions resulting in significant redistribu-
tions of costs and benefits; and time-scale effects
arising from long time lags between activities and
the appearance of effects and between remedial
action and positive results. These features have
implications for the choice of evaluation model
and evaluation design, evaluation criteria, the
problem of linking impacts to activities, evalua-
bility and the use of the evaluations (Mickwitz
2000c). They also partly explain why the evalua-
tion of environmental policies and programmes
has developed slowly and why many practices are
not standardised (Knaap and Kim 1998).
In our study we will focus on policy instru-
ments rather than specific programmes. This com-
plicates the evaluation because the intervention
is not unambiguous. It consists of the creation or
revision of policy instruments, but the implemen-
tation of the instrument is equally important. What
is then the rationale for choosing policy instru-
ments as the evaluand, i.e. the object of the eval-
uation? In an evaluation focused on policy instru-
ments, the specific characteristics of these instru-
ments are expected to be of relevance not only
for that particular situation, but also more gener-
ally. Thus, it should be possible to extrapolate the
results of an evaluation that focuses on policy in-
struments to other contexts, at least to some de-
gree, but it is important to note that it is not pos-
sible to extrapolate the results to an evaluation of
the environmental policy as a whole.
An evaluation approach that is suitable for the
evaluation of environmental policy instruments is
Vedung’s model for ”side-effects evaluation”
(Vedung 1997). It offers possibilities for dealing
with both the complexity and uncertainty of many
environmental policy problems and the instru-
ments that are used to solve them. The name ”side-
effects evaluation” is slightly misleading, because
the definition of a side-effect only refers to the
occurrence of an effect inside or outside the tar-
get area. We will also pay attention to unantici-
pated effects within the target area. These are not
side-effects in the strict sense. In addition we have
to note that a strict classification into main effects
and side-effects is often problematic in the con-
text of complex policy instruments, which include
multiple objectives, some of which may be im-
plicit. Thus although the target area specifies the
focus of the policy instrument (Rossi et al. 1999)
it is not always unambiguously defined. For ex-
ample reducing water pollution was one of the key
target areas of the Finnish Water Act, but objec-
tives also include the regulation of issues related
to the rights and limitations to use waters and the
establishment of fair procedures for dealing with
these. In this case the target area is very broad
and one can argue that only effects on e.g. educa-
tion are genuinely side-effects, whereas the ac-
cumulation of numerous court cases on water pol-
lution is an effect within the target area although
the delays in the procedures can be regarded as
an unanticipated effect.
In the side-effects evaluation approach the ef-
fects of the studied instruments are conceptually
divided, first, into anticipated and unanticipated
effects (Fig. 1). The next level examines whether
effects occur inside or outside the target area. The
third level is a qualitative categorisation of the
effects. The main value of this categorisation is
that it helps in the identification of different kind
of effects of the examined policy instruments. It
provides a broader frame of reference than an eval-
uation which would focus only on some well de-
fined objectives of the policy instruments.
To stress the nature of the approach as a con-
ceptual frame of reference our qualitative cate-
gorisation differs from the original side-effects
model (Fig. 1). It is often not meaningful to di-
vide all effects into the categories ”beneficial” and
”detrimental”, because this classification depends
on an unambiguous specification of objectives and
cannot therefore always be justified, especially for
unanticipated effects outside the target area. For
example an increasing number of specialised au-
thorities for pollution control may be regarded as
beneficial from an environmental quality point of
view, but may represent an economic burden for
society unless a strict polluter pays principle ap-
plies.
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Unanticipated effects can only partially be
known before an evaluation is actually undertak-
en. An important part of both interviews and doc-
ument analyses will thus be to develop a more
complete picture of the unanticipated effects of
the environmental policy instruments that have
been used.
3.1.2 Intervention theories
The starting point for the identification of the dif-
ferent types of effects is the definition of inter-
vention theories for the instruments that will be
evaluated. Vedung (1997, p. 301) defines inter-
vention theory1 as: The ”empirical and norma-
tive suppositions that public interventions rest
upon”. The role of intervention theories is to de-
scribe how the policy is intended to be implement-
ed and function. They are not intended to be de-
scriptions of how a policy instrument actually
works. Thus we will use them as tools guiding
the evaluation of how the intervention has been
implemented and what effects it has had in prac-
tice (Vedung, 1997, 143f.). For public policy in-
struments we can retrospectively identify an in-
tervention theory using official documents con-
cerning the instrument. Because policy instru-
ments frequently arise through compromises, such
an intervention theory may contain conflicting
elements and it may leave room for different in-
terpretations on how the instruments is assumed
to achieve its objectives. It should also be noted
that different groups may have their own views
and assumptions concerning the operation of an
intervention and these they use as a basis for their
support for or opposition against the intervention.
Intervention theories generally consist of the
following elements and their causal links:
actors, decision-making entities, e.g. authori-
ties, companies, non-governmental organisa-
tions and individuals. The actors include agen-
cies, implementing the policy instrument and
addressees, i.e. the targets of the instrument.
In this study the term operator will be used
for those responsible for the action at an in-
dustrial site, e.g. a specific paper mill.;
Fig.1. Different types of effects; summary of the classification used. Strictly speaking side-effects are those effects oc-
curring outside the target area.
1 Although most authors use the term ”programme the-
ory” (e.g. Rogers et. al. 2000), the term ”intervention
theory” will be used here, unless reference is made to
a specific source that uses the term ”programme theo-
ry”. The justification is that ”intervention theory” is
seen as a more general term including theories of pro-
grammes, policies and policy instruments.
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inputs, the means used by the administration
to produce outputs. Inputs include such re-
sources as personnel and finance, but also mat-
ters that come from the addressees that the
agencies take into account or respond to, for
example permit applications.;
outputs, matters that the addressees are faced
with, e.g. a permit and its specific conditions;
and
outcomes, the actions taken by the addressees
because they are faced with the outputs, but
also the consequences of these actions. Out-
comes can be further divided into immediate,
intermediate and ultimate outcomes.2
Patton (1997) distinguished three different ap-
proaches to the development of intervention the-
ories: the deductive approach, which is based on
literature; the inductive approach based on field
work; and the user-focused approach based on the
implicit theory of action of the intended users. In
many cases elements from all these approaches
can be used simultaneously.
In this study we have used a deductive ap-
proach in extracting basic intervention theories
from the legislation and its justifications, official
decisions and other formal documents related to
the instruments. The intervention theories thus
have two important functions in this evaluation:
first they have been used to establish the antici-
pated effects and the target area of each instru-
ment; second they have been used to determine
on which outputs and outcomes data should be
collected. Further, our empirical material provides
user-focused material on how different actors per-
ceive and form their own views of how the in-
struments work, which can be contrasted with the
assumptions in the intervention theory deduced
from the official documentation.
3.1.3 Criteria
The purpose of evaluation criteria is to specify
the dimensions or aspects of the policy instruments
which will be studied in order to assess their mer-
its. The chosen criteria will be examined in the
light of the intervention theories and empirical
findings of the effects. The criteria ensure a sys-
tematic approach in the evaluation, although not
all criteria are equally important for all instru-
ments. It is also not always possible to obtain
equally detailed information on all criteria.
Any choice of criteria reflects a value judge-
ment. While value choices can never be avoided,
they should be expressed as explicitly as possible
(Shadish et. al. 1995, House and Howe1999). Two
general approaches are recognised: a descriptive
and a prescriptive approach (Shadish et. al. 1995,
p.47f). In the prescriptive approach the evalua-
tors select the criteria, whereas in descriptive ap-
proaches the criteria are based on goals or needs
stated by others, e.g. by legislators or stakehold-
ers and they are generally not weighed together.
Our criteria choice is more towards the descrip-
tive approach, but not entirely, since we will also
use some criteria even if they have not been ex-
plicitly stated as important for a studied policy
instrument. When it comes to making a final syn-
thesis for all the criteria, we support the views
expressed by Shadish, Cook and Leviton (1995,
p.47ff) and Vedung (1997, 248ff) that in demo-
cratic societies a pluralism of values should be
appreciated and therefore the overall judgement
on the worth of the instruments should be made
in a communicative political process.
The criteria that will be used in this study are
presented in Table 1. These criteria do not repre-
sent an exhaustive list of all the criteria that could
be used. Mickwitz (2000c) discusses three groups
of criteria: general criteria; economic criteria; and
criteria linked to the functioning of democracy.
Economic criteria are considered important but
their use in evaluations in the environmental con-
text involve particular problems. Here only two
economic criteria are included, i.e. efficiency in
the cost-effectiveness sense and some aspects of
equity. Due to resource and data limitations these
criteria will be used only at a general level. It has
not been possible to collect comprehensive data
on all costs related to the use of the studied poli-
cy instruments.
There are several criteria linked to the func-
tioning of democracy: acceptability, equity and
transparency. It has been argued that environmen-
tal policy imposes special challenges on democ-
racy (e.g. Lafferty and Meadowcroft 1996a) and
2 Some additional terms that are often used are im-
pact, result and effect. Impact is generally used as a
synonym to outcome, while results refer to both out-
puts and outcomes. When outcomes are further divid-
ed into effects in the target area and side-effects, the
term effect is used as a synonym to outcome.
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therefore democracy criteria are particularly in-
teresting.
Not all effects (Fig. 1) are relevant for all the
criteria in Table 1. Some criteria become more
useful when applied only on a subset of the ef-
fects. For example the relevance criterion is rele-
vant for comparing the anticipated effects in the
target area with knowledge of key issues with
hindsight, whereas the impact criterion is useful
for all effects. Effectiveness is a criterion that can
be limited to the anticipated effects in the target
area in relation to the stated objectives.
Another characteristic of the criteria is that they
involve different stages in the ”input/output”
model (Vedung 1997; Nagarajan and Vanheuke-
len 1997, p.20; Fig. 2). The relevance criterion
will link the needs to the objectives of the envi-
ronmental policy instruments, by asking whether
the instruments, as they were established years or
decades ago, actually addressed real needs in the
light of our knowledge of the environmental is-
sues today. Impact assesses to what degree an
outcome is due to the output of the policy instru-
ment. Often, impact will have to be assessed at
an earlier stage than the final outcome. The dif-
ference between impact and effectiveness is that
effectiveness links the outcomes to the objectives
and not the outputs as impact. While some view
efficiency as a criterion that links inputs and out-
puts, e.g. how many permits does a Water Court
with a certain amount of employees and financial
resources produce, we see efficiency as a criteri-
on that conceptually can also be used to link out-
comes at any stage to the inputs. Sustainability
and flexibility both concern the ability of the fi-
nal outcomes to meet long-term needs. Transpar-
ency and distributional equity refer to all individ-
ual stages as well as the whole system, while ac-
ceptability refers primarily to the whole system,
although problems with acceptability may arise
at a specific stage.
3.1.4 Regulatory capture
Several of the criteria refer to the role of policy
instruments in a democratic and open society. The
policy instruments can also be approached by ex-
Table 1. The criteria that will be used in this evaluation.
Relevance Do the goals of the instruments cover key problems of environmental policy? On a general
level this criterion is trivial, but specific norms or rules can be questioned using this criterion.
Impact Is it possible to identify impacts that are clearly due to the policy instruments and its implemen-
tation? All impacts may be considered in the light of this criterion, irrespective of their occur-
rence within or outside the target area.
Effectiveness To what degree do the achieved outcomes correspond to the intended goals of the policy instru-
ment? Similarly, the effectiveness of reaching other public goals can also be assessed if the
goals are first identified.
Efficiency Do the results justify the resources used? This is a cost-results criterion, in which benefits are
(cost-effectiveness) not valued in monetary terms. Another possibility of how to consider costs is to use the cost-
effectiveness criterion: Could the results have been achieved with fewer resources?
Acceptability To what degree do individuals and organisations accept the environmental policy instrument?
Transparency and To what degree are the outputs and outcomes of the environmental policy instrument, as well as
participatory rights the processes used in the implementation, observable for outsiders? Who can participate?
Equity How are the outcomes and costs of the environmental policy instrument distributed?
Flexibility Can the policy instrument cope with changing conditions?
Predictability Is it possible to predict the administration, outputs and outcomes of the policy instrument? Is it
thus possible for those regulated, as well as others, to be prepared and take into account the
policy instrument and its implications?
Sustainabilitya Are the effects sustainable in such a way that they have a lasting effect on the state of the
environment? Through this criterion the effects outside the target area and the unintended ef-
fects that may create new problems can also be considered.
a It should be emphasised that sustainability in this context does not refer to ”sustainable development”, which is
a general goal of environmental policy. The relationship between a policy instrument and ”sustainable development”
would have to be considered in the light of several of the criteria to cover ecological, economic and socio-cultural
sustainable development.
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amining to what degree they lack the characteris-
tics that would make them meet the positive cri-
teria. This notion is included in the concept ”reg-
ulatory capture”, which means that powerful in-
terests, for example a company, an industrial sec-
tor or a political party, can influence the regula-
tors to prioritise their interest over the public one.
Throughout history, parties with strong interests
have used varied means to achieve unfair bene-
fits, ranging from simple persuasion in negotia-
tions to partly or wholly illegal practices (Laffont
and Tirole 1993). The risk and severity of the reg-
ulatory capture differs between different types of
instruments. In our study we will point out char-
acteristics of instruments that increase or dimin-
ish the risks of regulatory capture.
3.2 Environmental policy instruments
and their characteristics
Environmental policy instruments – and policy
instruments in general – can be categorised in dif-
ferent ways for the purpose of an evaluation. One
way of categorising them is based on the degree
of authoritative force involved. This results in
three main types of environmental policy instru-
ments: regulatory instruments, economic instru-
ments and information (OECD 1994, Vedung
1998), all with substantially different intervention
theories.
Regulatory instruments aim at alteration of the
set of options open to agents. Instruments used
include: standards, bans, permits, zoning, and use
restrictions. Economic instruments aim at alter-
ing the benefits and/or the costs of the agents.
Economic instruments that have been used in-
clude: grants and subsidies; taxes and charges; and
market creation, through tradable emission or re-
source use quotas. Information as a policy instru-
ment aims at altering the priorities and signifi-
cance agents attached to environmental issues.
These instruments include different forms of in-
formation campaigns, research and development,
and education. (OECD 1994).
Environmental policy instruments can also be
viewed in an input-process-output context, in
which the input-output model refers to produc-
Fig. 2. The evaluation criteria and their links to the stages of the input-output model (inspired by Pollitt and Bouckaert
2000).
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tion, not policy implementation as in Section 3.1.3.
The categorisation is in this case based on the
phase that is the primary target of the instrument.
Since these phases are linked, they are all affect-
ed irrespectively of which one is the primary tar-
get of the instrument. The primary target is still
essential since the other effects differ depending
on the target. It is, for example, often argued that
process innovations are hampered more if emis-
sions regulations target on inputs or processes,
than if they directly regulate the output of emis-
sions. Another example of how the target matters
is that it is quite impossible to measure and there-
fore tax the emissions from all private cars, where-
as taxing the input – fuel – is feasible. (Fig. 3).
In our study we have examined examples of
all types of instruments. The Water Act, the Air
Pollution Control Act and the Chemicals Act are
regulatory instruments. The Electricity Tax is an
economic instrument and voluntary environmen-
tal management systems are based on informa-
tion. It is important to note that economic policy
instruments and information are to some extent
also based on laws. All policy instruments also
require information, otherwise they could not
function, but the distinction is between informa-
tion on policy instruments and as policy instru-
ments (Vedung 1998, p 48f.). Finally, all policy
instruments have economic consequences, but only
the economic instruments aim at directly changing
the economic incentives of those regulated.
The terminology used in this study is based on
the praxis in political science and economics. The
term ”regulatory instrument” will be used to de-
scribe the policy instruments that governments use
to change the behaviour of different agents by acts,
rules and directives. These are often, but not al-
ways, supported by the threat of sanction (e.g.
Vedung 1998, p. 31) The term ”norm” refers to a
type of regulation, i.e. a regulatory instrument that
directly contains conditions or requirements, not
procedures. An example of a norm is the ”Coun-
cil of State Decision on restricting emissions of
sulphur compounds from kraft pulp mills” (160/
1987). Individual conditions or requirements are
also set by permits based on the regulatory instru-
ments. A technology requirement determines
which technology should be used and other per-
mit conditions set limits for the emissions of par-
ticular pollutants. The conditions and requirements
can be individual, i.e. designed for a particular
unit in a permit, or be specified in detail by acts
or norms, thus covering all or at least a group of
operators.
3.3 Interorganisational networks and
their evaluation
One important feature of policy instruments is that
they invariably involve connections between dif-
ferent actors. These links may profoundly influ-
ence the outcomes of the policy instruments and
are therefore of particular interest in an evalua-
tion. A policy network approach focuses on the
relations between authorities and other agents.
Generally speaking, resource interdependency is
a common feature of recent network definitions.
Networks are defined as ”...a cluster of complex
organisations connected to each other by resource
dependencies and distinguished from other clus-
ters or complexes by breaks in the structure of
resource dependencies.” (Daugbjerg 1998, 21).
Networks are expected to develop in relation to
policies when political actors exchange resourc-
es regularly and the patterns of dependencies are
strongly affected by the type of policy in ques-
tion and related regulation (ibid.).
In our study we will use the network approach
to address two fundamental questions: what net-
works arise as a consequence of the introduction
of a policy instrument and how can the networks
influence the implementation procedures and
thereby, possibly, the outcome of the instruments.
The analysis undertaken in this study follows a
structural approach which takes as its point of
departure the legislation and the intervention the-
ories. The general idea is that the legislation im-
poses more or less severe restrictions concerning
the role of various actors, and thereby affects net-
works. On the other hand networks are not ap-
plied on isolated actors and thus networks will play
a role in determining the results of an interven-
tion.
Fig. 3. Two dimensions defining nine kinds of policy
instruments (Mickwitz 2000c).
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From an evaluation point of view variations
in the networks are of particular interest. In other
words, to what extent the networks vary from one
policy instrument to another and from one region-
al/local environment to another, taking into ac-
count contextual differences such as industrial
structure and size of administration. This varia-
tion can illustrate the flexibility of the instruments,
but is also significant when considering predicta-
bility, transparency, equity and legitimacy.
The formal roles of the actors constitute the
basis of the study. In general, policy instruments
presuppose at least three types of roles: decision-
making, supervision and interest mediation. There
is considerable variation from one policy instru-
ment to another in the importance of the roles,
which may occur in various combinations. The
analysis focuses primarily on the networks relat-
ed specifically to the instruments, although it may
be problematic to separate such interactions from
general information networks that exist regard-
less of the instruments.
The network characteristics will be studied
within three main phases of the permitting proc-
ess (Fig. 4). The first phase, the pre-decision
phase, starts when a need for a new permit arises,
either because a new plant is planned or an old
permit will have to be revised. An operator who
already has a permit starts to prepare a new per-
mit application mainly for two reasons. First, con-
ditions external to the regulatory instrument may
have changed, e.g. demands for the product have
increased or new production processes are being
introduced. Second, the regulatory instrument
could demand a new permit application irrespec-
tive of the conditions of the operator. The pre-
decision phase ends when the permit application
is formally handed to the appropriate authorities.
The decision phase starts when the authorities
receive the permit application and it continues
until the permit decision enters into force. Nor-
mally this marks the beginning of the post-deci-
sion phase. If the permit decision is a rejection of
the application a new pre-decision phase may start.
For the operator the post-decision phase includes
implementing the permit conditions, while this
phase for the authorities includes supervision and
monitoring. As a result of the implementation of
the permit some outcomes will occur: the state of
the environment may improve, the operator may
have some additional costs, etc.. These outcomes
will together with many other external factors re-
sult in a new situation, in which the need for a
new permit may arise gradually or on a specific
date if the permit has been issued for a fixed time.
When the need for a new permit leads to con-
crete activities the post-decision phase has ended
and a new pre-decision phase has started. The
exact borderlines between the phases are theoret-
ical and used here as a classification tool for sys-
temising the empirical information. In reality the
phases may overlap and affect one another.
Part of our network analysis will be descrip-
tive, but we will also introduce situational and
dynamic approaches concerning networks as de-
manded by March (1999). We will specifically
examine in which ways the network structure af-
fects the implementation procedures, and whether
the structure can explain policy outcomes. For this
purpose the structural approach has advantages
compared to other approaches. The strength of the
structural approach is that it distinguishes between
several types of networks (i.e. professionalised
networks, issue networks, producer networks).
The type of network emerging in a given context
depends on the interests of actors, the degree of
vertical and horizontal interdependence and the
pattern of resource distribution (Rhodes 1986,
p. 22–23).
In this context we will draw on Matland (1995,
also Offerdal 1999, Sjöblom 2001), who proposed
that implementation procedures differ due to
varying combinations of conflict and ambiguity
caused by, for example, a high degree of com-
plexity within the organisation or its environment.
The idea is not that the types of implementation
Fig. 4. Three phases with different networks.
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occur in pure forms, rather the aim is to illustrate
the possible tensions between various implemen-
tation procedures and their determinants.
The structural approach does not, however,
indicate that the categories of networks should
necessarily be fixed a priori. Such network mod-
els tend to become rather rigid. A more conveni-
ent strategy is to operate with a continuum of
networks based on several analytical characteris-
tics, thereby emphasising variation (Daugbjerg
1998, 30). Characteristics frequently used in the
literature include membership, integration, re-
source distribution and stability of the organisa-
tional environment (Daugbjerg 1998, p. 31, Offer-
dal 1999).
Matland (1995, also Offerdal 1999, Sjöblom
2001), suggested that the network characteristics
affect the implementation processes so that vary-
ing combinations of conflict and ambiguity in the
decisionmaking situation produce specific imple-
mentation types. In this context the conflict level
reflects the number of divergent interests and ac-
tors involved in the decision-making. Ambiguity
is a measure of the lack of evident solutions to
the perceived problems and of industrial or ad-
ministrative complexity in the implementation
environment.
When combining the two characteristics Mat-
land (1995, p. 155 ff.) defined four types of im-
plementation, two of which are of special interest
for our study, namely administrative and politi-
cal implementation (Table 2). The types of im-
plementation cannot be expected to occur in pure
forms, but they illustrate the possible tensions
between various implementation processes and
their determinants.
In a situation with low conflict and low ambi-
guity, the implementation process is expected to
proceed as administrative routine. Regional or
local variations in implementation are largely re-
lated to varying resources of the involved actors.
Such implementation processes can be described
as administrative. Political implementation is ex-
pected to occur in situations with high conflict
levels and little ambiguity. Power relations be-
come important in understanding the outcome in
terms of implementation – changes can be pur-
sued by force, despite strong resistance from some
actors.
Coalition building is proposed to be a crucial
mechanism within symbolic implementation, pre-
sumed to emerge in situations with a high degree
of ambiguity and conflict. The final type – exper-
imental implementation – seems a priori less im-
portant in the case of regulatory instruments. High
ambiguity and little conflict would materialise in
trial and error- processes, in which local condi-
tions and perhaps pure coincidences would deter-
mine the implementation processes.
3.4 Inventions, innovations, adoption
and diffusion
The influence of environmental policy instruments
on environmental know-how and environmental
technology within companies and sectors (Carraro
and Siniscalco 1994; Porter and van der Linde
1995a; Palmer et al. 1995, Jaffe et al. 2000) is a
specific issue in our evaluation. It is related to the
characteristics and effects of the policy instru-
ments and the networks (Sections 3.1 to 3.3).
3.4.1 Concepts
The term ”invention” refers to ”a novel idea,
sketch or model for a new or improved product,
process or system” while ”innovation” means ”the
introduction of a new product, process, method
or system into the economy” (Freeman 1987).
Nowadays, however, it is often difficult to distin-
guish between the two in practice because research
and development also occur within companies
(Nelson and Winter 1982). For example, Kamien
and Schwartz (1982) included basic research, in-
Table 2. Implementation under varying combinations of ambiguity and conflict.
Ambiguity Conflict Implementation Determinant
Low Low Administrative Resources
Low High Political Power
High Low Experimental Local conditions
High High Symbolic Strength of coalitions
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vention as well as development into the concept
of innovation. Others, e.g. Freeman (1987), still
emphasise the distinctions between the two con-
cepts, for example by stating that only few inven-
tions ever become innovations.
Not all companies will introduce an innova-
tion simultaneously. The term ”diffusion” is used
to describe how innovations are adopted in dif-
ferent firms over time. Since companies are now-
adays very heterogeneous, many innovations will
have to be adapted to the firm’s specific situation
before they can be utilised. This may make it hard
to draw a sharp line between the innovation and
the diffusion processes. This is especially true in
the case of process innovations.
In some cases it is useful to distinguish between
different types of innovations3:
• Market innovations, i.e. new products, proc-
esses or technology, from which the firm ob-
tains the main benefits directly through the
market, due to increased income or reduced
costs. These can have beneficial or detrimen-
tal effects on the environment;
• Environmental innovations, i.e. innovations of
which the main objective is to improve the en-
vironmental performance of the company; and
• Policy innovations, i.e. new regulatory instru-
ments or processes.
The difference between market and environ-
mental innovations is far from clear. First, many
environmental innovations can be used to promote
the firm’s green image. Thus, they create bene-
fits that can be captured on the market. Second,
many environmental innovations are not produced
by the firm actually using them, but are supplied
by other companies. It is therefore clear that these
suppliers capture their benefits in the market.
In this study the focus will be on environmen-
tal innovations. Environmental innovations can
emerge on the technological and on the manage-
ment/organisational level. Market innovations
with beneficial environmental effects will also be
dealt with to a certain degree. Policy innovations
will be touched on because changes in the policy
instruments and the introduction of e.g. environ-
mental management systems can represent inno-
vations.
Many important innovations are technological.
Kemp (1997, p. 11) defined an environmental
technology as ”each technique, process or prod-
uct which conserves or restores environmental
qualities. Environmental qualities may be con-
served directly, through the treatment of pollu-
tion, re-use of waste material, and they may be
conserved in an indirect way by technologies and
materials that are less environmentally harmful
than comparable processes, products and sub-
stances.” As indicated above innovations are not,
however, limited to technological solutions. In
some cases organisational innovations might have
a greater impact than technological ones, but they
have been far less intensively studied.
3.4.2 Theories on the relationship
between policy instruments and
technological change
The effects of environmental policy instruments
on innovations and their diffusion are one of their
most important features, especially in the long
term (Hahn and Stavins 1992; Freeman and Soet
1997; Sikor and Nordgard 1999; Jaffe et al. 2000).
However, there is still comparably little published
research on this issue and especially empirical
studies are rare.
Based on theoretical models many economists
tend to agree that economic instruments are su-
perior with respect to promoting innovations, since
they impose a cost on the pollution irrespective
of its level. Regulatory instruments have been crit-
icized for not providing incentives for innovations
or even for hindering diffusion. Information based
instruments have hardly been considered at all.
The incentives for innovations and diffusion
that individual firms face in different settings have
been studied by for example by Milliman and Price
(1989). Their main conclusion is that on a rela-
tive basis, emission taxes and auctioned permits
provide the highest incentives for innovation,
whereas direct regulations provide the lowest in-
centives. A similar study comparing the incentives
at the industry level for heterogenous industries
3 Our distinction of different types of innovations is
inspired by Stewart (1981, p. 1279). He defined mar-
ket innovations as ”product or process innovations that
create benefits that firms can capture through the sale
of goods and services in the market”. The other type
of innovations used by Stewart is social innovations,
which ”refer to product or process innovations that
create social benefits such as clean air, that firms can-
not capture through market sales”.
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was undertaken by Jung, Krutilla and Boyd
(1996). They concluded that the most innovation-
promoting instrument is auctioned permits fol-
lowed by taxes and subsidies, whereas perform-
ance standards are the least innovation-promot-
ing instrument.
Kemp (1997, p. 57ff., 2000) criticised the mod-
els referred to above for not taking into account
the policymaking process under technological
uncertainty. When this is taken into account an
environmental tax would in most cases have re-
sulted in less incentives to innovate than direct
regulations, since the tax rate would be set at a
low level in order not to impose too high costs on
the industry. In the case of auctioned tradable per-
mits the incentives to innovate would also be re-
duced, since the total limit would be set ”too high”.
However, there is also another even more fun-
damental critique of the standard ranking of the
effects of environmental policy instruments on
innovations. This critique is based on another view
on how companies in the real world behave and
differs from the neoclassical one in which com-
panies behave optimally. The alternative view,
based on bounded rationality, is labelled an evo-
lutionary theory (Nelson and Winter 1982). Since
companies are not carrying out optimisation in this
model but rather follow other decision rules, it is
not certain that external constraints, e.g. those
imposed by environmental policy instruments,
reduce profits (Jaffe et al. 2000).
Within the context of environmental policy
Porter and Linde (1995a,b) advocated arguments
based on the evolutionary framework. In its sim-
plest form the ”the Porter-hypothesis” has been
expressed in the following way: ”properly de-
signed environmental standards can trigger in-
novations and production efficiency gains that
may lead to absolute advantages over non-regu-
lated firms” (Brännlund et al. 1996, p. 12). Accord-
ing to Porter and Linde (1995b, p. 99f.) this is due
to five mechanisms: first, regulations signal inef-
ficiencies; second, regulations foster information
gathering; third, regulations reduce uncertainty
about payoffs; fourth, regulations create pressure
to innovate; and fifth regulations reduce the free
riding effect caused by lowering future adoption
costs due to learning.
However, environmental policy instruments are
far from the only factors affecting innovations and
their diffusion. Karshenas and Stoneman (1993)
categorised the economic theories of diffusion into
four groups: epidemic models, rank models, or-
der models and stock models. By stressing the
complementary rather than the competitive nature
of these models Blackman (1999) summarised
them by stressing that diffusion is affected by
many factors and not a single one. These factors
Table 3. Determinants of the decision to adopt an environmentally beneficial technology (based on Kemp 1997, p. 96ff.).
Transfer of information Characteristics of Characteristics of
the technology the adoption environment
Information channels Purchase price Environmental standards and
enforcement of such standards
Content and frequency of information Operating costs Acceptance of environmental
policies
The number of people reached Performance Environmental awareness
The need for information characteristics and attitudes
by potential adopters (in comparison to Price and cost structure
The willingness of potential competing technologies) Availability and costs of
adopters to search for information Economic life time complementary techniques and
Credibility of information skills
The concentration of information Age of capital stock
to one source Competitive pressures,
Networks profit margins and possibility
to shift costs to others
Resistance to change
Availability of financial means,
and credit conditions
Societal pressures to reduce
environmental burden
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include: information and learning, characteristics
of potential adopters, characteristics of technolo-
gy, fixed resources and the effect of adoption on
output prices.
Kemp (1997, p. 96ff.) grouped the characteris-
tics that explain the decision to adopt or not to
adopt a particular environmental technology at a
certain point of time into three groups: factors
related to the transfer of information; the charac-
teristics of the technology; and the characteris-
tics of the environment of adoption (Table 3).
The diffusion process is affected by the com-
pany characteristics such as size, information
about the innovation and its effects on profits and
the willingness to take risks. The diffusion is fur-
ther influenced by reduced adoption costs over
time and the decrease in the benefits from adop-
tion with the number of previous adopters. The
benefits of an innovation to society as a whole
will largely depend on its diffusion rate, which is
influenced by public policy. The diffusion rate can
be slowed down through, for example, licenses
or patents or it can be enhanced through e.g. in-
formation campaigns. Although patents and li-
censes might slow down diffusion, they can be
essential for the promotion of research and de-
velopment and can thus increase the rate of inno-
vations.
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4 Materials and methods
4.1 The methodological approach
The research of the four main objectives of this
study (Section 2) was based on statistical analy-
ses, using a variety of methods, qualitative ana-
lyses of interview data and reconstruction of spe-
cific water court processes. In addition a large
number of documents, such as environmental re-
ports, general statistical data, acts, decrees, com-
mittee proposals etc. were analysed. Thus the gen-
eral approach was based on the idea of triangula-
tion: the conclusions were not based on findings
from a single viewpoint or data source but on the
combination of results using different methods and
data. The general argument for combining quan-
titative and qualitative research designs is that this
is one way of reducing or neutralising the risks
caused by inherent bias in a particular data source
or method.
The four objectives have required different com-
binations of methods. Thus the general evaluation
is a synthesis in which the findings of qualitative
and quantitative methods have been combined. The
qualitative data and analysis have strengthened the
hermeneutic aspects of the evaluation. The study
of the relationship between environmental policy
instruments and innovations has had its starting
point in statistical analyses of the reductions in
emissions and the associated improvements in the
state of the environment. The qualitative data and
analysis is then used to examine the likely role and
operation of the different policy instruments. The
study of interorganisational networks is almost
entirely based on qualitative data, part of it refer-
ring to the legal basis of the network, part to the
views of the actors as revealed by the interviews.
Finally we have approached the methodological
aspect of the study as an reflective qualitative ex-
ercise within the research group.
In practice we approached the evaluation of
environmental instruments in the pulp and paper
and chemical industries using two types of case
studies (Yin 1994) . Some questions were exam-
ined by collecting data for the entire sector, where-
as most questions were investigated by studying
not the entire industries, but selected cases, e.g.
the water permit histories of six mills were ex-
amined in detail (Section 4.4)
Because the cases studied do not represent a
sample, statistical generalizations, to for exam-
ple other industries or from the six mills studied
in detail to all other mills, should not be made on
the basis of the evidence. The cases should rather
be seen as examples of results that can occur, and
these examples can only be generalised analyti-
cally if combined to other information and theo-
ries. The result can be considered stronger if the
evidence clearly support a theory while it also
contradicts alternative theories (Yin 1994).
4.2 Background data on the sectors,
the administration and environmental
issues
The background information on the sectors, the
administration and key environmental issues were
compiled from published sources and available
statistics. Statistics Finland publishes detailed in-
formation on the output and economics of differ-
ent sectors of industry. The state budgets provide
data on the development of the administration and
general information on the state of the environ-
ment has been published by the Finnish Environ-
ment Institute (Wahlström et al. 1993, 1996; Hal-
lanaro et al. 2000; Rosenström and Palosaari
2000), in additional to detailed studies of speci-
fic issues.
4.3 Quantitative data and statistical
analyses
4.3.1 The material
The material used in this study for quantitative
analyses was collected from many different sour-
ces. It includes sectoral as well as site specific data
on water discharges, air emissions, production and
energy use. Another important source of informa-
tion are the permits. All quantitative permit lim-
its of the water permits for pulp and paper mills
operating in 1998 have been coded into a data-
base. Furthermore, all quantitative limits in air
permits since 1995 and also some earlier permits
have been studied. Data on water quality and the
responses to a survey of attitudes of the environ-
mental administration were also used.
The most detailed quantitative data available
is for water discharges and permits of pulp and
paper mills. This data contains mill level infor-
mation on waste water discharges, production and
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permit conditions. The data on discharges was
obtained from the official database of the envi-
ronmental administration and is thus the official
discharges that the mills have reported to the au-
thorities. The data on the permit conditions con-
sists of all the quantitative limits of all waste wa-
ter permits for the pulp and paper mills operating
in 1998. This data set was compiled by starting
with the present permits and going backwards
through the history of the permits. Only decisions
in which at least one limit value was set are in-
cluded and thus decisions that only deal with, for
example, compensations have been excluded.
When the introduction of limits into the per-
mits was studied the database was organised us-
ing the individual permit decisions. Since many
of the decisions contain limit values for different
time periods, the data of permit limits aggregated
for all mills contains far more discharge limit val-
ues than the number of decisions.
Another type of data is on water quality. This
data was compiled so that it would reflect the pre-
vailing view of the state of the waters during pre-
vious time periods, not the present view of what
their state has been. For each mill the data from
the nearest observation point was used and the
state was calculated for time periods of 5 years4.
One source of error in the analysis is that most
observation points are only a few kilometres from
the point of the discharges, but in some cases they
are more than 10 kilometres away.
The final source of information, here used
quantitatively, was provided by the answers to a
questionnaire sent out in 1997 to civil servants
(n= 1250) working within environmental admin-
istration in Finland. The response rate of the ques-
tionnaire was 57 per cent (for details see Mulders
1999).
4.3.2 Methods
The quantitative data has been used in numerous
ways. Descriptive statistics, such as means, vari-
ances etc. were calculated for all variables and
graphical analyses were performed. In some cas-
es statistical hypotheses were tested, for example
reductions in phosphorus discharges of mills with
a phosphorus limit compared to the reduction of
those without a limit. Correlations were calculat-
ed in order to examine whether different parame-
ters have common patterns. Finally, a wide range
of statistical modelling was undertaken, includ-
ing time-series analyses and probit and logit mod-
els (Cramer 1991) of permit contents.
In the cases in which time series analyses could
be used, three types of models were estimated:
single equation models for logarithmic transfor-
mations of BOD and phosphorus discharges; sin-
gle equation models for the first differences of
BOD and phosphorus discharges, i.e. models of
the change in discharges; and equation systems
modelling BOD and phosphorus discharges simul-
taneously.
Time series usually change over time. If they
change so that the mean and the variance also
change then the time series are said to be non-
stationary. A non-stationary time series can often
be made stationary if it is differenced once or sev-
eral times. If a time series is non-stationary but
its first difference is stationary it is said to have a
unit root and to be integrated of order one (I(1)).
A time series that must be differenced d times
before it becomes stationary is integrated of or-
der one (I(d)). The order of integration of the time
series used were tested by an Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) test (e.g. Hendry and Doornik 1999).
In addition to the mill-specific models some
sectoral models were also estimated. If the mills
are acting not only on the basis of their own per-
mit limits, but also take the development of per-
mit conditions of other mills into account in their
expectations of the limits that will affect them in
the future, this could be revealed by sectoral mod-
els. The sectoral models have basically the same
form as the mill-specific models but use aggre-
gated data.
We analysed why some mills have obtained a
permit limit for a particular substance which they
discharge, whereas others have not. The inclusion
of a particular permit limit in a permit is an ex-
ample of a binary choice; either it is included or
it is not. Models that aim at explaining these types
of variables are called binary choice models.
Modelling binary choices with ordinary linear re-
gression models is not appropriate (Hendry and
Doornik 1999). In this study we used logit and
probit models. Since there are no clear theoreti-
cal arguments for choosing between the two model
4 The huge task of compiling the water quality data,
with all the steps from determining the points to the
final calculations, was performed by Heidi Vuoristo
of the Finnish Environment Institute.
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types, both logit and probit models were estimat-
ed. Generally, when the two types of models are
fitted to the same data set they are so close that
the choice cannot even be made on empirical
grounds. (Cramer 1991, p. 17) However, this is
not very important in the context of this study since
the objective here was to identify variables that are
statistically connected to the permit decisions.
4.4 Thematic interviews and qualitative
analyses
Qualitative analyses of thematic interviews were
used as a complementary method in addition to
statistical analyses, reconstruction of cases and
analyses of official documents. Thematic inter-
views provide the opportunity to map the opin-
ions of multiple actors on crucial aspects of the
policy instruments. Apart from minor adjustments,
the structure of the interviews was the same re-
gardless of the actor in question.
Two types of thematic interviews were used.
First, we made general thematic interviews that
covered all the instruments of the study and the
key issues related to the overall evaluation. Sec-
ond, we made specific interviews on the use of
environmental management systems and environ-
mental reports. The reports on environmental
management systems and environmental manage-
ment within the chemical industry have been pub-
lished elsewhere (Luoma 1999, Kiviluoto 1999).
Here, findings of the interviews of environmen-
tal reports will also be presented as they provide
further information on environmental management
systems more generally.
4.4.1 The material
The general interviews were, apart from the na-
tional level, geographically concentrated to two
regions; the jurisdiction of the Western Finland
Regional Environment Centre and the Southeast-
ern Finland Regional Environmental Centre. This
provided some possibilities for examining regional
differences in implementation of the policy instru-
ments. The administrative levels were: national
administration (Ministry of the Environment,
Finnish Environmenth Institute, Supreme Admin-
istrative Court) regional administration (Regional
Environment Centres, Water Courts), municipal
environmental administration, headquarters of
industry groups and local factories (Table 4). The
sample of municipalities takes into account the
size and administrative structure of the munici-
palities, the industrial structure and the relative
importance of the industry in question. Conse-
quently, the sample includes municipalities with
primarily pulp and paper industry, primarily chem-
ical industry as well as municipalities including
both types of industries. The persons interviewed
were in central positions in developing and im-
plementing the instruments (national level), re-
sponsible for the environmental policy (compa-
nies) or in charge of the environmental adminis-
tration (regional and municipal level).
The interviews were structured around six
major themes: a) policy issues concerning the
possibilities of reaching the objectives of the in-
struments, b) major environmental changes dur-
ing the past two decades, c) technology and inno-
vations related to the policy instruments, d) net-
working, e) feed back and monitoring, and f) the
expected consequences of the new environmen-
tal protection act. The interviews lasted for ap-
proximately one and a half hours. The relatively
limited number of thematic interviews is a meth-
odological disadvantage, although diminished by
the fact that the interviews were regionally con-
centrated and that none of the objectives of the
study – according to the principle of triangula-
tion – rest solely on interview data.
The set of interviews aiming at describing en-
vironmental reporting as a communication tool
between enterprises and their stakeholder groups
focused on three EMAS-registered chemical in-
dustry enterprises and their stakeholder groups.
The objective of this special topic was to explore
stakeholder groups’ interests and needs concern-
Table 4. The thematic interviews of the study.
Actor National Region
Western Southeastern
Finland Finland
National administration 5
Headquarters of industry
groups 3
Regional administration 3 3
Municipalities 3 4
Factories 6 3
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ing environmental reporting. The empirical ma-
terial consisted of 20 thematic interviews, which
lasted approximately 45 minutes. The interview-
ees were representatives of stakeholder groups
with an important significance for enterprises. In
addition three environmental managers of chem-
ical industry enterprises were interviewed in or-
der to be able to compare their points of view with
those of the representatives of stakeholder groups.
The interviews consisted of three major themes:
a) experiences of using environmental reports, b)
expectations on the environmental reports, c) re-
liability and credibility issues.
4.4.2 The analysis
The categorisation/coding of statements followed
the general structure of the interviews, indicated
above. The aim was to identify a hierarchy of state-
ments so that the analysis could be carried out at
several levels from the general to the specific. For
example the theme concerning environmental
change was categorised in statements on general
development of emission, development of specific
emissions (water, air, chemical emissions), rea-
sons for developments in emissions, responsibil-
ity for environmental conditions and factors af-
fecting specific permit conditions. The total
number of statement categories used was about
70, distributed over the 6 main themes (Table 5).
By examining both the general statements and the
details it was possible to check the consistency
between statements as well as between various
actors and administrative levels, thereby deepen-
ing the picture delivered by other data sources.
The statements were coded using the QSR
Nvivo program for qualitative analyses. Compared
to older versions of such programs Nvivo has sev-
eral advantages; graphical applications, continu-
ous modifications of categories of statements and
a hierarchical ordering of statements are all pos-
sible, which also makes the program more useful
for theoretical purposes. In this report we used
specific quotations from the interviews to show
general views shared by many interviewees but
also specific claims by individual interviewees to
illustrate the diversity of views concerning dif-
ferent aspects of the policy instruments.
It is important to take into account the fact that
actors use story lines in order to control the pic-
ture of the issue at hand. This often occurs even
when they seem to be simply describing facts. (e.g.
Hajer 1995, Stone 1989) In this case all interview-
ees have an incentive to present the system in a
good light. For example, industries might want
to exaggerate the effects of voluntary measures,
such as EMAS and ISO 14001. It is also impor-
tant to note that the length of the history differs
for the policy instruments. The regulatory instru-
ments have the longest history and therefore dif-
ferent views have had time to develop. The man-
agement systems are the most recent instruments
and still in an early phase of their development.
This is likely to affect also the perception of the
instruments in an interview.
It is rather difficult to assess how much the
differences in the views expressed on the direct
effects of permits are due to different personali-
ties, tactical answers or different attitudes and
policies in environmental matters. There are cer-
tainly differences between the factories, e.g. some
have environmental management systems and oth-
ers do not. Those which have environmental man-
agement systems tend to stress their role for the
reduction of discharges far more than those which
do not have such a system. It might be that they
really have this experience, but there might also
be a positive bias, either for strategic reasons or
Table 5. Main aspects of the themes and statement categories.
Interview theme Main aspect of the detailed categories
Policy issues Main considerations and objectives behind the permit systems
Technology and innovation Technological options and the role of environmental considerations
Environmental change Effects of policy instruments and sources of information
Networking The decision-making process and the role of networks
Feedback and monitoring Deviations in emissions, use of monitoring information
Change in environmental legislation Expectations and fears concerning the new legislative system
30 Mikael Hildén et al. Monographs of the Boreal Environment Research No. 21
simply because they are so involved in the envi-
ronmental management system.
4.5 Analysis of decision-making
material
4.5.1 The material
The material produced for legal decision-making
is an important source of information. The docu-
ment, which is an output of the decision-making,
contains two parts: the permit itself, i.e. a deci-
sive part of the document and a report. In the re-
port the history of the procedure is described, start-
ing from the application. Thereafter different phas-
es of the procedure are reported chronologically.
The documents include an overview of the plan
of the environmental measures to be taken as well
as opinions and arguments of different actors con-
cerning the key conditions of a permit. The docu-
ments also contain information on the environ-
mental consequences of the activity concerned,
presented mainly by supervisory authorities and
the operator. Especially in the 1970s and the 1980s
the documents were rather long, even some hun-
dreds of pages. In the 1990s the documents be-
came much shorter, mainly due to the decreasing
amount of complex monetary compensation is-
sues. In addition, the different stages are no long-
er reported with the same level of detail.
Due to the vast amount of long documents, it
was not possible to analyse all the documents re-
lated to all permits. Therefore, 6 pulp and paper
mills were chosen for detailed examination of the
whole permitting history. Four of the mills pro-
duce both pulp and paper as well as cardboard,
one only cardboard and one only pulp. The total
number of permits which include an emission limit
value is 23, i.e. three or four for each mill. The
number of decisions of Water Courts based on the
same legal ground as the permits concerning the
mills is significantly greater. The main reason for
this is that the production capacities were limited
in the permits. If a mill wanted to increase its ca-
pacity, an amendment of the permit was required.
In practice, the production capacity has been in-
creased several times between two permit cycles
and the permit amended accordingly, without any
change in other conditions of the permit (with one
exception). Substantial changes, such as change
of an emission limit value, have been made ac-
cording to the timetable set up in a review clause.
In addition to the Water Courts, appeal bodies may
have handled a permit. This adds to the number
of decisions made, although not to the number of
permits granted.
Despite lengthy presentation of the adminis-
trative procedure, the decision itself has been poor-
ly justified. Typically the Courts have justified
their decisions only by repeating, with minor
modifications, the essential Section of the Water
Act. They have not presented which of the facts
the Courts considered to justify the exact contents
of a permit. Thus, there are a significant number
of different kinds of facts in the documents, but it
is unclear which of them have been considered to
be relevant by the decision-making body. During
recent years the Courts have improved their jus-
tifications by presenting the decisive facts behind
their decisions more clearly.
In addition to the detailed legal material we
have examined a larger sample of permit decisions
in order to study the interactions between the au-
thorities at a documentary level. This sample is
used especially in the network analysis (Section
8). It is based on a permit register (VAHTI) main-
tained by the Finnish environmental administra-
tion, containing permit decisions issued by the
Regional Environment Centres and includes per-
mits for chemical and pulp and paper industries.
For this sample all contacts, such as negotiations,
statements and decisions, between actors as re-
vealed by the documents were registered and cat-
egorised.
4.5.2 The analysis
The documents were analysed qualitatively. The
aim of the analysis was twofold: on the one hand
to identify the typical features of the actual per-
mits granted and on the other hand to gather in-
formation from the documents on the impacts of
the permits granted. Certain issues, such as tech-
nology specified by the permits, can be analysed
purely on the basis of the decision part of a per-
mit. Although the documents contain a complete
set of information of the contents of permits grant-
ed and useful information on the opinions and
proposals presented by different actors during the
process, they do not contain complete informa-
tion of all impacts of the permits. However, the
documents include e.g. information on environ-
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mental measures which the operator has taken
during the process or shall take after the permit
has been granted. In addition, the document con-
cerning the next permit cycle may contain infor-
mation concerning the impacts of preceding per-
mits (Fig. 5). However, it must be pointed out that
the documents do not always contain reliable in-
formation on the impacts of a permit. Therefore
different sources of information were used in the
analysis.
The effects of the deficiencies of information
found in the document analysis on the impacts,
can be overcome in certain cases by the interviews.
The documents do not, for example, provide in-
formation on the influence of other factors than
permitting on the behaviour of an operator. In this
respect the interviews are a much better source
of information. Three of the interviewees were
employees of the mills of which the permitting
history had been examined. All interviewees from
regional administration were employees either of
the supervisory authorities or of the Water Courts,
which issued the permits examined.
During the analysis a fact sheet of each mill
was produced. The fact sheets include informa-
tion with respect to each permit granted on pro-
duction capacity, environmental measures, emis-
sion development, conflicts between the mill and
the authorities, implementation problems and
types of conditions set up in a permit. In addi-
tion, a judgement was made concerning whether
an operator had or had not been forced to adopt
new environmental measures due to the permit
granted.
Fig. 5. Obtaining a picture of the history of an operator by linking its permits.
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PART 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
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5 The industrial sectors, the admin-
istration and the instruments
This section presents a general overview of the
focus of the evaluation. A general description of
the sectors places them in their societal context,
which also includes the public administration
responsible for the implementation of the instru-
ments regulating the activities of the sectors. Fi-
nally, the instruments are briefly described by iden-
tifying key elements of their intervention theories.
5.1 The industrial sectors
Regulatory instruments have been important tools
with respect to both pulp and paper production
and the chemical industry. In addition, a range of
other environmental policy instruments and ex-
ternal signals have significantly influenced these
industrial sectors during the 1970s, 80s and 90s.
In the 1970s and 1980s, environmental policy
making was almost exclusively based on regula-
tory instruments. Economic instruments were in-
troduced in the early 1990s and the environmen-
tal management systems were introduced in the
latter half of the 1990s.
Both of the studied industrial sectors are im-
portant for the Finnish economy. Pulp and paper
production and the chemical industry accounted
for approximately 15 and 10 percent, respective-
ly, of the total value added of Finnish industry in
1998 (Statistics Finland 1999). The two sectors
differ somewhat with respect to the size distribu-
tion of the companies and establishments. These
differences are important, as the size of the es-
tablishment and company affects means and pos-
sibilities to respond to international trends and
environmental policy.
Forest industries have for a long time been a
key industrial sector in Finland and the Finnish pulp
and paper industry is among the most important
developers of the industry worldwide. The sector
is characterised by large companies and establish-
ments. In 1999 there were a total of 226 establish-
ments in the field of pulp and paper production,
of which 35 per cent had a turnover of 10 million
FIM (€ 1.68 million) or greater (Statistics Finland
2000a). In recent years the pulp and paper indus-
try has undergone substantial structural change with
respect to ownership and it is currently dominated
by a few multinational companies.
The Finnish production of pulp has increased
from under 4 million tons in 1960 to almost 12
million tons in 2000. The production of paper and
paperboard has grown even more, from about 2
million tons in 1960 to 13.5 million tons in 2000.
Also the composition of the production has
changed, i.e. the value-added level has been ris-
ing. In recent years about 60 per cent of the pro-
duction has been printing and writing paper. The
recovery rate of paper was about 65 per cent in
1999, but since only 10 per cent of the produc-
tion is used domestically, recycled paper covers
only some 5 percent of the fibre demand. (Finn-
ish Forest Industries Federation 2001)
A large share of the production by the Finnish
forest industry is exported, during the last years,
about 90 per cent. The only country exporting
more paper and paperboard products than Finland
is Canada. The largest part of the export goes to
Europe. Almost 70 per cent of the value of the
export in 2000 was from export to the European
Union, with Germany (20 %), the UK (15 %), and
France (7 %) being the most important individual
countries. The composition of the Finnish export
has gradually changed during the last decades; the
share of pulp and other lower value added prod-
ucts has decreased, while the share of printing and
writing paper has increased. In 2000 some 45 per
cent of the export was printing and writing paper,
which makes Finland the world’s largest export-
er of these products. (Finnish Forest Industries
Federation 2001)
The chemical industry is important worldwide,
but Finnish companies have only in a few cases
been world leaders in the development work.
Within the sectors there are large as well as small
and medium- sized companies. In 1999 the number
of establishments was 375, of which 27 per
cent had a turnover greater than 10 million
FIM (€ 1.68 million) (Statistics Finland 2000a).
The production of the chemical sector is very
heterogeneous, including besides basic chemicals
also petroleum products, plastic and rubber prod-
ucts, paints and inks, and pharmaceuticals. The
total value of the production in 2000 was € 11.7
billion of which the largest amounts were from:
petroleum products (35 %), basic chemicals (29
%) and plastic products (19 %). (Chemical Indus-
try Federation of Finland 2002)
The Finnish chemical industry is besides a pro-
ducer for the domestic market also an important
export sector, in 2000 about 40 per cent of the
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production was exported. The value of the export
was, some € 5.2 billion. More than half of the
export is to the EU area, the largest individual
countries being, Sweden (€ 1.1 billion), USA (€
0.5 billion), Russia (€ 0.4 billion) and Germany
(€ 0.4 billion). The larges shares of the export
are basic chemicals and oil product accounting for
about one third each. (Chemical Industry Federa-
tion of Finland 2002)
Our sample covers an essential part of the pulp
and paper sector, whereas coverage of the chem-
ical industry sector is very heterogeneous. The
sample includes examples of mainly small and
medium-size companies. Therefore our findings
are more illustrative than conclusive with respect
to the chemical industry, but the small- and me-
dium-sized companies raise certain specific issues
in the study.
5.2 The administration
In Finland duties in what now is considered to be
the field of environmental administration were for
a long time fragmented and divided between sev-
eral authorities. The first initiatives towards a more
comprehensive environmental administration were
taken in water management, which was initially
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Forestry. The Water Courts had Court
Status and belonged to the jurisdiction of the Min-
istry of Justice.
The first central environmental agency was
founded in 1970 as the National Board of Waters
under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
(Fig. 6). On a regional level, Finland was divided
into Water Districts. The Provincial Administra-
tive Boards were assigned tasks in environmen-
tal protection in 1973 (Decree 132/1973). The
Provincial Administrative Boards were part of the
regional administration of the Ministry of the In-
terior.
When the Ministry of the Environment was
founded in 1983, water protection was placed
under the jurisdiction of this Ministry, whereas
other water policy still fell under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. In
1986, the Water Administration was reorganized
into a Water and Environment Administration,
under the primary jurisdiction of the Ministry of
the Environment. The National Board of Waters
became the National Board of Waters and the
Environment, which supervised and coordinated
the activities in the regional Water and Environ-
ment Districts.
After the founding of the Ministry of the En-
vironment the environmental tasks of the Provin-
cial Administrative Boards were supervised and
coordinated by this ministry (Act on Provincial
Administrative Boards 1233/1987). The Provin-
cial Administrative Boards were given several
functions: guidance and supervision of munici-
pal environmental protection, nature conservation,
development and regulation of recreational use,
landscape protection, particularly as part of land
use planning, land use planning and housing, pro-
tection of historical sites, air pollution control,
noise pollution control, environmental health and
waste management.
The Finnish Cabinet decision of June 17th 1993
led to an administrative reform, which aimed at
concentrating the regional environmental admin-
istrations into one unit per region; the Regional
Environment Centres (there are thirteen such cen-
tres). These Regional Environment Centres are
supervised directly by the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment, but the Ministry is not allowed to inter-
vene in individual permit decisions made by the
Centres. In the reorganisation, the National Board
of Waters and the Environment lost most of its
administrative tasks and became a research and
development centre in environmental matters, the
Finnish Environment Institute.(Government Bill
1994/241)
The Environmental Protection Act, which came
into force March 1st 2000, has led to a further re-
organization of the environmental administration
in Finland. The Water Courts from 1962 were
abolished and instead three Environmental Per-
mit Authorities were founded. (Government Bill
1999/84). The Environmental Permit Councils are
a regional permit administration in accordance
with the Water Act and the Environmental Pro-
tection Act.
The development described above has also
been reflected in the development of the state ex-
penditure on environmental administration. In
1963 the environmental administrative costs were
distributed mainly within the budget of the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Minis-
try of Justice, which had allocated e.g. FIM 4
million (deflated to 1999 prices, i.e about € 0.7
million) for the Water Courts. In the 1970s the
budget of the Water Administration was around
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FIM 150 million (1999 value, i.e. € 25 million)
and in the late 1990s the budget of the Ministry
of the Environment and the state environmental
administration had increased to more than
FIM 500 Million (1999 value, i.e. € 84 million).
In addition to the administrative costs the state
has provided grants and subsidies for environmen-
tal measures. The interest subsidy for water pro-
tection investments in industry peaked in the mid
1970s and in the mid 1980s at FIM 7 million (1999
value, € 1.2 million), but has since declined. In-
terest support for air pollution control in indus-
tries was initiated in 1980 and reached approxi-
mately FIM 15 million (1999 value, i.e. € 2.5 mil-
lion) by 1993. By 1999 the interest support for
all environmental investments had declined to
FIM 14 million (€ 2.4 million). In 1999 the envi-
ronmental subsidies amounted to FIM 31 million
(€ 5.2 million), but this sum also included sup-
port for the clean-up of polluted soils. Subsidies
have also been granted for the development of
waste management. A general condition has been
that the subsidy should represent no more than
50 per cent of the total cost and no more than 30
per cent of investments (State Budget for 1999).
Until 1986, many municipalities did not have
any personnel with specific environmental com-
petence. In October 1986, an Act on Municipal
Environmental Administration (64/1986) came
into force. This Act made environmental commit-
tees mandatory in municipalities with more than
3 000 inhabitants. Municipalities were further
obliged to supervise and promote environmental
control to secure a healthy, pleasant and stimu-
lating living environment for their inhabitants
(Kettunen, 1996, p. 24). In 1997, this act was
amended, giving municipalities more freedom to
organize their environmental administration in
collaboration with other municipalities, or in cor-
poration with other sectors within the municipal-
ity (Government Bill 1996/212).
5.3 The instruments and their use
5.3.1 The Water Act
5.3.1.1 The basic structure of the Act and
the decision-making
Between 1962 and 2000 the Water Act was the
most important piece of legislation with respect
to water pollution. The Act also covers other as-
pects of water management and development, but
Fig. 6. The temporal development of Finnish environmental regulatory instruments.
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these aspects will not be dealt with in this study.
The Water Act (19.5.1961/264) replaced the ear-
lier Water Rights Act (Vesioikeuslaki, 1902) when
it came into force April 1st 1962. The central de-
cision-making body was the Water Court. Finland
was divided into three regions, with one Water
Court in each. The Courts had legal, technical and,
since 1987, ecological expertise. With respect to
water pollution, the main function of the Court
was to issue wastewater permits. In addition the
Water Court was empowered to take decisions in
a great variety of issues related to the use of water.
The basis of the intervention theory of the
Water Act has been three bans: on closing off, on
altering and on polluting a body of water. The two
first bans are still part of the Water Act and the
third ban, which is crucial for pollution control,
was transferred to the Environmental Protection
Act (86/2000) in March 2000.
The ban on polluting a body of water was not
intended to be absolute, but conditional on the
decision made by the Water Court. Thus the in-
tervention theory emphasises flexibility. The ban
merely defined the kind of activities for which a
permit was needed. All activities that emitted or
discharged solid, liquid or gaseous substances or
energy into a water body, thus immediately or
ultimately causing pollution, were covered by the
ban. Detrimental impact on nature, apparent dam-
age to fish stock, danger to health, significant de-
terioration of the amenities of the environment,
of cultural values or the environment’s suitabili-
ty for water supply or recreational purposes were
also cited as examples of violations of public in-
terests, which were to be taken into account ac-
cording to Section 19 of Chapter 1 (as amended
in 1987).
The Water Courts were decision-making, not
supervisory, bodies. Between 1970 and 1995 Fin-
land had a centralised supervisory system in the
field of water pollution, which was led by the
National Board of Waters and the Environment
(until 1986 the National Board of Waters). Since
1995 the Regional Environment Centres have been
responsible for supervision. Although the Centres
are regional state organisations under the Minis-
try of the Environment, their position is rather
independent. Municipal environmental authorities
are autonomous with respect to the state environ-
mental authorities. According to the Water Act
they decided on smaller matters and had certain
supervisory duties. With respect to pollution from
major industrial installations, they did not have a
decision-making role, although they had an addi-
tional role in supervision. In practice, the Water
Court gave municipalities an opportunity to par-
ticipate in decision-making by requesting com-
ments on the cases.
From a legal point of view only the operator
was recognised in the pre-decision phase. The
starting point of the law was that a permit matter
should be brought to the Court by an application
of the operator of the polluting activity. The De-
cree on Precautionary Measures for the Protec-
tion of Waters (283/1962) assisted operators by
listing activities for which a notification was re-
quired to the supervising authority in order to
judge the necessity of a permit application. Oth-
erwise the operator was free to decide with whom
it wanted to co-operate. According to the revision
in 1970 of the Decree (283/1962), the supervis-
ing authority was empowered to demand supple-
mentary information and to require the operator
to make a permit application to the Water Court.
During the decision phase those likely to be
affected by the polluting activity were informed
about the process and they had a right to express
their views. In addition, the authorities protect-
ing a public interest likely to be affected were in-
formed and they had an opportunity to give state-
ments. The regional centres (or their administra-
tive predecessors), were always involved as su-
pervisory authorities and certain other authorities
such as the regional fisheries authorities were in
practice also always involved.
In order to get a more detailed assessment of
the consequences of the activity concerned, the
Water Court was empowered to set up a special
Inspection Procedure. Minor issues were handled
without the inspection procedure. The ad hoc In-
spection Board consisted of an expert (typically
an employee of the environmental administration)
and two laymen. In addition other experts were
frequently involved in carrying out the analysis
of specific issues such as damage to fish resources
or property. The Inspection Board scrutinised the
matter in detail, organised hearings and produced
an Inspection Document containing a draft per-
mit.
During the post-decision phase the Water Court
had no active role. The environmental authorities
were responsible for supervision and partly for
monitoring. While the duties of the operator were
expressed in the permit, generally these included
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action to ensure that limit values were not exceed-
ed, and often monitoring and some research and
development requirements.
The decision-making according to the Water
Act was based on individual discretion. There have
been no general standards, such as general emis-
sion limit values or binding environmental quali-
ty objectives. Neither were there any lists of in-
stallations or hazardous substances automatical-
ly requiring a permit until the mid 1990s. Tradi-
tionally only those installations and activities,
causing certain environmental consequences, de-
fined in the ban to pollute water as explained ear-
lier, needed a permit. Due to European Commu-
nity law an obligation to apply for a permit irre-
spective of its impacts was inserted into the law.
For example, discharges of all substances men-
tioned in ’the Black List’ (List I) or ’the Grey List’
(List II) of the framework directive on water pol-
lution (76/464) always requires a permit and sev-
eral substances mentioned in ’the Black List’ are
totally banned. Furthermore the discharge of mu-
nicipal or industrial waste water (Directive 91/
271) and discharges from activities regulated by
the titanium dioxide directives require a prior per-
mit irrespective of their impacts. This requirement
of EC-law was implemented in the Decrees 363/
1994 and 365/1994.
Despite the lack of legally binding general
standards, non-legally binding objectives for dif-
ferent sectors, including the pulp and paper in-
dustry, have been set in the National Water Pro-
tection Programmes. Before these a special pro-
gramme for the pulp and paper industry was is-
sued (Sitra 1970). The time period of each of the
three National Water Protection Programmes de-
cided upon so far has been approximately 10 years.
The latest programme specifies objectives for the
year 2005 (Table 6). The Programmes have by
their nature been general and they have not con-
tained recommendations for individual decision-
making.
The Water Courts considered permit applica-
tions stepwise. The first step was to examine
whether there was an absolute obstacle to grant-
ing a permit. Threats to public health, far-reach-
ing changes in natural conditions, significant de-
terioration in the conditions of local inhabitants
or local economic life constituted an absolute ob-
stacle according to the Water Act as enacted in
1962. Pursuant to the amendments of 1987 and
1994, two other absolute obstacles were intro-
duced. Finland’s international agreements (the
Helsinki Convention is the most relevant agree-
ment in this context) in the field of the protection
of waters of the sea could become an absolute
obstacle. Pollution of the sea outside the territo-
rial borders of Finland also constituted an abso-
lute obstacle.
The second step was weighing of public and
private interests. A permit was to be granted if
the adverse effects of discharges were relatively
minor compared with the total benefits gained.
Different kinds of public and private interests (as
described in Section 19 of Chapter 1, see above)
were taken into consideration. A precondition for
granting a permit to pollute was that the elimina-
tion of wastewater or some other substance pol-
luting the water body was not possible at reason-
able cost. Thus the applicant had to take all pol-
lution prevention measures not causing excessive
or unreasonable costs. This principle has a sub-
stantial connection to the Best Available Tech-
niques (BAT) principle, which was introduced into
the Act in 1994. The BAT principle was adopted
as a consequence of international and EC law.
According to the Government Bill concerning the
amendment, the BAT level is required as a mini-
mum standard. The impacts taking into consider-
ation the sensitivity of the recipient body of wa-
ter may require even higher level of environmen-
tal protection technology than the BAT level. (For
a more thorough description on the Water Act,
see Vihervuori (1998b, p. 72–103.)
5.3.1.2 Evolution of the permits
The first permits issued under the Water Act were
in the form of qualitative statements, which were
not exact. Since 1971, quantitative maximum lim-
its for discharges have become common for pulp
and paper production (Fig. 7), although limits rel-
ative to the production have also been used. Lim-
its on discharges of suspended solids were the first
maximum limits included in the permit conditions.
These limits were soon followed by limits on the
total biological oxygen demand, nowadays mea-
sured over seven days (BOD7), earlier often mea-
sured over five days. Since the beginning of the
1990s most new permits have included limits on
phosphorus discharges, while many permits issued
in the end of the 1990s no longer contain any quan-
titative limits on the total discharges of suspend-
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Table 6. Programmes containing goals for water protection. The three National Water Protection Programmes are in
bold. (SITRA 1970, The National Board of Waters 1974, Ministry of the Environment 1989a, b; 1998). BOD = Biological
Oxygen Demands, SS = suspended solids.
Programme Goals for pulp and paper, except the quantitative goals for 2005, which are for all industries
Qualitative Quantitative
BOD Phosphorus Nitrogen Others
Pollution of the BOD5 – – SS
Environment and Sulphite 5–20kg/t
its Prevention 70–200kg/t (1970s)
(Sitra 1970) (1970s) 5–15kg/t
50–70kg/t (1980s)
(1980s) 5–10kg/t
50–20kg/t (1990s)
(1990s)
Sulphate
35 kg/t (1970s)
25 kg/t (1980s)
15–20kg/t (1990s)
Principles of ”New industrial sites should aim BOD7 1.5 t/day 15 t/day SS 200 t/day
Water to stop emissions to the environment. 650 t/day 1980 1985 1985 1980
Pollution The development of processes (–50 % of 1972) (–25 % of (same as Lignines
Control up producing less waste and utilising 400 t/day 1985 1972) 1972) 500 t/day
to 1985 raw material efficiently and other (–69 % of 1972) 1985
(7.8.1974) internal measures should be central...”
The necessity of the products should be
determined considering their
environmental impacts both when used
and after use. In addition new waste
water treatment will be necessary.
Water Action will first be taken with respect BOD7 1.5 t/day – Sulphate
protection to the emission which is most critical 160 t/day (–25 % of CODcr 65 kg/t
programme for the particular receiving water 1986)
to 1995 course. Special emphasis should be on Specific
(6.10.1988) toxic substances and the functioning load in
of technology. sulphate prod
60 g/t
Decision on In accordance with the water protection Chlorine
the programme to 1995, 1.4 kg per
Reduction the Ministry of the Environment made ton of
of a decision on the reduction of bleached pulp
Chlorinated discharges of chlorinated organic
Organic compounds from the pulp and paper
Compounds industry
(22.7.1989)
Water BAT. Minimum water use. No sector specific quantitative goals, but it is obvious that for
Protection Optimisation of utilisation of chemicals, COD and nutrients (P,N) the major reductions are expected
Targets especially those containing nutrients. to come from the pulp and paper sector.
to 2005 Intensified removal of nitrogen is only Quantitative for industry as a whole:
(19.3.1998) required if nitrogen is the minimum
factor. The targets are based on –50 % –50 % CODcr
production estimates from 1996, compared to 1995 level –45%
differences in actual production compared to
should be reflected in the targets. 1995 level
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ed solids. Some permit conditions that will come
into force during the next few years also include
limits on nitrogen. In addition to the substances
in Fig. 7, permits have also begun to include lim-
its for chemical oxygen demand (COD). For pulp
mills they currently include limits on chlorine dis-
charges in the form of AOX, which is a measure
of the amount of organic chlorine compounds.
There are 192 decisions concerning the per-
mit limits of the pulp and paper mills that were
operating in 1998. Four decisions cover several
mills, but have separate sections determining the
limit values for the discharges of each mill. These
will be considered as separate decisions even
though they are technically parts of the same de-
cision. When this is taken into account the data
consist of 213 decisions. Of these 166 were made
by the Water Courts, 47 by appeal courts, which
were either the Water Court of Appeal or the Su-
preme Administrative Court. In four decisions by
the Supreme Administrative Court new limit val-
ues were introduced, once for BOD, once for COD
and twice for suspended solids. In all other cases
the decisions contained limit values on the same
parameters as before the appeal. The Water Court
of Appeal has once changed a target value for
COD to a limit value and once done the same for
nitrogen. Four times phosphorus target values
were changed into limit values. (Mickwitz 2000a)
The history of the key permit limits can be di-
vided into three periods: a period when no permit
decisions contained a limit on the discharges of a
specific type; a period when both decisions with
limit values and without were common; and a
period when all permits issued contained a limit
value (Table 7) (Mickwitz 2000a). Since only the
Fig. 7. Limits on total discharg-
es included in permits of the
Finnish pulp and paper plants
operating in 1998. Some plants
had limits on discharges per
production some years before
limits on the total discharges
were included in their permits.
Table 7. Three phases describing the inclusion of permit limits for discharges of pulp and paper mills (Mickwitz 2000a).
Discharge No limits2 in the decisions Both decisions with All decisions have limits2
limits and without
Suspended solids 1999– 1971–74 & 1991–98 1975–1990
BOD –1970 1971–1974 1975–
COD –1989 1990–1993 1994–
Phosphorus –1986 1987–1997 1998–
Nitrogen –1997 1998–
AOX1 –1989 1990–1992 1993–
1 AOX limits are only included in permits for mills producing pulp and thus the phases in the table are only for mills
producing bleached pulp.
2 Although these implementation phases have been called ”No limits” and ”All have limits” they are here deter-
mined so that clear exemptions are overlooked, e.g. earlier phosphorus and nitrogen limits for a plant that have
discharges into a river running into what at the time of the decisions was the Soviet Union.
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permits for some of the mills are decided each
year it often takes many years after the policy has
changed before all mills have a particular limit in
their permit. Thus the last mills got their first AOX
limits in 1996 (entered into force in 1997), al-
though no decisions without AOX limits were
made after 1992.
There has been variation in the time period for
which the limit on the discharges is set. Most
emission limit values (55 per cent) have been spec-
ified as monthly discharges, whereas 43 per cent
have been for quarterly discharges. In eight cases
the time period was six months and in two deci-
sions one year. The yearly discharge limits give
the greatest flexibility to the firm.
5.3.2 The Air Pollution Control Act
5.3.2.1 The basic structure of the act
The Air Pollution Control Act (67/1982) came into
force October 1st 1982. Before 1982, certain as-
pects of air pollution were regulated by the Pub-
lic Health Act from 1965 (reformed in 1995 (763/
1994)) and by the Neighbourhood Relations Act
(26/1920). The Environmental Permit Procedure
Act (736/1991) combined the decision made un-
der the Air Pollution Control Act with permits
made under the Public Health Act, the Neighbour-
hood Relations Act and the Waste Management
Act from September 1st 1992 onwards. The Waste
Management Act was replaced by the Waste Act
(1072/1993) in 1994. However, only the proce-
dures under the different Acts were combined, the
substantial legal basis for the decisions remained
in the different Acts. Thus, only one application
was needed and one decision was made, but that
decision included several permits.
Under the Air Pollution Control Act norms and
guidelines were issued and in this its intervention
theory differed clearly from that of the Water Act
(see above). To avoid any confusion with ”regu-
latory instruments” the word ”general norm” will
be used, although especially in this context the
word ”regulation” would otherwise be preferable.
Both the general norms and guidelines directed
the decision-making, although only the norms
were binding. The general norms and guidelines
may have referred to e.g. quality of air or deposi-
tion; emissions to the air; composition of a sub-
stance, a preparation or a product produced, im-
ported, exported, delivered or used; and labelling
of substances, preparations or products when nec-
essary for identification. The most important gen-
eral norms and guidelines with respect to the pulp
and paper industry were the following: guidelines
on air quality standards and target values of sul-
phur deposition (480/1996), norm on limit values
and threshold values for air quality (481/1996),
guidelines on the reduction of particle emissions
from power plants and boilers (157/1987), guide-
lines and norm on the reduction of concentrations
of sulphur compounds in emissions from sulphate
pulp mills (160/1987).
There were two different types of permitting
authorities under the Air Pollution Control Act.
Decisions concerning large installations, such as
pulp mills, were originally made by the Provin-
cial Administrative Boards, and after March 1st
1995 by the Regional Environment Centres. De-
cisions concerning small installations were made
by Municipal Environmental Committees. Con-
trary to the decision-making system of the Water
Act, there were no separate bodies for decision-
making and supervision. Thus the Provincial Ad-
ministrative Boards, and later the Regional Cen-
tres, were also supervisory bodies for large instal-
lations. For small installations municipal environ-
mental authorities carried the responsibility. There
were no provisions in the law concerning co-op-
eration during the pre-decisional phase. During
the decision phase the provision of general ad-
ministrative law applied, which left the decision
on which other authorities should be heard to the
decision-making body. Those whose rights were
affected should always be heard or be given the
possibility to be heard. During the post-decision-
al phase only the two authorities with supervi-
sion duties were involved.
The intervention theory of the Air Pollution
Control evolved. Originally the Act on Air Pollu-
tion Control was based on a notification system.
However, the notification system was gradually
developed into a permit mechanism between 1992
and 1995. The procedure of handling a notifica-
tion based on the Act was combined by the Envi-
ronmental Permit Procedure Act, which came into
force September 1st 1992, to certain other permits
under the Public Health Act, Neighbourhood Re-
lations Act and the Waste Management Act, from
1994 the Waste Act. The most important permit
excluded from the common procedure was that
of water pollution. The Environmental Permit
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Procedure Act meant that the requirements of dif-
ferent Acts were set in one and the same decision
(called an Environmental Permit), although the
substantial provisions still were separated in dif-
ferent pieces of legislation. This led to a situation
in which the decision taken under the Air Pollu-
tion Control Act was, functionally, more close to
a permit than notification, although the exact ex-
pression used in the Act was not changed to a per-
mit until 1995.
After the enactment of the Environmental Per-
mit Procedure Act a legally binding decision was
needed before the activity could be started. How-
ever, there still remained another difference be-
tween a permit and notification: a permit could
be rejected, whereas a notification could not lead
to a total rejection of the activity concerned. Be-
tween 1992 and 1995 the legal situation in this
respect was not clear, but after the 1995 reform it
has been clear that the Air Emission Permit could
be rejected. However, in practice the crucial is-
sue is not whether an activity shall be allowed or
not, but on what conditions it shall be allowed.
The development of the intervention theory from
a notification system to a permit mechanism did
not mean that all mills were regulated with a per-
mit under the period studied. In fact, those mills
which had made a notification before the 1995
reform were obliged to file a permit application
either by the end of 2000 or by the end of 2002.
Most of the mills included in this study belong to
the latter group. Thus, many mills were not, in
practice, regulated by a permit at any moment
during the existence of the Air Pollution Control
Act but by a weaker instrument, i.e. a decision,
made on the basis of a notification.
In contrast to the water legislation the instal-
lations under the Act were listed in the Air Pollu-
tion Control Decree. The list included e.g. chem-
ical pulp mills, plants producing inorganic indus-
trial chemicals and plants using volatile solvents
at a level of more than 50 tons per year, but not
paper mills as such. As the Act did not include
any other mechanisms for the control of air pol-
lution than the notification/permit system, it was
toothless with respect to those activities not in-
cluded in the list (Kuusiniemi 1995, p. 121).
Pursuant to the 1995 reform Air Emission Per-
mits were to be issued if the following precondi-
tions were met: (1) the activity fulfils the require-
ments specified by the Act or secondary legisla-
tion; (2) the activity causes no risk or injury to
health, or otherwise significant pollution of air;
and (3) the reduction of emissions corresponds to
the level of best available techniques. The permit
authority was able to impose specific air pollution
control conditions in a permit. These conditions
could be emission limits, other air pollution pre-
vention measures as well as monitoring and con-
trol. In practice it is not possible to separate the
preconditions to grant a permit and the conditions
set up in a permit, because an operator could
achieve a specific emission level either by meet-
ing the preconditions or by introducing measures
according to the permit conditions.
In addition to the preconditions, the conditions
specified in a permit had to be based on (1) gen-
eral guidelines, (2) general norms and (3) the con-
siderations mentioned in Section 7, paragraph 2.
The general guidelines were not binding, but have
in practice been important. In contrast to general
guidelines, general norms were binding. A start-
ing point was that the conditions in a permit had
to fulfill the general norm, but more stringent con-
ditions could be imposed in order to meet the sec-
ond precondition described above. Section 7, par-
agraph 2 includes a requirement to take into ac-
count the following considerations: the character-
istics of the area where the effects of the activity
will become evident, the effects of the activity on
the environment, the significance of measures for
the prevention of air pollution from the point of
view of air pollution control and the technical and
economic conditions for carrying out the mea-
sures.
Before the 1995 reform the types of conditions
to be set up in a permit were basically the same
as after the reform. However, the justifications
were amended. Before the amendment air pollu-
tion control conditions in a permit had to be based
on general guidelines or general regulations. In
addition, it was possible to impose a condition in
order to avoid evident pollution of air but there
was no reference to e.g. best available technique.
5.3.2.2 Evolution of the permits
The Air Pollution Control Act was based on a list
of installations which required a permit. Pulp but
not paper mills were such installations. A paper
mill could, however, include a listed installation.
For example, a paper mill with a power station or
a boiler plant of a certain minimum size was
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obliged to acquire a permit. A single mill could
require several permits if separate permits applied
to different parts of a mill. In total there are more
than 70 decisions for 43 mills.
Our data consists of 38 permits granted to the
pulp and paper industry during the period
14.1.1991–29.9.2000. The data includes all per-
mits granted after 1994 and approximately 50 per
cent of the permits granted since the Air Pollu-
tion Control Act came into force in 1982. The data
has been collected from the VAHTI database and
the archives of the Finnish Environment Institute.
In addition, information on the number and dates
of all regulatory decisions made under the Act has
been used.
The implementation of the Act proceeded slow-
ly. Before 1987 only one mill had obtained a de-
cision under the Act. By 1992 the number of mills
with at least one decision was 18 and by 1997 the
number was 29. By the end of September 2000,
34 out of 43 mills had obtained at least one deci-
sion.
Emission standards were the most common
type of substantial conditions included in the de-
cisions forming our data. More than every second
decision included an NOx limit value and limit
values concerning particles, one third of all deci-
sions included a SOx limit value, and approximate-
ly one fifth a limit value on odorous sulphur com-
pounds. Approximately one fourth of the decisions
included technological requirements, but some of
these were limited to a specification of the height
of the chimney. The most common technological
requirement concerned the type of filter for emis-
sion control. Several air permits also include in-
put limits. These usually determined some char-
acteristic of the fuel that could be used, e.g. an
upper limit on the sulphur content of heavy fuel
oil. Approximately one fifth of the decisions in-
cluded at least one R&D obligation. Some per-
mits included numerical reduction targets, whereas
others only mentioned qualitative objectives.
5.3.3 The Environmental Protection Act
The integrated pollution control under the Envi-
ronmental Protection Act (4.2.2000/86) replaced
the sectoral system based on different Acts and
several permits as of March 1st 2000 (Vihervuori
2000). The Air Pollution Control Act and the water
pollution provisions of the Water Act were re-
pealed, although other parts of the Water Act are
still in force as amended. The Finnish pollution
control system has gradually been developed to-
wards an integrated control system during the past
decade, but the demands of the EU’s Integrated
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) direc-
tive (96/61) finally led to the adoption of the sys-
tem in Finland with corresponding changes in the
intervention theory of the pollution control. The
new intervention theory aims at integration and
clarification of legislation on environmental
health, waste, noise, water, air and soil pollution
control, but has not aimed at significant changes
in the stringency of existing laws. However, due
to the changes of the framework for decision-mak-
ing, not all existing permits necessarily meet the
substantial demands of the Environmental Protec-
tion Act.
The three Water Courts were metamorphosed
into three new independent Environmental Per-
mit Authorities under the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment. The permits for major installations are
now granted by the permit authorities, e.g. for all
pulp and paper mills. The Regional Environment
Centres grant other permits except those concern-
ing small installations, which are granted by the
Municipal Environmental Boards. The division of
labour between the Regional Environment Cen-
tres and the Environmental Permit Authorities is
partly based on historical precedents and is not a
strict division based on size or environmental sig-
nificance of the installations. Thus some parts of
the chemical industry, notably the production of
industrial chemicals, are left to the Regional En-
vironmental Centres. Similar to the Water Courts,
the Environmental Permit Authorities are deci-
sion-making bodies without a supervisory func-
tion. The Regional Environment Centres and the
Municipal Boards are both decision makers and
supervisory bodies.
5.3.4 The Chemicals Act and its
authorities
The Chemicals Act (744/1989) superseded the
Poisons Act (309/1969). Major amendments were
made in 1992 in response to the demands of EC-
Law (Government Bill 1992/106). The purpose
of the Act is to prevent and avoid adverse health
and environmental effects and also to prevent fire
and explosion damages and consequences to prop-
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erty (Chemicals Act 744/1989, Section 1). In this
study we have focussed on large-scale industrial
handling and storage of dangerous chemicals, but
it is obvious that there are close links between
general safety regulations, the risk assessment of
individual chemicals and the permits for the pro-
duction and use of chemicals.
The Chemicals Act involves three Ministries
and numerous other authorities (744/1989). The
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has respon-
sibility for the general co-ordination of the legis-
lation on chemicals, supreme management and
guidance of preventing and averting harm to health
and fire and explosion hazards caused by chemi-
cals, and supervises regulations concerning the
classification, warning labels and packaging of
chemicals and the safety data sheet. The Ministry
of Social Affairs and Health also submits a pro-
posal for the Advisory Committee on Chemicals,
which is a co-operation body appointed by the
Council of State and which covers all the key ac-
tors in issues related to chemicals. The Ministry
of the Environment has responsibility for the su-
preme management and guidance of preventing
and averting harm to the environment caused by
chemicals. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has
responsibility for the supreme management and
guidance of industrial handling and storage of
dangerous chemicals and regulations concerning
industrial handling and storage of chemicals.
The National Product Control Agency for
Welfare and Health under the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health has responsibility for the su-
preme control of chemicals dangerous to health
and of chemicals posing fire and explosion haz-
ards, whereas the Finnish Environment Institute
under the Ministry of the Environment has respon-
sibility for the supreme control of chemicals dan-
gerous to the environment.
The Safety Technology Authority (TUKES)
has responsibility for granting licences for and
supervision of large-scale industrial handling and
storage of dangerous chemicals and for mainte-
nance of the licence register. Since November
1995 TUKES has been the key actor in implement-
ing the regulations on the industrial use and stor-
age of the Chemicals Act. Industrial plants that
manufacture, utilize and store dangerous goods
are subject to supervision by TUKES. After ex-
amining and approving the necessary reports,
TUKES grants statutory licences and authorisa-
tions. TUKES also checks that the responsible
persons have the required qualification and that
the supervisory staff pays regular visits to the
plants, and also monitors the importers, installa-
tion companies and inspection bodies. In its in-
spection work TUKES is also in close contact with
the Regional Environment Centres, the Provincial
Administrative Boards and the municipal super-
visory authority for chemicals. In addition, Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Inspectorates super-
vise the classification and labelling of chemicals
used at workplaces.
The municipal authority has responsibility for
supervision of the retail trade of chemicals, su-
pervision of small-scale industrial handling and
storage of chemicals dangerous to health and the
environment, supervision of the classification,
packaging and labelling of chemicals to be placed
on the market and for controlling that the safety
data sheets have been compiled and notifications
of new substances have been made.
The procedures for dealing with permit appli-
cations for large-scale industrial handling and stor-
age of chemicals follow general administrative
law. There are no provisions on co-operation dur-
ing the predecision phase and at the decision phase
it is up to the decision-making body to decide
which other authorities should be heard. During
the post decision phase the duties of supervision
are divided among the provincial board, regional
environmental authorities and municipal chemi-
cal authorities.
The key elements of the intervention theory for
the Chemicals Act concerning industrial handling
and storage are that the operator must live up to a
set of safety rules, which have been specified for
the chemicals he intends to use. A shift can be
detected in the intervention theory in 1998–1999.
In the amendments of 1998 (Government Bill
1998/221) the links between chemical permits and
land use planning regulations were made explic-
it. Amendments in 1999 (Section 16 a, 1198/1999)
introduced the obligation to choose the least dan-
gerous chemical, thus creating an implicit con-
nection to the concept of Best Available Tech-
niques and therefore also to the Environmental
Protection Act (86/2000). The amendments of the
Chemicals Act have further stressed the respon-
sibility of the operator by requiring detailed safe-
ty plans. Thus the role of the Safety Technology
Authority has changed from detailed technical
inspection towards more general process orient-
ed inspection. The basis is, however, still in the
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detailed specifications of the use of chemicals,
which leave little room for negotiations on their
safe handling.
5.3.5 Electricity Taxation and subsidies
Electricity is taxed in Finland in several different
ways and for many reasons. Some of these rea-
sons are non-environmental, e.g. to generate in-
come, while others – e.g. the introduction of the
world’s first CO2-tax in 1990 – were to a large
extent justified by environmental concerns. Elec-
tricity taxation is in this context understood to
cover the taxation of inputs used for the produc-
tion of electricity, subsidies for electricity produc-
tion and taxation of the end product, i.e. electric-
ity itself.
After several minor changes the energy taxa-
tion was reformed in the beginning of 1997. The
main justification for the reform was the liberali-
sation of the energy market that had taken place
and the need to ensure the competitiveness of the
Finnish energy producers. The greatest change in
the intervention theory was that taxation shifted
from taxation of the production of electricity based
on the input fuels to the utilization of electricity.
The inputs for heat production are still taxed and
the tax rates are partly based on the carbon con-
tent, e.g. the tax rate for hard coal is higher than
that for natural gas. The description of the elec-
tricity taxation below refers to the present situa-
tion, i.e. after the 1997 reform. (e.g. Ministry of
the Environment 1997, Määttä 2000)
The electricity taxation in Finland is a rather
complex combination of subsidies, different tax
rates, exemptions and refunds. There are two tax
rates: industry and professional greenhouse grow-
ers pay a lower tax and all other users a higher
tax, which has been almost twice the rate for in-
dustry. Energy intensive industries, i.e. industries
for which the paid energy taxes are more than 3.7
per cent of the value added of the industry, can
get their tax partly refunded. Electricity that is
produced for one’s own use using wood or wood-
based fuels or gases from metallurgic processes
is exempted from the tax. Finally, electricity pro-
duced in certain ways, for example, with wind
power, can get a subsidy, which is equal to the
tax rate for non-industrial users. (e.g. Ministry of
the Environment 1997, Määttä 2000)
In 1999 the electricity tax for industry was
0.025 FIM/kWh (0.0042 €/kWh), which corre-
sponded to about eight per cent of the total price
which industries using more than 2.5 MW were
paying for electricity. The price was 0.312 FIM/
kWh (0.052 €/kWh) in the beginning of 1999.
The price for transmission of electricity has for
industries using more than 2.5 MW been about
0.13 FIM/kWh (0.022 €/kWh). (Statistics Finland
2000b)
5.3.6 Environmental management
systems
Several of the studied companies have used vol-
untary or self-governing instruments for their en-
vironmental management. The general ones are
the European Union’s Environmental Manage-
ment and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and the ISO
14001. The Responsible Care programme of the
chemical industry is not presented as a manage-
ment system, but it will here be treated together
with EMAS and ISO 14001 as they are all based
on very similar intervention theories. The main
feature of the intervention theory is that all stress
systematic but voluntary approaches to environ-
mental protection. The concept of continuous im-
provement is another key feature.
The Responsible Care programme is the old-
est. It was initiated in Canada in 1984 and by 1999
many companies in 42 countries were members.
In Finland the Finnish Responsible Care – ”Vas-
tuu Huomisesta” programme was launched on 19
May 1992 and has since expanded to cover most
of the sector (Fig. 8). The programme was drawn
up with special regard to Finnish conditions (Re-
sponsible Care 2000). The programme does not
contain any direct involvement of authorities. Thus
the participating industries are fully responsible
for their commitment to the programme.
The EMAS is based on the EC regulation 1836/
93 and in Finland it has been enacted as the EMAS
Act (1412/1994). Although the scheme is volun-
tary the register of sites that have joined the
scheme is kept by a competent body, which in
Finland has the status of an authority. The scheme
requires that external verifiers are used to con-
firm the adopted management scheme and to check
the public environmental reporting demanded by
the system. Continuous improvement of environ-
mental performance is a core feature of the
scheme. In January 2001 a total of 31 sites had an
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EMAS certificate in Finland (EMAS-ISO ajankoh-
taiskatsaus 2000).
The ISO-14001 was launched by the Interna-
tional Organisation for Standardization 1996 as
an environmental standard that specifies the ele-
ments of an environmental management system.
The management system can be certified and it
includes a commitment to continuous improve-
Fig. 8. The number chemical firms committed to the Responsible Care programme (Responsible Care 2000).
ment. No authorities are directly involved in the
implementation or monitoring of the system. The
accredited verifiers keep their own registers of
the certified companies. By November 2000 al-
together 526 sites had an ISO 14001 certificate
in Finland. The pulp and paper sector had 52 ISO-
14001 certificates. The corresponding figure for
the chemical industry was 45.
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6 Overview of pollution loads and the
state of the environment
The general overview of the state of the environ-
ment in Finland shows a positive development
with respect to regulated pollution from point
sources.
6.1 Water pollution and the state of
waters
The load of several pollutants has been reduced
substantially. In the 1960s the biological oxygen
demand of the waste waters from pulp and paper
industries increased at the same rate as produc-
tion (PI-Consulting 1997). Except for the fertilis-
er industry the chemical industry has not caused
major direct discharges of nutrients or organic
matters. An estimate made in 1970 of the total
amount of point source loading causing oxygen
deficit ranked the pulp and paper industry as the
main polluter (75 per cent of total load), followed
by human settlements (19 per cent), food indus-
tries (2.6 per cent) and the fertiliser industry (2.3
per cent) (Sitra 1970).
The production of chlorine using the mercu-
ry cell process was a major source of mercury
loading in the 1960s and 1970s and the pulp and
paper industries discharged significant amounts
of toxic organic and organo-chlorine compounds.
The sediments of the receiving water bodies dis-
play clearly the history of the pollution (Verta
et al. 1999). Some of the major chemical indus-
tries were also significant local polluters, e.g. the
two oil refineries and the associated industries
and the titanium dioxide plant had clear impacts
and were the source of controversies and con-
flicts.
Overall the state of Finnish waters was proba-
bly poorest in the 1960s and 1970s. In the late
1960s nearly all major watersheds had significant
water areas classified as ” poor”, generally down-
stream from pulp and paper mills. In 1994–97 only
0.3 per cent of the lakes were classified as poor
(Rosenström and Palosaari 2000). The change can
be seen e.g. in the nutrient levels of the recipi-
ents. For example in southern Lake Saimaa, which
has received wastewater from pulp and paper in-
dustries and municipalities (Haukiselkä), phospho-
rous levels reached 50 microgrammes per litre in
1970, whereas the levels in 1995 and 1998 were
below 14 and 13 respectively according to the data
of the water quality register.
6.2 Air emissions and air quality
Indicators of regulated air pollution emissions
display drastic declines in Finland. The import of
ozone layer depleting substances declined from
more than 3 000 tons in 1986 to insignificant
amounts in 1995, and the emissions of acidifying
substances from nearly 600 000 tons in 1980 to
less than 100 000 tons in 1998. The area within
which critical loads of sulphur are exceeded has
declined to approximately five per cent of the
country’s surface (Syri et al. 1999). Improvements
have also been registered in several air quality
variables, although e.g. ozone levels have shown
increasing tendencies (Jonson et al. 2001), main-
ly due to transport related emissions. Emissions
of non methane volatile organic carbons show a
decreasing tendency (Saarinen 2001) and the de-
velopment is likely to continue. The same is true
for e.g. particle emissions. The emissions of green
house gases have continued to increase, but at a
slower rate than previously (Ministry of Trade and
Industry 2001).
6.3 Use and production of chemicals
The use of chemicals has expanded all over the
world. According to Allanou et al. (2000) The
Chemical Abstracts Service has attributed a Chem-
ical Abstracts Service Registry Number (CAS RN)
to approximately 16 million chemical substanc-
es. About 100 000 chemicals are in regular in-
dustrial use. The expansion in the use and pro-
duction of chemicals can also be seen in Finland.
Between 1964 and 1984 the chemical industry’s
share of the Finnish exports increased from 3 to
13 per cent (Haapaniemi 1986).
Despite very rapid increase in the number and
amounts of chemicals, several indicators suggest
a decline in the amount of specific chemicals re-
leased into the environment. For example the US
toxic release inventory shows a decline of about
50 per cent from 1988 to 1995 in the direct re-
leases, while the transfers of site more than dou-
bled (Davies and Mazurek 1998, p. 274). Similar
declining trends can be observed in indicators of
toxic contamination in Finland (Rosenström and
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Palosaari 2000). The amounts of emission per unit
of production also show downward trends. For ex-
ample emissions of volatile organic compounds
relative to the amounts used declined from around
0.12 per cent in 1988 to 0.04 per cent in 1999
(Responsible Care 2000). New chemicals may,
however, cause a new burden on the environment.
Due to the increasing use there may also be new
pathways for chemicals to enter the environment.
The number of chemical accidents registered
by the Safety Technology Authority has increased
from 1995 to 1998, although this may be due to
more efficient registration practices, which now
give better coverage of chemical accidents (Muje
1999). The most common types of accident are
leakages and fires due to technical or organisa-
tional failures (Muje 1999).
6.4 Use of electricity
The use of electricity by industries has continu-
ously been growing (Fig. 9). In 1998 some 19 per
cent of the total energy consumed was produced
with wood-based fuels. Industrial wood residues
and byproducts accounted for 1 607 ktoe (five per
cent of the total energy used in Finland), while
black liquor and sulphite-based liquor account for
3 406 ktoe (eleven per cent of the total). (Statis-
tics Finland 2001)
Fig. 9. The electricity used by industry in 1970 – 2000 (Statistics Finland 2001).
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7 Overview of effects
The longest data series and the most comprehen-
sive information on effects is available for the
regulatory instruments. It is nevertheless possi-
ble to identify different types of effects for all the
instruments we have examined. The effects out-
side the target area and unanticipated effects are
at least as important as the anticipated effects with-
in the target area when examined in terms of en-
vironmental changes. In many cases it is difficult
to draw the border between effects within and
outside the target area because the policy instru-
ments evolve and interact. What at some point has
been an effect outside the target area may in sub-
sequent revisions become part of the main objec-
tives of an instrument.
7.1 Observed effects of regulatory
instruments
When regulatory instruments are used the target
population is rather well defined, but outcomes
may nevertheless be difficult to connect unam-
biguously to an instrument. Using several differ-
ent methods we have been able to show that the
implementation of an instrument is in some but
not all cases associated with specific measures to
reduce pollution. In most cases measures to re-
duce pollution have been undertaken because op-
erators have had a rational expectation that de-
mands will become stricter, often following mar-
ket pressures that have already been evident.
7.1.1 Improved state of the environment
Within the target area the desired main effects of
all the examined instruments have been the re-
duction of adverse environmental changes. It is
easy to verify the improvement in the state of
water courses in the vicinity of major industries
and the reduction of critical loads of e.g. airborne
acidifying substances (Section 6, Hallanaro et al.
2000). Lack of data hampers the verification of
the reduction in adverse environmental changes
due to handling of chemicals, but sediment anal-
yses show that the load of specific chemical pol-
lutants clearly has been reduced in certain heavi-
ly polluted areas (Verta et al. 1999). The fact that
the Chemicals Act is not about regulating emis-
sions but mainly about the reduction of risks com-
plicates the assessment of its role in the reduc-
tion. One indicator of improvement is the obser-
vation that the number of environmental accidents
has remained constant (Luntinen et al. 2000) de-
spite a general increase in the use of chemicals.
Another indicator of improved handling of chem-
icals is that incidents of contaminated soils due
to industrial activities are mainly dated to the pe-
riod before the 1990s and only relatively few new
cases have been recorded (Haavisto 2000), al-
though problems with leaking tanks in small scale
handling of e.g. fuels have persisted (Emelie Enck-
ell, Uusimaa Environment Centre, personal com-
munication).
In general the use of emission control or, for
the Chemicals Act appropriate safety technolo-
gy, has been part of the desired main effect in the
target area of the instruments. Our study shows
that the permitting systems have worked in this
direction. Issues related to process innovations and
their diffusion have largely been an effect out-
side the target areas of the regulatory instruments
and will be further discussed in Section 9.
Improvements in the state of the environment
do not mean that all the problems that justified
the introduction of regulatory instruments have
been solved. Preliminary results of an analysis of
the use of chemicals indicates that the increasing
use of chemicals has outpaced improvements in
dealing with chemicals. Thus chemical loads on
the environment may have increased despite gen-
erally improved handling and control of produc-
tion (Elina Karhu, Finnish Environment Institute,
personal communication).
7.1.2 The role of regulation
For all regulatory instruments the problem of at-
tributing the impact to the implementation of the
instrument is obvious because several develop-
ments and societal changes have worked in the
same direction as the desired main effects. Our
study has, however, identified effects of all stud-
ied regulatory instruments during the time they
have been in use.
In air pollution control the decline in the emis-
sions of acidifying substances is evident (Fig. 10).
Initially some of the old mills had emissions clear-
ly above the limit value of 6 kg SO2 per ton pulp
specified in the Council of State Decision
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(12.2.1987/160), Fig. 10). According to the sec-
ond report of the Sulphur committee (Ministry of
the Environment 1993) the bulk of the reduction
is due to a change in the basic production proc-
ess, i.e. sulphite mills were substituted with sul-
phate mills. In addition, however, end-of-pipe in-
vestments have contributed to further reduction.
For three mills the Regional Environment Cen-
tre decided on stricter limits than those of the
Council of State Decision (12.2.1987) for annual
gaseous emissions of sulphur compounds. The first
of these permit decisions was made in 1995, while
the two others are from 1997. In all three deci-
sions there were two limits; a limit of 3 kg SO2
emissions per ton of pulp produced and a stricter
limit of 2 kg. In two cases the stricter limit en-
tered into force after a new production line or an
enlargement was ready, while it will enter into
force in the beginning of 2004 in the third per-
mit. In two of the cases the permit limits became
legally binding immediately after the decision
entered into force, in one case approximately one
year after the permit was issued by the Regional
Environment Centre.
There is a clear difference between the situa-
tion when the Council of State Decision was is-
sued in 1987 and that prevailing when the limits
were included in the permits in 1995 and 1997.
In 1987 more than one third of the pulp mills for
which data is available had emissions exceeding
the future limit, whereas all three mills were be-
low the future permit limit when decisions where
made in the 1990s. On the other hand the transi-
tion period in the decision in 1987 was a decade,
whereas there was no transition time for the 3 kg
limits of the permits.
The analysis of water permits was able to iden-
tify a statistical connection between the reduction
of loads and the introduction of limit values (Mick-
witz 2000a) and this could also be verified using
legal documents and interview data (Similä 2002).
The mill-specific models (Table 8) have estimat-
ed the effects of the BOD limits by either utilis-
ing the BOD limit as such or the change in BOD
limits. These models can only be estimated for
the period during which the firm has a BOD limit
and cannot thus be used to examine the effect of
introducing the limit in the first place. Further-
more many of the time-series are quite short and
no strong conclusions should be based on only
the statistical results.
Another way of looking at the effect of the
permit limits is to compare the development of
the discharges of mills with a limit on their total
phosphorus discharges with the development of
the mills without any limit (Table 9). Here the
comparison is made relative to the greatest dis-
charge of each mill in the data series.
Fig. 10. The SO2 emissions per ton of pulp produced in different mills (each line indicates an individual mill) and the
limits for old (6 kg, solid green line) and new (4 kg, dotted green line) mills in the norm of February 12th 1987.
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Table 9 shows that all mills had considera-
bly lower phosphorus discharges in 1998 than
their maximum discharges. However, there is
no clear difference between the mills that have
had a limit on their total phosphorus discharg-
es in force and those that have not. This can be
shown by a t-test of the difference in means (t-
value 0.995; critical value 1.812). One reason
for the development in the total phosphorus dis-
charges reported might be that the production
has developed differently for the different mills.
When the phosphorus discharges in relation to
the production of the mill are analysed in the
same way the results, however, remain. All mills
have been able to reduce their phosphorus dis-
charges per production compared to the maxi-
mum.
The reductions in nutrient discharges per pro-
duction are on average greater than the reductions
in absolute discharges. In the case of the absolute
phosphorus discharges there is no clear difference
between mills that have had a limit on their total
phosphorus discharges in force and those that have
not. (Mickwitz 2000a). These results are very de-
pendent on the discharges in 1998. The advan-
tage of the approach is that there is no ambiguity
about the existence of a limit on total phosphorus
discharges for this particular year. A disadvan-
tage is that this analysis utilises only a very limit-
ed amount of the information that the discharge
data contain. Therefore we have also estimated
trends in the discharges for all the mills and ex-
amined whether there is a difference between the
groups.
Table 8. Summary of the results of the mill -specific models – the number of mills with significantlya positive or negative
coefficients for the BOD limit (Mickwitz 2000a).
Single Single equation 2 equation system ln(BOD &
equation of of difference of P discharges)
ln(BOD discharges) BOD discharges
BOD Phosphorus
equation equation
> 0 9 5 10 6
~ 0 22 26 20 20
< 0 1 1 1 5
a The significance is here defined as a less than 5 per cent probability of the coefficient being zero based on a t-test.
Table 9. Comparing the phosphorus discharges for mills with limits on their total phosphorus discharges and those with-
out (Mickwitz 2000a).
Mills with a limit on their total phosphorus Mills without a limit on their total phosphorus
discharges in their water permits discharges in their water permits in force in 1998
Mills with reported discharges in 1998: 30.8 % Mills with reported discharges in 1998: 8.8 %
Reduction in discharges, when the discharges Reduction in discharges, when the discharges
of phosphorus in 1998 are compared to the of phosphorus in 1998 are compared to the
maximum discharges of the milla maximum discharges of the mill
Mean reduction: 76.6 % Mean reduction: 70.8 %
(The average for the 30 Mills) (The average for the 8 Mills)
Maximum reduction: 97.9 % Maximum reduction: 95.1 %
(The mill with the greatest reduction) (The mill with the greatest reduction)
Minimum reduction: 54.0 % Minimum reduction: 53.2 %
(The mill with the smallest reduction) (The mill with the smallest reduction)
a For each mill its maximum annual discharges is first calculated, after which the 1998 discharges are compared
with this maximum.
56 Mikael Hildén et al. Monographs of the Boreal Environment Research No. 21
The analysis of trends indicates a difference
in the slope for the mills with a phosphorus limit
and those without (Table 10). Phosphorus limits
were, however, on average introduced earlier for
mills with high phosphorus discharges (Mickwitz
2000a). The mean phosphorus discharges per pro-
duction were consequently on average more than
seven times higher for the mills with a phospho-
rus limit than for those without one and therefore
this is a probable reason for the faster decrease.
Further evidence of the effects of phosphorus
limits can be obtained by using data for the mills
that have had limits for at least 5 years. For these
both log-linear and difference models were esti-
mated with a dummy variable that took the value
one for the years when a phosphorus limit was in
force and zero before that. For all but 2 of the 11
mills the dummy variables in the log-linear mod-
els had negative signs and in 3 cases they were
significant at a five per cent level. In the differ-
ential models only one mill got a negative and
significant coefficient for its phosphorus limit
dummy variable. These results thus support the
finding that the limit values have had effects, but
not on all mills.
In addition to the analysis at mill level some
modelling for the aggregated pulp and paper sec-
tor can be used. It has been argued that when the
phosphorus limits started to become common,
mills which did not have a limit in their permit
also intensified their action in order to reduce
phosphorus discharges. In order to obtain infor-
mation on this claim some models of the total
phosphorus discharges were estimated. As explan-
atory variables we used the total production of
pulp and paper (mechanical and chemical pulp was
also examined separately), a trend and the number
of phosphorus limits (the number of mills with a
phosphorus limit is used here but also the number
of decisions with a limit as well as the share of
the decisions that contained limits were used) (Ta-
ble 11). A difference model was used because an
ADF test for stationarity indicated strong trends
in the variables.
The results in Table 11 indicate that the de-
crease in the sector’s phosphorus discharges is
largely explained by a negative trend. This has
partly been counteracted by the increasing pulp
production as shown by the positive coefficient
in the model. The coefficient for the number of
mills with phosphorus limits is negative indicat-
ing that discharges of phosphorus drop when the
number of permits with phosphorus limits in-
crease. The results should, however, be interpret-
ed with care. The coefficient is not significantly
different from zero and recursive estimations of
the model show that the parameter values are very
dependent on the sample.
Generally all interviewees from the mills
viewed the water permits and the specific limits
they contain as one of the reasons for the decline
Table 11. The results of a difference model of the aggre-
gated phosphorus discharges 1983–98 (Mickwitz 2000a).
Single equation of
difference P discharges
(t-values in brackets)
Constant 50.89 (2.02)
Trend –8.24 (–2.57)
Ln(Pulp production) 0.07 (2.64)
Ln(Paper production) 0.003 (0.15)
No. of mills with P-limits –10.88 (–1.47)
Table 10. Comparing the phosphorus discharges per production for mills with limits on their total phosphorus discharges
and those without. The slope indicates the rate of reduction in discharges (Mickwitz 2000a).
Mills with a limit on Mills without a limit
their total phosphorus on their total phosphorus
discharges in their water permits discharges in their water permits
Phosphorus P/Production Phosphorus P/Production
Na 31 28 10 9
Mean slope: –803.9 –0.0060 –81.0 –0.0007
Maximum slope: 462.2 0.0001 305.9 0.0004
Minimum slope: –4020.3 –0.0412 –538.1 –0.0022
a The difference in the number of observations is due to the lack of production data for some mills.
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in discharges. However, the role of the permit
system is described differently by different per-
sons, and sometimes even different comments by
the same person were conflicting. Some interview-
ees explicitly recognised the difficulty to sepa-
rate the effect of one factor – the water permits –
from all the other factors affecting the general at-
mosphere that have contributed to the action tak-
en by the industry. (Mickwitz 2000a)
Chlorine is used by all representatives of the
mills as an example in which reduction in dis-
charges has been driven mainly by the demand
and where the permit system has had no direct, or
only a very minor, role. Note that this does not
mean that the environmental administration had
no role in the development that reduced the use
of chlorine. The adoption of new bleaching proc-
esses for pulp in order to reduce chlorine discharg-
es is discussed in more detail in section 9.3.1.
Going back further in history it is also obvious
that a considerable improvement in the state of
waters was achieved through the decommission-
ing of the sulphite mills, which had much greater
emissions than the sulphate mills (Sitra 1970). The
decommissioning was primarily due to economic
factors, not environmental concerns. This was
shown by the restarting of the notorious pollut-
ing mill of Lievestuore in the early 1970s when
pulp prices increased rapidly and made even ob-
solete technology profitable. The restarting suc-
ceeded despite opposition from the National Board
of Waters (Haila et al. 1971).
7.1.3 Costs of pollution control
Conceptually the total costs of an environmental
policy instrument are ”the change in consumer
and producer surpluses associated with the reg-
ulations and with any price and/or income chang-
es that may result” (Cropper and Oates 1992;
p. 721). It is difficult to apply this conceptual defi-
nition in practice. Monitoring and enforcement
costs of authorities are only a small part of the
picture, because the capital and operating expen-
ditures of the regulated industry are commonly
far greater than the costs of the authorities. Fur-
thermore there are many important cost items that
are neither included in the costs of the authorities
nor in the capital and operating expenditures of
the regulated industries. These are costs which are
often labelled general equilibrium effects and tran-
sition costs (e.g. Jaffe et. al. 1995), and include
e.g. unemployment, obsolete capital and retarded
innovations. The costs we have been able to study
are thus only a subset of the total costs and even
these cost items we have been able to study only
partially. The same is obviously true for the ben-
efits of the instruments.
The general costs of the environmental admin-
istration were briefly discussed in section 5.2. It
is hard to divide the costs of the administration
between the individual regulatory instruments,
since tasks related to different instruments are
partly financed by the same budgetary moment.
It is even harder to split the administrative costs
related to a particular instrument to the individu-
al tasks of an act and sectors. For example, in the
case of water pollution, pollution prevention is
only one of the tasks of the water courts and at-
tributing some share of the costs to water permits
for the pulp and paper industry would be very
challenging. A thorough analysis of the costs of
the administration would have required a study
of its own.
With respect to the environmental protection
expenditures of the regulated industries the situ-
ation is easier, since Statistics Finland has pub-
lished statistics for the years 1992 to 1997. The
environmental protection investments have been
between 18.3 and 7.7 per cent of the total fixed
investments by the pulp, paper and paper prod-
ucts industry during 1992 to 1997 (Statistics Fin-
land 1999, p. 22). The investments are reported
per environmental media in Table 12. Another way
to break down the investments is to divide them
into end-of-pipe and process-integrated invest-
ments for environmental protection. For the for-
est industry the share of the end-of-pipe invest-
ments has varied between 35.8 and 52.3 per cent
(Statistics Finland 1999, p. 26)
Based on the figures in Tables 12 and 13 we
can make several observations. First, the direct
costs of the regulatory instruments of the regulat-
ed industries are much higher than the costs of
the administration. The internalisation of the en-
vironmental costs is in line with the adoption of
the polluter pays principle, which was made ex-
plicit in a policy decision of the OECD in 1972
(Mickwitz 1998). Second, the annual environmen-
tal protection investments are very variable even
at the industry level. For individual sites the
variation between years is of course far greater.
During some years the bulk of the investments
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have been for water protection, while more in-
vestments have been made for air pollution con-
trol during other years. The operating costs have
been more stable than the investments. The oper-
ating costs for the industry have increased, even
when the change in the price level is taken into
account. The largest share of the operating costs
is related to water treatment but the operating ex-
penditure of air pollution control has increased
faster than costs for water and waste treatment
during the period.
For earlier decades, information on investments
and operating expenditures by the industry are less
systematic. The information will not be discussed
in detail here, but some general observations will
be made. During the 1970s the total water pro-
tection investments by the forest industry were
about FIM 1 700 million (€ 286 million) at the
1980 price level. Annual investments varied be-
tween FIM 50 million (€ 8.4 million) and
FIM 280 million (€ 47.1 million) and the annual
operating costs were about 30 million (€ 5 mil-
lion). The air pollution control investments of the
industry as a whole during the 1970s were assessed
to about 1 000 million (€ 168 million). (Wallin
1983, p. 56f.) During the years 1985 to 1988 the
annual investments in water protection varied be-
tween FIM 128 and FIM 526 million (€ 21.5 and
€ 88.5 million) and in air protection between
FIM 42 and FIM110 million (€ 7 and € 18.5 mil-
Table 12. Environmental protection investments in the pulp, paper and paper product industry (FIM thousand, nominal
values)(Statistics Finland 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999).
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Air 221 312 113 135 110 319 156 278 175 174 200 786
Water 418 308 443 560 332 433 732 282 607 020 141 414
Waste 18 146 15 797 23 228 7 841 44 421 30 602
Other 1 632 149 3 000 238 1 088 3 285
Total 659 399 572 641 468 980 896 639 827 703 376 088
Total in
1997 prices 697 612 594 494 481 906 912 481 837 647 376 088
Total euro in
1997 prices € 117 330 € 9 987 € 81 051 € 153 468 € 140 882 € 63 253
Table 13. Environmental operating expenditure in the pulp, paper and paper product industry (FIM thousand, nominal
values)(Statistics Finland 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999).
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Air 7 503 12 943 22 946 41 083 42 015 53 471
Water 165 194 193 428 228 066 260 041 288 563 321 254
Waste 55 244 45 934 62 974 56 309 61637 88 326
Other 1 631 2 664 5441 1 994 4 065 4 111
Running and
maintenance
– Total 229 572 254 968 319 427 359 428 396 280 467 162
Other operating
expenditure 52 066 63 317 70 830 49 290 35 737 53 253
Total 281 638 318 284 390 257 408 718 432 017 520 415
Total in
1997 prices 297 959 330 431 401 013 415 939 437 207 520 415
Total euro in
1997 prices € 50 113 € 55 575 € 67 446 € 69 956 € 73 533 € 87 528
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lion) (Myréen and Anhava 1992). During the pe-
riod 1985 to 1990 the annual running costs of
waste water treatment plants increased from some
FIM 100 million to about FIM 200 million (€ 16.8
to € 33.1 million) (Repo and Hämäläinen 1996).
These figures are not fully comparable because
they are from different sources, which used dif-
ferent methods of compilation. They do, howev-
er, give an indication of the levels of the different
costs and their development.
7.1.4 Environmental information and
awareness
All the studied regulatory instruments have in-
creased the demand for specific environmental
expertise both within the administration and in the
private sector. This was evident already in the late
1960s when the need for generalist environmen-
tal experts was recognised (Sitra 1970). It can be
documented in the number of experts involved
(Mulders 2001). The response to this demand can
also be seen in the higher education institutions.
A strong indication that it is truly related to the
regulatory demands can be seen in the fact that
education of specialists in the different fields has
received a boost with the introduction of the reg-
ulatory instruments.
Environmental awareness has been both a cause
and an effect of the developing regulatory regimes
and of the expanding environmental specialist ed-
ucation. It is an effect outside the target area and
at least initially it was an unanticipated effect of
the introduction of new environmental policy in-
struments. During the 1960s and 1970s several
environmental issues were raised by independent
scientists (Haila et al. 1971, Eskola 1972, Nuorte-
va 1976), but with the development of regulatory
instruments and the environmental administration
the number of studies and the width of scientific
disciplines involved has broadened. Professional
societies have also developed the education and the
debate (Eskola 1972) and have acted as gate keep-
ers for ideas developed elsewhere.
7.1.5 Links between environmental
media
Regulatory instruments based on specific envi-
ronmental media may have cross media effects.
This has been explicitly recognised in the Di-
rective (96/61) concerning integrated pollution
prevention and control (IPPC-directive), but has
not been a major issue in older Finnish environ-
mental legislation. The interviews confirmed the
links between water protection, waste, air emis-
sions and energy use. For example the produc-
tion of thermomechanical pulp is beneficial from
a water protection and wood resource use point
of view, but is highly energy intensive. In the
late 1960s thermomechanical pulp production
caused around 15 kg BOD5 per produced ton of
pulp, whereas the corresponding figure for
bleached sulphate pulp was 40 kg (Rosén 1971).
At the end of the 1990s mechanical pulping re-
quired two to four times as much energy as chem-
ical pulping (Ministry of the Environment 1997,
p. 85). Partial trade-offs have also been raised
for example between phosphorus loads and loads
of biological oxygen demand for pulp and paper
mills and between safety aspects and broader en-
vironmental concerns such as those of ozone lay-
er depletion or climate change in the regulation
of specific chemicals.
The interviews also emphasise several instanc-
es of positive cross media effects of different en-
vironmental measures. A case in point is the re-
duction of water consumption, which has reduced
water discharges but also affected the water con-
tent of the sludge. Interviewees argued that burn-
ing of dryer sludge has improved the energy effi-
ciency and decreased the sulphur dioxide emis-
sions (Mickwitz 2000b).
7.1.6 The implementation of the
instruments and the length of the
processes
The Water Act and the Air Pollution Control Act,
which both introduced significant new adminis-
trative tasks, including negotiations between op-
erators and authorities, display lags and gradual
adoption sometimes spanning more than a dec-
ade (Mickwitz 2000a, Similä 2002). There are two
important features of the lags. First they may de-
lay the implementation of new environmental
measures, allowing pollution to continue. Second
they give industries time to adapt to the new situ-
ation, which is important especially for large fac-
tories that may combine environmental invest-
ments with major investments in production.
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The Air Pollution Control Act was implement-
ed slowly in practice. Most of the factories were
issued decisions as late as 10 years after the Act
entered into force. When viewing cumulatively
the accumulation of decisions according to the Air
Pollution Control Act, it can be seen that only one
factory received its decision before 1987, 18 re-
ceived their decisions before 1992 and 29 facto-
ries before 1997. The implementation and adop-
tion of new demands has proceeded more rapidly
in the use and handling of chemicals. New safety
regulations have entered rapidly into force and
there have not been comparable lags in the per-
mit procedures after the enactment of new legis-
lation.
The length of the permitting processes was a
largely unanticipated effect of the water and air
pollution control legislation. The lengthy process-
es have generally been observed for the largest
firms and this is confirmed by interviewees from
the industry. In the regulation of chemicals the
time lags between application and permitting have
been shorter. The longest lags in water and air
pollution control have been well above a decade
and have been due to lack of resources, the learn-
ing process for new procedures both among au-
thorities and firms, difficulties in determining
compensations according to the Water Act, the
changing external technological and economic
context of the firms, the possibilities for negotia-
tion and renegotiation between firms and author-
ities and the lack of specified time frames for firms
and administration alike. The following statement
by an enviornmental manager of one firm illus-
trates the complexity of the reasons for the long
delays and indicates that shorter lags would not
always have led to a faster reduction of emissions:
”... when in 1984 as I remember it, we made our
notification to the authorities based on the Air
Pollution Control Act, we got the decision as I
remember in 1992. Sometimes we asked the au-
thorities when the decision would be made and
what limits would be set. The authorities once
answered that they had not seen it as very urgent
since we had voluntarily carried out most of the
measures they find justified.”
The time between a decision on a BOD limit
and its entry into force illustrates the time availa-
ble for adaptation to new conditions. Sometimes
– in 25 of 202 cases analysed – the limits on total
BOD discharges included in a permit came into
force immediately when the decision was made.
In most cases, however the mill was given time
to adjust before the limit came into force. On av-
erage the limits, in decisions that were not ap-
pealed, came into force about one year and four
months after the decision. The longest adoption
time was six and a half years. For 110 limits the
time between the decision and the date when the
limit came into force was more than a year and
for 92 limits it was less than a year.
The adaptation time of a factory is not limited
to the time between the decision and its entry into
force. The decision is an outcome of a process –
often a lengthy one – and the factory applying for
a permit receives information on the likely out-
come before the final decision. Prior to making
applications, factories may be in contact with the
environmental authorities to obtain information
on their likely standpoint (see Section 8). After
the application is made the process takes some
time and during this period the views on appro-
priate measures are discussed repeatedly. In some
cases the time between the original application
and the decision has been more than sixteen years.
The longest lags were observed for decisions made
in the 1970s, but lags exceeding 10 years were
also observed in the 1990s. In these cases the ap-
plication had been updated and revised several
times by the applicant. When a permit decision is
made by an appeal court the applicant naturally
gets additional time to adapt to the likely outcome.
7.1.7 Opposition against reform of
regulatory instruments
One of the interesting effects of regulatory instru-
ments is that the administrative structures they
require may increase opposition against new de-
mands and further reforms. Thus the comprehen-
siveness of the Water Act with its associated ad-
ministrative structures was an impediment to gen-
eral reform of the environmental legislation. So-
lutions that would have challenged the working
structure of the Water Act did not gain sufficient
support until the entry into force of the Environ-
mental Protection Act in 2000. The basic struc-
ture of the Water Act had thus remained intact
for nearly 40 years, although for example the need
to consider simultaneously different environmen-
tal elements was generally recognised in the ear-
ly 1970s (Rosén 1971). The existing system of
the Water Act was also one of the arguments
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against a comprehensive environmental impact
assessment procedure in the 1980s (Sairinen
2000). An analogous effect can be seen in the ad-
ministration of chemical issues. The historical
backgrounds in the administration and control of
chemicals can be seen in a complicated adminis-
trative pattern involving two or three ministries
and three different central administrative units. In
the Air Pollution Control Act the original notifi-
cation approach carried over in the form of tem-
porally unrestricted permits.
7.1.8 Specific issues
Due to the history of the legislation there are ef-
fects which are specific to the individual instru-
ments. The Water Act explicitly deals with con-
flicting interests in the use of waters and there-
fore aims at solving or regulating the conflicts of
interest. The system of indemnities and other com-
pensations has been elaborate and it has transferred
funds to those who have suffered from pollution.
Guidance for determining the compensations has
been produced, but in individual cases the com-
pensations have often been contested. In the 1990s
the largest sums were paid to owners of waters
with reference to loss of recreational value or loss
of value of a water area. The payments to com-
mercial fishermen have been lower. The largest
sums of other payments were the water protec-
tion fees, which were levied on industries for the
development of water protection and studies ben-
efitting the protection of waters (Table 14). In
general the sums have been small compared with
the investments and operating costs of pollution
control (Section 7.1.3).
The early phases of air pollution control aimed
simply at identifying and listing firms with po-
tential air pollution problems. Thus a dominant
effect was the increase in knowledge about the
air pollution situation, and the early intervention
theory of air pollution control resembled that of
knowledge-based instruments. Effects were ex-
pected to arise from the increasing knowledge of
an issue.
The Chemicals Act has its history in standard-
based control of activities. Thus its main effects
have arisen from a very detailed control and in-
spection mechanism, which has focused on spe-
cific features of the industrial activities. There has
been little room for negotiation in the specific area
of its application and in this sense it has repre-
sented strong command and control. Its effects
have been restricted by the fact that it is concerned
with specific parts of the production, i.e. the han-
dling of chemicals and related risks, whereas the
emissions of the normal production processes have
not been dealt with.
7.2 The effects of regulatory
instruments in relation to evaluation
criteria
7.2.1 Relevance
Regulatory systems have been created out of gen-
eral societal needs to address problems that have
been perceived to be severe enough to justify pub-
Table 14. Indemnities to owners of waters and commercial fishermen, and other payments paid by industry pursuant to
the Water Act 1990–1997 (FIM, nominal values). The sums cover several years of damage, typically more than a decade
(Marja Hiitiö, Elise Sahivirta, Eira Ostamo, unpublished data).
Water Court Indemnities for Indemnities for Indemnities paid Other payments,
(average number loss of loss of value of to commercial including water
of years covered recreational water area fishermen protection fees,
by the paid amenities fisheries
indemnities) management
Northern Finland 451 295 2 324 448 1 685 620 1 644 000
(22 years) € 75 902 € 390 944 € 283 50 € 108 313
Eastern Finland 4 825 786 4 962 394 269 003 2 292 120
(12 years) € 811 639 € 834 615 € 45 243 € 385 507
Western Finland 31 821 536 19 156 446 3 850 605 12 936 650
(13 years) € 5 351 998 € 3 221 883 € 647 625 € 2 175 788
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lic intervention and regulation. The increasing se-
verity of environmental problems had been doc-
umented (Sitra 1970). A key question is whether
the regulatory instruments addressed the most im-
portant environmental issues in the environmen-
tal regulation of industrial activities.
In Finland water issues were important for the
development of environmental policy instruments.
Several cities had experienced serious water pol-
lution already in the early 20th century (Laakko-
nen et al. 1999), but the importance of water is-
sues can also be linked to the private ownership
of waters and the need to solve conflicts between
owners and users. Pollution of waters was simply
one example of conflicts of interest. The fact that
only one chapter of the 22 chapters in the Water
Act dealt specifically with pollution issues under-
scores this observation. It also explains the strong
emphasis on negotiation, interest considerations
and involvement of lay persons in the process. The
lack of standards meant that pollution and pollu-
tion damages were in principle always negotia-
ble. The absence of standards and strong supervi-
sory authorities made the Water Act initially less
relevant than it was to become later on after the
founding of a strong central board and the prepa-
ration of guiding policies in the form of water pro-
tection programmes and guidance documents for
supervision that emphasised the protection poli-
cy (Sections 4.3.1 and 7.1, Similä 2000).
Air pollution was for a long time regarded only
as a local nuisance problem regulated by the
Neighbourhood Relations Act (26/1920). Towards
the end of the 1960s air pollution became a broader
issue (Sitra 1970). The development was acceler-
ated by the public recognition of long range trans-
port of pollutants and e.g. acidification, but the
difference between air and water issues was strik-
ing. In 1970 a major survey of the state of envi-
ronmental protection in Finland devoted 94 pag-
es to air pollution and 278 pages to water issues.
In presenting recommendations the report devot-
ed two short paragraphs to air pollution control
and 5 pages to water (Sitra 1970). A part of the
explanation for this discrepancy is probably that
the foul smell around e.g. the pulp mills was not
perceived to destroy property, whereas the pollu-
tion of water infringed on the rights of water own-
ers. Water pollution had been seen as a very con-
crete issue and had been the subject of considera-
ble public concern before the enactment of the
Water Act in 1962 (Leino-Kaukiainen 1999).
Public regulation of chemicals has a long tra-
dition (Marjanen 1998), but initially the empha-
sis was strictly on human health and technical
safety. For a long time the burden of proof con-
cerning the environmental dangers of chemicals
was laid on regulators, not developers or users of
chemicals. This situation paved the way for ma-
jor environmental disasters such as those caused
by indiscriminate use of e.g. agricultural chemi-
cals and mercury. The environmental relevance
of the Poisons Act was reduced by its reactive
rather than proactive nature. The large number of
potentially chemically polluted soils (Haavisto
2000) shows that the environmental relevance of
the old chemical regulation was limited. In the
Chemicals Act several steps have been taken to-
wards a more proactive regulation, with require-
ments of risk assessments and safety plans for
major users. The relevance with respect to chem-
ical pollution is still somewhat limited due to the
rapid development of chemicals and their use.
The focus of the regulation has followed is-
sues that have been recognised as important. The
regulatory systems with elements of discussion
and discretionary case by case consideration do,
however, display relatively slow reactions on the
formal level. Data for the regulation of phospho-
rus emissions from pulp and paper mills show a
transition period of more than a decade from the
first emission limit for phosphorus to a general
rule of always having emission limit values (Mick-
witz 2000a). The regulation of chlorine bleach-
ing through specification of AOX limit values only
started in the early 1990s after the decision taken
by the Ministry of the Environment in June 1989.
It took until 1997 before all mills had AOX lim-
its included in their permits. All AOX limits were
set at levels well above the annual average dur-
ing the year the decision was taken, and still on
average one year and 4 months elapsed before the
limits entered into force. At the time when all mills
had AOX limits in force the average annual AOX
discharges per ton of bleached pulp were about
0.2 kg mainly due to the customer demands that
had forcefully influenced the choice of technolo-
gy. A similar development had previously oc-
curred in the regulation of emissions of mercury.
The Water Act was only used as one of the argu-
ments in negotiations leading to a voluntary agree-
ment on replacing mercury-based slimicides in the
pulp and paper industry reached on 27.11.1967.
The Water Act could have been used for dealing
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with damages caused to fisheries, but by 1976
authorities had not initiated a single process deal-
ing with mercury pollution although this had been
possible in the name of general public interest
(Nuorteva 1976). A separate Act was eventually
developed for dealing with the losses caused to
fishermen (Act on Compensation to Fishermen
Suffering from the Pollution of Waters 208/1974).
7.2.2 Impact
There is no doubt that the examined regulatory
administrative instruments have had an impact in
their target areas. The general tendencies in the
development of the state of waters, the airborne
pollution and the handling of chemicals have im-
proved in accordance with the desired main ef-
fects, which were used as justification when reg-
ulation was introduced. Pollution levels have been
reduced and the handling of chemicals has become
safer. The Water Act has provided economic com-
pensation to persons who in the event of no ex
officio determination of compensation would
probably not have received anything. There is
greater uncertainty with respect to the impact in
specific cases, in particular concerning the regu-
lation of water and air pollution at the level of
individual firms (Mickwitz 2000a, Similä 2002).
Mickwitz (2000a) and Similä (2002) have
shown that there are clear cases in which the wa-
ter permits, and the explicit limits they contain,
have affected the discharges. This can be seen
from the statistical analysis of BOD and phospho-
rus discharges, the analysis of the legal documents,
as well as from the analysis of the interviews. At
the same time cases have been found in which the
permit limits have had no effect on the reduction
of the discharges. The fact that many mills have
been far below limit levels years before the lim-
its have entered into force, the finding that 8 mills
have only had one or two different BOD limits
during their whole operative history, the model-
ling results and the analyses of the interviews jus-
tify this claim. A lack of direct effects of the lim-
it values can most clearly be seen in the case of
discharges of chlorine compounds.
A major difference between air and water pol-
lution control lies in the nature of the permits.
Permits issued according to the Water Act for
polluting activities have since the 1960s in prac-
tice been given for a fixed period of time. This
has been the case, even though permanent per-
mits were the legal starting point of the Water Act
until 1987. Fixed time periods gave regulatory
authorities and also other stakeholders opportu-
nities to demand improvement in each new per-
mit round with reference to monitoring results,
without specifically initiating and justifying a new
permit process. This has been important, because
the monitoring has almost exclusively been based
on self monitoring by the permit holders. Autho-
ries approved the monitoring programmes and
received the results, but did not play an active part,
except in cases of accidents and disasters such as
fish kills.
In air pollution control the initiative was in
practice left almost entirely to the firms, with the
exception of the general norms for emission lim-
its. Initially only a notification was required of
the firms, with some possibilities for setting limit
values. Subsequently permits were issued, but
since 1995 the default was to issue permanent
permits. Thus only changes in the production proc-
esses or significant changes in production volumes
opened the discussion on acceptable permit con-
ditions. Under such a system the incentives to
improve are clearly weaker than in a system which
includes a revision procedure where permit con-
ditions are made tighter, unless the general norms
are adjusted downward faster than the permit lim-
its in the revision process.
One of clearest impacts outside the target area
has for all the examined instruments been the de-
mand for know-how in several different disci-
plines from law to engineering and natural as well
as social sciences. The importance of social sci-
ences was recognised early (Sitra 1970), but no
real attempts were made to institutionalise the re-
search. Applied natural and engineering sciences
were in contrast developed in specific sector re-
search institutes. The regulatory policy instru-
ments largely determined the need for informa-
tion and consequently the demand for e.g. econo-
mists has been relatively low. Sairinen (2000, p.
262) states that: ”Many influential officials in the
ME [Ministry of the Environment] were commit-
ted to the legalistic culture, and initially showed
no interest in developing new measures.” This
correspond to the Dutch situation where the poli-
cy processes ”tend to be dominated by judicially
trained specialists who, in general, favour legal
solutions to most problems.” (Bressers and Hu-
itema 1999, p. 193). The regulatory instruments
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with their emphasis on public presentation of in-
dustry specific emission, impacts and corrective
measures have, however, contributed to the in-
crease of public awareness and the public discus-
sion and debate of environmental changes. This
effect outside the original target area was initial-
ly largely unanticipated, but has now become part
of the intervention theory of recent regulations
(EIA Act, Environmental Protection Act).
7.2.3 Effectiveness
The goals of water protection have ben set in of-
ficial programmes, of which the three National
Water Protection Programmes decided in 1974,
1988 and 1998 are the most important ones (Ta-
ble 6). These programmes included quantitative
as well as qualitative goals. The quantitative goals
of the two first programmes were set as tons per
day especially for the pulp and paper industry,
whereas they were determined as per cent reduc-
tions for the whole industry in the third pro-
gramme. The first programme contained quanti-
tative goals for suspended solids (1980), BOD7
(1980 and 1985), phosphorus (1985)and lignins
(1985) and it stated that nitrogen should remain
at the same level in 1985, i.e. 15 tons per day.
The second programme had targets for 1995 for
BOD7 and phosphorus while a target for chlorine
compounds was set in a 1989 decision by the Min-
istry of the Environment. The third programme
contains targets for the year 2005 for the industry
as a whole, but it is clear that the major contribu-
tions are expected to come from pulp and paper
for CODCr, phosphorus and nitrogen. Fig. 11
shows some of the goals and the realised discharg-
es.
The targets of the first National Water Protec-
tion Programme contained the largest reductions
compared with the available discharge statistics
at the time when the programme was approved.
For BOD7 the reduction was 50 per cent to 1980
and 69 to 1985 compared with the values for 1972.
For phosphorus the reduction was 25 per cent until
1985 and for nitrogen the goal was to prevent the
discharges from increasing. On the other hand the
programme was approved at a time when the in-
Fig. 11. Effectiveness of the implementation of the Water Act in attaining some of the Goals of the three National Water
Protection Programmes The 1972 discharges are based on the daily figures included in Table 1 of the first National
Water Protection Programme. The other discharges are from the Monitoring and Environmental Loading Data System of
the Finnish Environmental Administration (available graphically in e.g. Statistics Finland 2000c). The corresponding 1972
discharges from the data system of the Finnish Environmental Administration are about 6 per cent lower for BOD7 and
nitrogen and 11 per cent lower for phosphorus.
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vestments in waste water plant had been modest
and when the first quantitative goals started to
appear in the waste water permits. Although BOD7
discharges decreased rapidly in the 1970s and
early 1980s the goals of the programme were not
reached. The phosphorus goal was also not
reached, whereas nitrogen discharges actually
were reduced below the target level.
The second programme contained a goal of a
65 per cent decrease in the BOD7 discharges com-
pared with 1986, which was reached. It restated
the goal of the previous programme that phospho-
rus discharges should be below 1.5 tons per day,
which was a 25 per cent reduction compared to
1986 and this goal was reached. It had no goal
for nitrogen. Finally it stated that ”the Ministry
of the Environment will set by the year 1992 a
target value for total discharges of chlorinated
organic compounds from the pulp and paper in-
dustry” (Ministry of the Environment 1989a, p.
15). Such a decision was taken by the Ministry of
the Environment in June 1989. This decision set
the target for the annual mean chlorine discharg-
es to be below 1.4 kg per ton of bleached pulp
produced, determined with the AOX method (Min-
istry of the Environment 1989b). The total dis-
charges of chlorinated organic compounds in 1986
were about 4.5 kg per bleached ton of pulp. In
the beginning of the 1990s the actual development
was much faster; by 1995 the discharges were less
than one quarter of the target level.
It is too early to assess the third programme,
since its targets are for 2005, but many interview-
ees from the industry expressed the view that its
goals will be hard to reach. The programme ex-
plicitly states that the targets were determined
based on production estimates of 1996. If the pro-
duction develops differently this will have to be
taken into account in future evaluations of the
programme.
In addition to the target values contained in
norms based on the Air Pollution Control Act there
are also goals and targets for the reduction of some
air emissions based on international environmen-
tal agreements. In 1979 the Convention on Long-
range Transboundary Air Pollution was adopted
in Geneva. This convention has been ratified by
Finland and it entered into force in 1983. The
Convention has later been extended by eight pro-
tocols, of which five have hitherto entered into
force. Of these some contain emission ceilings and
reduction goals and are thus important in this con-
text, whereas others contain other requirements
such as monitoring obligations or technical re-
quirements for different types of polluters. The
Finnish targets contained in these protocols for
sulphur, nitrogen oxides and Volatile Organic
Compounds (VOCs), or to be precise all organic
compounds of anthropogenic nature other than
methane (NMVOCs), will be discussed.
For sulphur Finland adopted the goal of the
Sulphur Protocol signed in Helsinki in 1985,
which entered into force in 1987. The protocol
stated that the emissions should be reduced by 30
per cent of the 1980 level by 1993, and Finland
declared the goal of a 50 per cent reduction by
1995. In 1991 the Finnish government made a
decision in principle to reduce sulphur emissions
by 80 per cent compared to the 1980 level in ten
years. The Oslo Protocol from 1994 also estab-
lished a ceiling for sulphur emissions of 116 kt
SO2 per year from 2000 onwards, i.e. an 80 per
cent reduction compared to 1980. The same ceil-
ing, 116 kt SO2 per year but from 2010, is also
contained in the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, that
Finland has signed but not yet ratified.
For nitrogen oxides Finland committed itself
to the goal of the Sofia protocol of 1988 of freez-
ing the emissions at the 1987 level by 1994. A
declaration that the target would be to reduce the
nitrogen oxides emissions by 30 per cent by 1998,
compared to the a freely chosen base year between
1980 and 1986, was also made. (The Ministry of
the Environment 1993) In the 1999 Gothenburg
Protocol there is an emission ceiling of 170 kt NO2
per year from 2010, i.e. a 43 per cent reduction
from the 1990 level.
A protocol on the emissions of Volatile Or-
ganic Compounds was signed in Geneva in 1991
and it entered into force for Finland in 1997. This
protocol contains a target of reducing the annual
emissions of VOCs by at least 30 per cent from
the 1988 level by 1999. In the 1999 Gothenburg
Protocol, which Finland has signed but not yet
ratified, there is an annual emission ceiling of 130
kt VOC per year from 2010, i.e. a 38 per cent re-
duction from the 1990 level. (The Ministry of
Environment 1998, UNECE 1999)
The sulphur emissions from the pulp and pa-
per industries are related to energy production and
pulp production. For sulphur the reduction goals
were established for the economy as a whole. All
the goals relating to sulphur emissions have been
reached (Fig. 12). As already discussed in sec-
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tion 7.1.1 (Fig. 10), the sulphur emissions per ton
of pulp have decreased sharply and thereby the
total emissions have been reduced even though
the production has increased. For nitrogen oxides
the goal of the Sofia Protocol of stabilisation was
reached, but the goal of the declaration of a 30
per cent reduction by 1998 was not reached dur-
ing the 1990s (Fig. 12).
While the total emissions of nitrogen oxides
decreased by about 17 per cent during the 1990s,
the emissions of pulp and paper industries in-
creased by 43 per cent during the same period.
The Finnish NMVOC emissions were about 177
kt in 1999 (Saarinen 2001), which means that the
target of a 30 per cent reduction by 1999, i.e. an
emission level of about 150 kt, was not reached.
In 1998 a committee made the assessment that the
30 per cent reduction of nitrogen oxides will be
reached by 2004, and that the VOC goal was ex-
pected to be reached after the turn of the century
(The Ministry of Environment 1998, p. 146, 149).
The committee also expressed the view that ni-
trogen oxides as well as sulphur emissions will
thereafter remain below the ceilings to which Fin-
land has committed itself internationally.
The effectiveness of the Water Act can also at
general level be judged by comparing the devel-
opment in Finland to that in other countries. In
Sweden the decoupling between emissions of
BOD and pulp production occurred approximate-
ly five years earlier than in Finland: 1965 and 1970
respectively (Figures of Rosén 1971 compared
with data from Finnish industries (PI-Consulting
1997)). Later the developments have been more
similar for other pollutants. For example the AOX
development is synchronous with levels of about
2.5 kg/t pulp in 1989 and about 0.2 kg per bleached
ton of pulp in 1998 in both countries (Metsäteol-
lisuus 1999, p. 9, Naturvårsdsverket 1999, p. 37).
Emissions of sulphur oxides declined earlier
in Sweden, i.e. in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Part of this lag in the Finnish reductions of emis-
sion can be attributed to the poorly developed reg-
ulation of air pollution. In Sweden, air pollution
has been regulated together with water pollution
since the late 1960s. However, other factors did
also contribute. The Swedish energy production
has had a greater share of hydro power and nu-
clear energy was used to a greater degree. The
effects of airborne acidification became an issue
earlier in Sweden and the consequences of ”acid
rain” were more severe than in Finland (Hordijk
et al. 1990, Merilehto et al. 1998).
In Finland, implementation difficulties of the
Air Pollution Control Act contributed to a slow
initial reduction in emissions (Section 7.1.4).
Authorities had little resources at their disposal
and the notification system was clearly suscepti-
ble to regulatory capture at the factory level be-
cause the factories could largely dictate what they
Fig. 12. The goals and total Finnish emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides and the emissions of the pulp and
paper industry during the 1980s and 1990s (Statistics Finland 2000d, p. 61, 63f.)
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were going to do. Further, the Council of State
Decisions on air pollution control differentiated
between old and new installations in order to avoid
a sudden increase in costs for companies. This
could have slowed down the emission control, but
in practice the reduction of sulphur dioxide emis-
sions was fast (Fig. 12).
Environmental concentrations of strongly reg-
ulated chemicals display declining trends. It is thus
fair to say that chemical regulation has been ef-
fective in reducing some important risks to the
environment. The well known problematic chem-
icals such as PCBs or mercury compounds are,
however, only a small fraction of the total chem-
ical load. In 1995 the 4th North Sea Conference
in Esbjerg adopted the much more ambitious goal
of ”moving towards [the cessation of discharges
of hazardous substances] within one generation
(25 years)” (Anon. 1995). One can argue that this
is in line with the spirit of the intervention theory
for the chemical regulation, as its objective is not
limited to reducing risks related to particular sub-
stances. At the same time there are clear indica-
tions that the chemical regulation has not been able
to turn development in this direction. In fact it is
unlikely that a regulation of industrial activities
can ever achieve this kind of goal. A significant
part of the discharges are now diffuse. Our re-
sults for paint manufacturing are also indicative
of the changes. Discharges from several firms have
decreased to a fraction of their previous levels,
but it is not as clear that the discharges during the
life cycle of the products have decreased, as tra-
ditional production discharges are now concen-
trated to central production units and to retailers
and users of the products. The retailers and users
are outside the scope of the regulation of large
scale handling of chemicals.
7.2.4 Efficiency
Cost-benefit calculations are difficult to use in
examining regulatory instruments, as the target
area is largely concerned with public goods with-
out clearly defined market values. The problems
involved in valuation can be divided into two cat-
egories: conceptual and practical. Especially the
valuation of environmental effects is problemat-
ic. Even though several methods such as ”Will-
ingness to pay” (WTP), ”Willingness to accept”
(WTA), the ”travel cost method” and the ”hedonic
price method” have been developed there are still
problems. The practical problems of utilising eco-
nomic criteria are often related to data availabili-
ty. (e.g. Braden and Kim 1998) Furthermore, im-
pacts cannot be unambiguously attributed to the
instruments. The main concern is therefore often
with cost-effectiveness of the regulation, rather
than cost benefits. Cost-effectiveness can be as-
sessed at different stages from the output through
to the final outcome of the regulation. The costs
can also be viewed from the point of view of the
administration or of the operators, or of the econ-
omy as a whole.
If the goal of the cost-effectiveness analyses
would be to compare the merits of different types
of instruments, it would be important to look att
outcomes, either costs in relation to pollution re-
ductions or environmental improvements. This is
because the direct costs of the operators are far
greater than the costs of the administrations in-
volved (Section 7.1.3). If, however, the cost-ef-
fectiveness criterion is used primarily to improve
implementation of the administration it can be
applied to outputs, e.g. permit decisions.
The pollution regulation according to the Wa-
ter Act has been the most expensive in terms of
public administrative costs as well as investments
and operating costs of the operators. The higher
public costs reflect different institutions as well
as procedures. The cost recovery from the appli-
cant was also less developed for water permits than
for the Environmental Permit Procedures Act,
which covered air pollution permits. The Water
Act reflected an older legal tradition with a more
narrowly defined polluter pays concept.
From the point of view of operators the ad-
ministrative costs were lowest for permit appli-
cations according to the Water Act, but costs of
preparing applications and the necessary investi-
gations could be high. With the introduction of
air pollution permits the costs of the operators
increased, but only a few operators have been re-
quired to make extensive investigations of their
emissions.
Monitoring of both air and water has predom-
inantly been based on self monitoring by permit
holders. From the point of view of the authorities
the system has been cheap. It has also provided
incentives to plan and carry out joint monitoring,
in which several operators participate.
For the operators the costs of permit procedures
and monitoring are small compared to the hun-
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dreds of millions which the studied sectors use
annually for investments as well as for operating
expenditures. Hitherto all these cost items have
been highest for water protection. The costs for
the operators are, however, difficult to assess.
Especially for process investments it is hard to
determine the share that actually is environmen-
tal (Section 7.1.3). The real costs for the opera-
tors may in the long run be lower than the direct
ones, since environmental investments often re-
sult in some efficiency gains through lower re-
source use and increased energy generation.
Our findings suggest that the total cost-effec-
tiveness of a regulatory instrument will signifi-
cantly depend on indirect costs, which are hard
to assess. It is possible to imagine regulatory in-
struments which would have hardly any costs to
the administration and no direct costs to the
present polluters but which nevertheless could
cause major indirect costs. If, for instance the
pollution control would lead to a total ban on new
emissions in an area, such control would imply
no direct cost but could have indirect costs in the
form of discouraged investment, retarded inno-
vations, unemployment etc.. These types of gen-
eral equilibrium costs are likely to be higher for
regulatory instruments than for economic ones.
We have not been able to say very much on
efficiency; more precise statements would have
required a specific study on the issue. One such
study was recently undertaken in Finland (Gyn-
ther et al. 1999). In the study the costs and bene-
fits of the water, air and waste treatment invest-
ments by the Finnish pulp and paper industry were
assessed. The value of the benefits from reduced
water discharges from 1989 to 1997 was estimat-
ed to FIM 2 275 million (€ 383 million), where-
as the investment costs were only FIM 619 mil-
lion (€ 104 million). For the development during
the years 1994 to 1997, the benefits were valued
to FIM 434 million (€ 73 million) and the invest-
ments were FIM 229 million (€ 39 million). The
costs of the investments in air pollution control
between 1989 and 1997 were valued to FIM 244
million (€ 41 million) and the benefits of the re-
duced emissions to FIM 754 million (€ 127 mil-
lion). For the period 1994 to 1997 the costs were
FIM 85 million (€ 14 million) and the benefits
FIM 309 million (€ 52 million). (Gynther et al.
1999, p. 60).
The results cannot directly be used to assess the
efficiency of the regulatory instruments for water
and air emissions. This is because Gynther, Torkkeli
and Otterström assessed the costs and benefits of
the investments in pollution reduction by the in-
dustry without linking them to specific policy in-
struments and without considering other potential
costs. Since there are also other reasons for envi-
ronmental investments than the studied policy in-
struments (section 7.1.2), the figures overestimate
both the costs and the benefits of the policy instru-
ments. An assessment of the efficiency of the reg-
ulatory instruments would further require that oth-
er costs than the investment costs of the industry
would also be taken into account (section 7.1.3).
The results do, nevertheless, give a strong indica-
tion that the value of the benefits of the regulatory
instruments has been greater than their costs in the
case of pulp and paper production.
Many studies indicate that marginal costs dif-
fer substantially between sectors and sites. This
would imply a clear sign of inefficiency, since then
the same pollution reductions could have been
achieved more cheaply with another distribution
of abatement. However, in the case of emissions
with local impacts the judgement is not straight-
forward, since only emissions that affect the same
local environment can directly be compared in a
cost-effectiveness sense. It is likely that the mar-
ginal costs of nutrient reduction have in many
cases been higher for the studied industrial point
sources than for non point sources, e.g. agricul-
ture. If inefficiency is found, it should be remem-
bered that there are also other evaluation criteria,
and that the inefficiency might be justified for
example by the equity outcomes.
7.2.5 Acceptability
None of the interviewees have explicitly ques-
tioned the existence of regulatory systems as such.
The environmental awareness which in Finland
has developed in interaction with the official en-
vironmental policy also suggests a general accept-
ance of pollution regulation through permitting
procedures and supervision by authorities. In gen-
eral the demand for (environmental) deregulation
has not been a major issue in Finland, in contrast
with the discussion in e.g. the US (Jeffreys 1995).
Arguments related to the use of regulation have
mainly been voiced in the context of new obliga-
tions. Thus existing regulations were used as ar-
guments against the introduction of environmen-
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tal impact assessment procedures (Sairinen 2000).
When Finland joined the EU these arguments
weakened considerably, as EU legislation must
be implemented in the Member States.
7.2.6 Transparency
In Finland the transparency of the regulatory proc-
esses has long been a key feature. It was part of
the Water Act and the inspection procedure, which
involved lay persons and public display of rele-
vant information. In the Water Act the background
of the transparency has been the regulation of case-
specific interests, but the openness has been adopt-
ed for other regulatory systems as well, such as
the Air Pollution Control Act, although it does
not give lay persons specific responsibilities.
The openness has provided easy access to en-
vironmental information and possibilities for de-
tailed and intensive public scrutiny of individual
factories (Haila et al. 1971) as well as free ex-
change of information between firms. The open-
ness has provided feedback to the regulatory sys-
tem so that the lack of standards, which has been
a hallmark of the regulation according to the Wa-
ter Act has, de facto, been based on something
which has been loosely referred to as ”the gener-
al policy” (Similä 2002).
The fact that the Finnish Forest Industries Fed-
eration has published annual mill-specific emis-
sions data in an environmental report for more than
a decade is a good example of the transparency.
The Finnish system is one of the best developed
examples of environmental information produced
by the industry. Mill-specific emission data is
nowadays also available on the Internet, for ex-
ample in the environmental reports by the com-
panies and the permit conditions issued by author-
ities. One interviewee claimed that the Finnish
Forest Industries Federation started to publish the
data due to the slow reporting on the part of au-
thorities and argued explicitly that the industry
would have benefited from more information be-
ing published in time. The fact that the time se-
ries of the key water discharges are only availa-
ble in graphic form in publications by the Finn-
ish environmental administration and not the ac-
tual numbers as a data table gives some support
to this claim.
Finally, it should be noted that transparency is
not only a question of the availability of data on
individual cases. A general transparency is also
reflected in the kind of syntheses that are provid-
ed. This is particularly important in case-by-case
decision-making, from which it is difficult to de-
termine the overall effects and functions of the
system. Until recently few overviews of the deci-
sion-making had been made available and despite
some studies (Sairinen et al. 1999, Laakkonen et
al. 1999, Varjopuro et al. 2000, Haila and Jokin-
en 2001), detailed comparative syntheses of how
authorities have used the instruments to regulate
different types of polluters are largely lacking.
7.2.7 Equity
Regulatory capture, i.e. the possibility for strong
interests to have undue influence on the regula-
tion, can affect equity. Our study has demonstrated
a rather close relationship between supervisory
authorities and the firms, but the relationship be-
tween the Water Court as a decision-making body
and the companies has been at a more formal lev-
el. Interview results indicated that the firms have
generally been satisfied with the procedures of the
processes of the Water Act. The processes have
been seen to be clear and straightforward, with
clearly defined roles for each party.
The permit procedure of the Water Act has
been based on ex officio expert assessment of
damages in order to determine appropriate levels
of compensation and indemnities. It has also pro-
vided opportunities for appeal. In practice this has
meant that the rights of those suffering from the
immediate effects of pollution have been guaran-
teed at least at a basic level of compensation (Sec-
tion 7.1.4), but there are several examples of e.g.
fishermen who have had to go through long and
difficult legal processes before reasonable indem-
nities have been granted (Saiha and Virkkunen
1986).
The number of major public conflicts with re-
spect to pollution at chemical industries and pulp
and paper mills have diminished. Several indus-
trial sites have been subject to public controver-
sy: the titanium dioxide plant off Pori (Saiha and
Virkkunen 1986), the oil refinery off Porvoo (Sair-
inen 1994), the pulp mill in Lievestuore (Haila et
al. 1971) and several others (Laakkonen et al.
1999). In the 1990s no comparable conflicts have
been observed at industrial sites. This reflects an
improvement in the state of the environment,
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which has increased the confidence in the ability
of industry to deal with emissions, and also in the
authorities and the regulatory processes. It may
also indicate a shift of the public’s interests to-
wards other types of environmental issues.
7.2.8 Flexibility
There are several aspects of flexibility. Our pri-
mary concern is with the flexibility of an instru-
ment to changing needs in relation to the out-
comes. The changing needs may arise because new
environmental problems are discovered or because
the objectives of pollution control become more
demanding. Another kind of flexibility is related
to the scope for taking into account site or opera-
tor specific conditions, i.e. a flexibility with re-
spect to the output of the instrument in address-
ing the need that motivated the instrument in the
first place.
Because the environmental requirements of the
Water Act were determined in a very general way
and have not been guided by detailed secondary
legislation, the Act has been remarkably flexible
in dealing with increasing environmental needs
and redirecting outcomes. The supevising author-
ities have been able to issue guidance to inspec-
tors on a variety of issues without having to wait
for revisions of the law. The initial notification
mechanism of air pollution control was flexible
with respect to the output, but suffered for this
reason from effectiveness problems and a high risk
of regulatory capture. The change to a permit sys-
tem for air pollution control increased possibili-
ties of regulation and also made it possible to cope
more easily with new demands for stricter regu-
lation. This is shown by the fact that permit limit
values could be issued below the general norm
set by the Council of State (Section 7.1.2).
It could be argued that the flexibility with re-
spect to the needs of the Water Act and air pollu-
tion control has represented a ”quantitative flexi-
bility” well suited to dealing with stricter control
of the same kind or to control of conceptually re-
lated parameters, i.e. new substances. The Chem-
icals Act has undergone some fundamental struc-
tural changes that shifted the work load from in-
spectors to the firms in order to be able to deal
with increasing demands, as the system of site-
specific control of details would have become
extremely expensive.
Both air and water pollution regulation have
only slowly adopted new environmental demands
despite the general nature of the texts in the acts.
Nothing in the acts would in principle prevent
regulators from considering biodiversity issues in
pollution regulation, but making new concepts and
demands operational in a form that can be han-
dled by regulation takes time. Methodological
deficiencies mean that there are as yet no stand-
ardised approaches to deal with biodiversity in
pollution control and it is unclear what form e.g.
compensations for lost biodiversity should take.
Similarly greenhouse gas emissions, which do not
have local or regional pollution effects, cannot
easily be dealt with in air pollution regulation.
There are no end-of-pipe solutions which could
be easily included in permitting conditions. In-
stead, interference in the use of raw materials and
the production processes would be required. With
the exception of regulating sulphur contents in
fossil fuels, such regulation is largely outside tra-
ditional air pollution control and would probably
have large negative effects (Hildén et al. 1999).
7.2.9 Predictability
The analysis of networks (see Section 8) stresses
the importance of the preparatory phases of the
permit procedures during which discussions and
informal negotiations take place. The permitting
procedures, which have been long both in water
and air pollution control, also leave room for ne-
gotiation (Section 7.1.6). The preparatory phase
and the long formal procedure make the output
rather predictable in practice, even in the absence
of norms (water pollution control) or with partly
obsolete norms (air pollution). The gradual adop-
tion of new permit conditions, for example limit
values for phosphorus (Section 7.1.2), and the role
of the national water protection programmes
(Similä 2000) have contributed to the predicta-
bility.
In chemical regulation the site specific safety
control permits are highly predictable due to un-
ambiguous norms. The development of new norms
concerning specific substances is slightly less pre-
dictable, as new scientific discoveries may raise
new issues at short notice, but the development
and approval of actual norms is a EU-wide task
and therefore so slow that the output can be de-
termined well in advance, thus allowing opera-
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tors time to adjust. The drawback of the high de-
gree of predictability is that it inevitably entails
slow reactions on acute problems.
7.2.10 Sustainability
Sustainability is an integrating criterion that re-
flects several of the foregoing ones. To meet the
sustainability criterion the regulation must have
a positive impact which is not offset by other neg-
ative effects. The regulation must also be accept-
ed, as positive impacts would otherwise dissipate
due to non-compliance.
The studied regulatory systems have had a sus-
tained positive effect on the local and, with re-
spect to acidifying substances, the regional envi-
ronment. These effects are generally in line with
the objectives of the instruments. Effects outside
the target area have in general supported the
achievements in the target area. The sustainabili-
ty of the outcomes have furthermore been sup-
ported by several factors, such as cost saving and
customer demands, and the development environ-
mental labels and environmental management
systems.
The effects of regulation on education and gen-
eral know-how have, perhaps even more than the
direct legal regulation of emissions, contributed
to sustained improved state of the environment
in the vicinity of point source polluters. Here a
synergistic effect can clearly be seen between the
different regulatory systems. One manifestation
of this are the changes in the union of profession-
al environmental experts. In the 1960s and 1970s
it started as an organisation for water and fisher-
ies experts, but in the 1990s its field broadened
and it became a general organisation for environ-
mental experts.
7.3 Effects of electricity taxation
In 1990 Finland introduced an environmentally
motivated CO2 tax, which from the beginning of
1997 was replaced by a combined CO2 and elec-
tricity tax (Government Bill 1996/225). The ob-
jective was fiscal, but possibilities to use the tax as
an environmental policy instrument were also not-
ed. This dual objective has remained during later
revisions. Despite this it is evident that the main
effect of the electricity taxation has been fiscal.
In 1999 the total tax revenue of energy taxa-
tion was about FIM 16 billion (€ 2.7 billion), most
of which was collected as diesel and petrol taxes.
Of the energy tax about FIM 2.2 billion (€ 370
million) is collected as electricity tax. (Statistics
Finland 2000b) The interviewed firms have clearly
not perceived it to be part of an environmental
regulation but one of the factors affecting the
working conditions of the firms by influencing the
prices of production factors. Thus the main effect
has been an additional cost to the operators, but
this additional cost has been modest.
The energy use of the industry has increased
during recent decades (Fig. 9), and the electricity
consumption continued to increase in the 1990s
after the introduction of the CO2-tax. In the pulp
and paper industry the increase in the 1990s was
34 per cent and in the chemical industries it was
15 per cent. Since the tax reform came in to force
in 1997 the energy use of the pulp and paper in-
dustry has increased by about 18 per cent and that
of the chemical industries by 4 per cent, when the
use in 1999 is compared to 1996, i.e. the year pri-
or to the reform. (Statistics Finland 2000b). These
increases in energy use do not indicate that the
tax has not had any effects, since the increased
use is due to increased production. It could be ar-
gued that the electricity consumption would have
increased even faster without the tax. There are,
however, other indications that the electricity tax-
ation has only marginal effects. The production
of the most energy-intensive pulp has continued
to grow at a rapid rate. Thermo-mechanical pulp
production has increased by almost 40 per cent
during the 1990s and lags only a little behind the
increase in the production of sulphate pulp (42
per cent) (Finnish Forest Industries Federation
2001). The demand for specific pulp and paper
qualities, the more efficient use of the raw mate-
rial and the partial refunding of the energy tax have
largely eliminated the effects of the electricity tax.
The interviewees from the industry generally
stated that the energy taxes have had no or only a
very small effect on their energy use. Some ar-
gued that the energy price has affected energy use,
but the tax was seen to be so small compared to
the total price that it had no effect. ”Energy is al-
ready so expensive that all simple solutions to save
energy have already been undertaken” is an ex-
ample of one statement of this kind. If, however,
the energy tax would be much higher than today
some argued that it could have an effect, ”...if it
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were increased dreadfully, of course it would at
that stage affect...”. Other interviewees argued that
their energy use was not sensitive to the price at
all. Among this group were representatives of
chemical firms which used very little energy, ba-
sically for heating and light. This view was, how-
ever, also expressed by one interviewee from a
pulp mill that produced more energy than the mill
used itself, but who argued that the electricity
network operators charged such high prices that
they had no incentive to save energy or increase
their energy production. Some interviewees, how-
ever, said that the energy tax might have partly
affected their fuel choices, mainly away from fos-
sil fuels.
The interviewees representing the authorities
generally had difficulties to express any opinions
on the impact of energy taxation, as one repre-
sentative of the national authorities said ”this is
a question that maybe the representatives from
the companies can answer best themselves”.
Very few of the representatives for the mills
knew whether their mill had received any repay-
ments of their energy taxes. This is likely to be
due to the internal organisation: energy taxation
is handled by those that otherwise also deal with
financial transactions and not by those taking care
of environmental issues.
As noted above, energy taxation has for most
firms had only marginal cost effects. It has nev-
ertheless contributed to the public discussion on
energy. This has provided an impetus for energy
saving and developing the use of waste products
in the pulp and paper industries. The energy tax
should be seen as an item in a broader discussion,
which is fuelled by debate concerning the future
of nuclear energy, the development of renewable
energy sources, energy saving, energy self-suffi-
ciency vs. open energy markets, the Kyoto obli-
gation and the general industrial structure in Fin-
land. Its role in the energy debate is stronger than
its direct economic effects would justify.
7.4 Effects of electricity taxation in
relation to evaluation criteria
The dual objective of electricity taxation means
that criteria can be viewed in relation to the fiscal
and economic objectives or the environmental
objectives. Here we will focus on the environmen-
tal objectives of the instrument.
7.4.1 Relevance
The instrument as such is relevant from an envi-
ronmental point of view because cheap energy
is one of the reasons for wasteful use of resourc-
es. It could be argued that the present general
electricity tax is less relevant from the point of
view of regulating greenhouse gas emissions than
before the reform in 1996. It could, on the other
hand, be even more relevant from a general re-
source conservation point of view. A clear and
deliberate reduction of the relevance has, how-
ever, been introduced by having two different
taxation categories for electricity, with a lower
taxation level for industry and commercial green-
house growers. Furthermore there is a system for
tax refund to the most energy intensive indus-
tries according to the amended section 8b of the
Act 1260/1996. A company which has paid more
than 3.7 per cent of its value added in energy
taxes can get refunded for up to 85 per cent of
the taxes, provided that these taxes exceed
FIM 300 000 (€ 50 456).
7.4.2 Impact
A recent assessment of the Finnish energy taxa-
tion concluded that the CO2 emissions would have
been 7 per cent higher in 1998 without the tax
instrument, but it also stated that the assessment
is uncertain and is likely to indicate the maximum
reduction (PMOPS 2000, p 47). Most of the re-
duction is due to the taxation on transport fuels,
but changes in industrial structure and energy con-
sumption in industry are estimated to correspond
to a quarter of the reduction. The analysis does
not, however, pay attention to the improvement
in efficiency that would have occurred even with-
out the tax, nor to other factors contributing to
energy saving and a shift in the use of fuel for
energy production.
Political signals provided by the tax have prob-
ably contributed to the interest in voluntary ener-
gy saving agreements. By 1999, 63 firms corre-
sponding to approximately 75 per cent of the en-
ergy use in industry had entered voluntary ener-
gy agreements (Motiva 2000). By the end of 1999
a saving potential of 0.7 TWh per annum had been
identified, of which half was likely to be utilised.
This is around 1 per cent of the annual electricity
use in industry. The costs of the programme have
73Evaluation of environmental policy instruments
been around FIM 20 million (€ 3.4 million).
In 1998–99 altogether 17 energy audits were car-
ried out in the pulp and paper industry and 3 in
the chemical industry. (Motiva 2000).
A potential indirect effect of taxes is that they
increase the costs of companies and may there-
fore divert resources from other environmental
measures. Our interviews show, however, that
such links are unlikely because taxes are per-
ceived to be part of the costs of raw materials
rather than an environmental cost. Thus the gen-
eral economic performance of the companies,
rather than a specific tax, has effects on the pos-
sibilities and willingness to invest in environmen-
tal measures.
7.4.3 Effectiveness
Energy taxation has reached its fiscal objectives.
Some environmental objectives have also been
achieved in the form of energy saving. The use of
energy and electricity in particular has continued
to increase, but at a slower rate than previously
(Ministry of Trade and Industry 2001). This re-
duction in the growth rate of energy use on a na-
tional level can, however, only partly be attribut-
ed to the electricity tax. The general shift in pro-
duction structure with an increasing share of the
electronics industry is an important contributing
factor.
In its Bill to the Parliament (122/1989, p.3)
introducing the ”CO2 tax” in 1989 the Finnish
Government stated the objective of reducing the
overall growth in CO2 emissions by 1 per cent
compared with the development without the tax.
and the emissions of nitrogen oxides and hydro-
carbon by 2 per cent. An economic analysis sug-
gests that this has been achieved (Section 7.4.2),
with some reservations for the underlying factors.
Studies for the national climate strategy envision
that energy taxation will be used for reaching the
greenhouse gas emission reductions (Ministry of
Trade and Industry 2001), but its effectiveness will
depend on the tax structure. In the past, energy
taxes have been subject to several revisions. Ac-
cording to Määttä (2000, p. 130), this has reduced
their effectiveness. Our observations suggest that
the low level of the tax is a more likely explana-
tion for its modest environmental effectiveness in
the case of industry, although the lack of predict-
ability may have contributed.
7.4.4 Efficiency
Energy taxes are, as long as they are kept simple,
a cost effective way of collecting tax revenue be-
cause it is reasonably easy to measure the basis
for the taxation. Monitoring and enforcement are
also facilitated by the fact that the number of ac-
tors is limited compared with e.g. household tax-
ation. As an environmental policy instrument, tax-
ation can be highly efficient from the point of view
of the environmental administration as it ties lit-
tle administrative resources. However, in its Bill
to the Parliament (225/1996) on reforming the
electricity taxation, the Finnish Government stat-
ed that so far 50 to 55 persons at the customs au-
thorities had been able to administer all the ex-
cise duties, but that the reform would require 40
new workers. The main resource need was due to
the different tax rates for industry and to the re-
fund system. To ensure its efficiency the effects
of the tax and different tax structures should be
analysed from an economic and environmental
point of view. Such analyses of the Finnish sys-
tem have been rare.
7.4.5 Acceptability
Acceptability of taxation is generally a function
of the level of the taxation, given the historical
context. This is shown by comparing the accept-
ability of taxation in high and low taxation coun-
tries. Changing conditions may lead to a rapid loss
of acceptability as shown by the reactions to fuel
taxation in the EU in the autumn of 2000. In sev-
eral countries fuel tax levels were under heavy
pressure and the taxation levels were no longer
acceptable when costs were perceived to increase
too rapidly.
Industries, especially energy intensive indus-
trial sectors, are often against energy taxes. This
opposition usually leads to politically feasible tax-
es, which include measures that ensure the accept-
ability of the energy intensive industry. Such
measures include exemptions for some sectors,
often in combination with direct or indirect sub-
sidies. (Bressers and Huitema 1999, Brack et al.
2000).
Some of the interviewees from the companies,
as well as the authorities, expressed arguments of
principle against environmental taxes. ”Steering
through taxes almost within production – it has
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this severe problem: as the investment money that
has to be earned somewhere, this type of envi-
ronmental tax will consume just the share [of the
revenue] with which something [some invest-
ments] could be made” is an example of such a
statement made at a mill. As noted above (Sec-
tion 7.4.3), such direct adverse effects on envi-
ronmental investments are, however, unlikely.
7.4.6 Transparency
The intervention theory of the present electricity
taxation is complex, with its differentiated levels
and refund systems. The system is far from im-
mediately transparent although aggregate data is
available on the tax levels and tax revenues. Firm
level data cannot be obtained, in contrast to data
on environmental regulation and emissions and
therefore it is not possible to examine the effects
or importance of the tax at the firm level using
data available in the public domain.
7.4.7 Equity
Systems of exemptions and different taxation lev-
els have placed the heaviest users of energy in a
relatively advantageous position with respect to
the tax. This feature has been a regular target for
debate in the energy policy discussion. The low-
er tax rate for industry has been seen as unequal,
for example by the Finance Committee of the Par-
liament (44/1996) (Määttä 2000, p. 164). The Fi-
nance Committee argued that the price of elec-
tricity paid by the industry is in any case lower
than that paid by households and small scale pro-
duction; that industry also benefits the most from
the liberalisation of the energy markets in other
respects; that services and small scale production
was discriminated against; that the competitive-
ness of the large scale export industry was good
anyway; and finally that the tax difference will
result in implementation problems.
The tax rates and the details of the tax are de-
cided annually in the state budget process, involv-
ing ministerial preparation, government level ne-
gotiations and finally a decision procedure with
several steps in the Parliament. Not all groups have
equal resources and possibilities to influence such
a process. Large scale industry, which can con-
centrate its efforts and which can obtain clear ben-
efits for a few, appears to have an advantage over
e.g. households when it comes to lobbying (Ol-
son 1971, Wilson 1980, Mickwitz 1998).
7.4.8 Flexibility
Flexibility is in principle high, as energy taxation
is part of the tax legislation with opportunities for
annual revision. The most recent law on energy
taxation has been revised twice since its entry into
force in 1996. One of these revisions dealt with
the tax refund (Section 8b). Attempts to use the
instrument flexibly will be met by political resist-
ance and demands for long term stable policies.
The position of strong interest organisations is,
however, not consistent: even sudden reductions
are readily accepted whereas long term increases
are met with opposition. The lack of self correct-
ing or adaptive features in the face of fluctuating
energy prices also means that increasing energy
prices will lead to demands for tax reduction or
more elaborate refund systems, but few will de-
mand increasing energy taxes when energy pric-
es decrease.
7.4.9 Predictability
Since the taxation can be changed on a yearly basis
in tax laws its predictability is in theory low. In
practice the predictability is not so low, as strong
lobbies of energy intensive industry demand tax
harmonisation throughout the EU (Brack et al.
2000). Finland’s membership in the EU has thus
increased the predictability of the taxation instru-
ment and at the same time reduced possibilities
for national experimentation.
A key characteristic of environmental taxes is
that their environmental impacts cannot be directly
predicted since they arise indirectly as a conse-
quence of the costs. In contrast the marginal costs
are perfectly predictable, which they are not for
other instruments. (Weitzman 1974)
7.4.10 Sustainability
Electricity taxation is difficult to use as an environ-
mental policy instrument, because it is highly sen-
sitive to changing external conditions. The debate
on fuel tax in the face of rapidly increasing prices
of crude oil during the summer of 2000 shows how
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easily the taxation becomes a political problem in
which non-environmental concerns will dominate.
7.5 Effects of environmental
management systems
7.5.1 Environmental awareness and
concrete action
The popularity of environmental management
systems has continued to increase. The number
of EMAS sites has increased in Sweden as well
as in Finland, although the rate of increase has
been slower than for e.g. ISO 14000 certificates,
which do not explicitly demand an environmen-
tal report. Since 1995 the number of EMAS reg-
istered sites has increased to 199 in Sweden and
to 32 in Finland, but the numbers of ISO certifi-
cates have increased to 1120 and 462, respective-
ly (EMAS-ISO ajankohtaiskatsaus 2000). The
Responsible Care programme of the Chemical
Industry already covers a large proportion of the
chemical industry in Finland.
It is possible to verify a general environmen-
tal awareness in Finnish firms. The management
systems are not the sole or even the main expla-
nation for the environmental awareness, but they
enforce the awareness and may be one way of
translating a general awareness to concrete im-
provements. The results show that operators who
have adopted environmental management systems
are often forerunners in the environmental discus-
sion among businesses. Ilomäki and Melanen
(2001) made a similar finding. In this study it has
not, however, been possible to rate the environ-
mental performance in quantitative terms. Stud-
ies in other countries have suggested contradic-
tory results (King and Lenox 2000).
In Finland there have been no formal links be-
tween the management systems and the regulato-
ry or economic instruments. The Environmental
Protection Act established a weak link through the
Environmental Protection Decree (169/2000) Sec-
tion 19, according to which the permit decision
shall, as appropriate, include a mention of how
environmental management systems have been
considered in establishing the permit conditions.
Thus the core of the intervention theory of stand-
ardised environmental management systems has
not been to link with the regulatory systems but
to provide firms with publicly credible and veri-
fiable ways of demonstrating their positive ap-
proach towards environmental issues. The inter-
vention theory is built on the idea that a volun-
tary systematic approach to environmental issues
within the firm will lead to continuous improve-
ment of the environmental performance. The mar-
ket is thought to reinforce the positive develop-
ment by giving environmentally friendly compa-
nies a competitive advantage that arises from the
fact that standardised environmental management
systems are more than green washing.
The requirement to systematically examine a
firm’s activities and their environmental aspects
is one of the most important main effects of the
environmental managements systems. This can
lead to an improvement process that also improves
the management system itself. A survey in Swe-
den demonstrated that significant improvements
can be made (Zackrisson et al. 1999). Our study
has also identified similar evidence of the effects
of environmental management. An example is
provided by a firm which replaced a printing col-
our after it found out through its systematic search
for points of improvement that the use of one spe-
cific colour corresponded to a major proportion
of the firm’s total copper emissions in the waste
water. In a pulp mill, problems with accidental
air emissions from power production could be
solved when the operators of the unit examined
the causes of the accidental emissions. One inter-
viewee stressed the systematic treatment of com-
plaints and the increased transparency. He used
the example of a complaint by neighbours on a
particular noise, which resulted in redesign and
investments. Similar examples of improved envi-
ronmental performance have been found in the
area of waste management of major industries
(Kautto and Melanen 2000).
7.5.2 Environmental reporting
The EMAS differs from the other management
systems by including an explicit demand to in-
form the public through verified environmental
reporting. In Finland, environmental reports are
provided by both EMAS and non-EMAS firms.
The standard of reporting has generally improved,
although 45 per cent of the firms on the Helsinki
stock market main list do not provide any envi-
ronmental reports at all (Lovio 2000). In Sweden,
signs indicating a declining interest in environ-
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mental reporting have been observed among firms
(Anon. 2000). This observation may, however, be
an artefact arising from the fact that firms have
to send in their reports to participate in a compe-
tition for the best report, whereas the Finnish com-
petition scans all available reports.
The results of our study indicate varying use
of and expectations on the environmental reports
(Box 1). According to interviewees the main role
of the environmental reports is to provide some
background information and in many cases it is
their existence, not their detailed contents that is
important. Eighteen out of twenty interviewees
considered environmental reports to be important
as such. They argued without hesitation that the
fact that a company has an environmental report
is significant regardless of the contents of the re-
port. One of the interviewed environmental man-
agers said that the most asked question is ”do you
have an environmental report?”
Box 1. The functions of and expectations on environmental reports.
(Palosaari 2002)
Interviewees stated that nowadays it is assumed that every modern enterprise has an environ-
mental report and if some enterprise neglects reporting this carries greater significance and
more publicity than an excellent environmental report could ever have. Nevertheless few po-
tential users of the reports look for specific information, but recognise the report as an expres-
sion of the firm’s sincere commitment to environmental improvement. Thus the basic contents
should be easily accessible and comparable across firms.
A more detailed analysis of the expectations concerning the reports shows that different
groups of actors have widely diverging expectations on the contents of the reports. Some would
like to see detailed accounts of impacts and measures to reduce these. Others demand a close
connection to the financial reporting of the firm. Finally many stakeholders would like readable
and interesting reports for non-specialists.
In general the interviewees considered reports to be reliable, although several recognised
the possibility that the reports are not a completely unbiased account of all environmentally
relevant issues. As one interviewee put it:”That’s the way it always is, that for different rea-
sons, there are things that have been left out of the report… So it requires that you have to be
able to pose the right questions, and read between the lines.”
Though it can be assumed that environmental reports give reliable facts about environmen-
tal performance, the actual environmental impacts remain unclear. Some interviewees stressed
that it is impossible to understand all impacts through the information given in reports. As one
interviewee put it: ”For example, what does it mean if one per cent of some solvents gets into
the air as diffuse emissions, let’s say in the factory area, what does it mean in practice?”
Among the interviewees those who were very familiar with environmental management sys-
tems and reports recognised and expressed well the limitations of reports. However, they were
also the ones who had the greatest faith in environmental reports. Most doubtful were those
who did not seem to have any personal interest in environmental issues. Although representa-
tives of authorities and NGOs presented most of the criticism, their opinion was that voluntary
environmental management systems in general have very positive effects on the activities of
enterprises. The authorities pointed out that management systems require that important envi-
ronmental aspects and impacts are handled, and publishing the information is a big step for-
ward. One representative of a NGO stated that environmental management systems have enor-
mous importance from the psychological point of view because they guide the activities of en-
terprises in the ”right direction”.
The interviewees generally agreed that open reporting about the problems, accidents and
difficulties with environmental issues increases remarkably the credibility of the reports.(”You
cannot just pretend that everything is OK”)
According to the interviewees environmental reporting is, at least for big companies, a ”must”
if they want to succeed in business. The interviewees stated repeatedly that environmental
reporting will be a crucial condition for success in the future. Especially the representatives of
mutual funds stressed that investing in environmental issues provides an indication of the man-
agement’s ability to foresee the future. Besides the willingness to be a modern company, tak-
ing care of the environmental aspects indicates that the company has everything well under
control. The interviewees generally stated that environmental progressiveness creates a gen-
eral impression of careful, responsible and systematic activity.
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7.5.3 Market and network effects of
environmental management
systems
Environmental management systems may in some
sectors become a ”must” in marketing (Box 1). If
a significant number of large operators have adopt-
ed management systems the others in the sector
or even cluster have little choice but to adopt a
management system as well. Similarly major cus-
tomers may through a domino effect force not only
a producer but also those delivering components
or raw material to the producer to adopt manage-
ment systems. This chain effect was seen in some
of our case firms. Similar findings have been made
by Ilomäki and Melanen (2001) and Kautto et al.
(2000).
The environmental management systems give
birth to a new breed environmental experts – the
environmental management consultants, whose
approach is quality and management oriented.
These experts differ from traditional environmen-
tal consultants, whose market has been investi-
gations connected with permit procedures, envi-
ronmental planning and estimation of effects or
environmental risks. Management oriented envi-
ronmental consultancies are largely offered by
new types of firms such as standardisation bod-
ies, e.g. in Finland SFS-standardisation, and clas-
sification firms such as Det Norske Veritas.
The EMAS differs from the other voluntary
management systems by being closely connected
with the authorities. The main purpose of this close
connection has been to ensure the credibility of
the certification. It has, however, also established
new types of contacts between firms, verifiers,
accreditation bodies and competent environmen-
tal authorities. These contacts create new flows
of information. Environmental reporting may fur-
ther enhance these contacts, eventually support-
ing the company’s development towards ”active
citizenship”.
A simple example of increasing cooperation
is seminars with participants from firms, several
different authorities and researchers. Although it
could be argued that such seminars would be or-
ganised in any case, it is evident that the exist-
ence of EMAS has demanded an active input on
the part of authorities. In this respect there is a
clear difference compared with the Responsible
Care programme of the chemical industry. The
Responsible Care programme encourages con-
tacts, but the initiative is in the hands of the in-
dustry. For EMAS important development initia-
tives come from authorities or through political
bodies such as the European Commission or Par-
liament.
7.5.4 Costs and other unwanted effects
of environmental management
systems
Within the Finnish public administration the
EMAS has annually required 2–4 person years of
work since 1995. This effort has also covered the
administration’s involvement in ISO 14000. With
EMAS the main work has been related to the es-
tablishment of the registration functions, includ-
ing the necessary legal background, the distribu-
tion of information and the development of ac-
creditation functions and the negotiations at the
EU-level. A minor part of the costs have been re-
covered in the form of registration fees.
For firms the greatest costs arise internally, as
the establishment of a verified management sys-
tem will demand active effort from a large part of
the staff. Additional costs arise from the use of
external consultants in setting up the management
system and in verifying it. Production, printing
and distribution costs of the environmental report
add costs. The costs of the external services in
setting up and running EMAS or ISO 14000 at a
site can be significant. The registration fee, which
for EMAS is € 1 700 (until January 1st 2002 it
was FIM 10 000) for large companies, € 1 000
(earlier FIM 6 000) for firms with less than 50
employees and € 500 for companies with less than
10 employees, is small in comparison.
One of the most unwanted effects in addition
to costs is the risk of internal bureaucracy. The
external bureaucracy is generally not a problem.
Authorities have not interfered in or retarded the
adoption process and the registration time of
EMAS certificates is less than 2 months. Within
firms the amount of bureaucracy depends on the
skills of the external consultant and the ability of
the employees to make the system a part of their
daily work, integrating it with other related de-
mands on health, safety and quality.
One of the concerns voiced by firms relating
to the partly authority-dependent voluntary
schemes such as EMAS is that the difference be-
tween goals and real performance possibilities
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becomes confused. The fear is that ambitious goals
of environmental performance, which may depend
on the successful deployment of some as yet poor-
ly known technology, are suddenly translated into
environmental limit values with legal status. If this
risk is perceived to be significant, firms may pre-
fer to play it safe and not set too ambitious goals.
This may lead to a rather pedestrian advancement
in environmental performance, without possibili-
ties for major leaps. The Responsible Care pro-
gramme does not have these kind of strings to the
permit systems and can thus evolve completely
independently of authorities in response to mar-
ket pressure.
The lack of real sanctions may attract poor
environmental performers to the environmental
management systems. These poor performers are
likely to seek public credibility in a greening mar-
ket without having to alter production processes
or general environmental attitudes. Our study has
not been able to identify this kind of effects of
the environmental management system, but King
and Lenox (2000) have observed that the Respon-
sible Care programme has lead to such opportun-
ism in the US with poor environmental perform-
ers joining the programme simply to gain credi-
bility. Eventually such free-riders could under-
mine the whole programme.
7.6 The effects of environmental
management systems in relation to
evaluation criteria
7.6.1 Relevance
The basic assumption of the intervention theory
is that the likelihood of identifying possibilities
to improve environmental performance increases
when activities and processes are systematically
examined. Our observations and related studies,
e.g. Zackrisson et al. (1999), have demonstrated
that this assumption is generally correct. The rel-
evance of internal management systems has also
increased because the marginal costs of end-of-
pipe solutions increase rapidly as demands on
emission reduction become more stringent. Sig-
nificant improvements will therefore often depend
on changes in the running of processes or in new
technical solutions. Such improvements have been
reported by our interviewees (Section 7.5.1).
Another aspect of relevance of environmental
management arises from the increasing public
concern for the environment, which makes envi-
ronmental issues interesting from a marketing
point of view. Environmental management and
auditing according to specified rules is necessary
in order to achieve and maintain credibility. Stand-
ardised voluntary environmental management sys-
tems are highly relevant in this respect. The great-
est relevance of the management systems is in the
relationship between firms and between firms and
authorities (Section 7.5.3). On the retail market,
environmental labelling of products has greater
relevance.
7.6.2 Impact
Our study has demonstrated that management sys-
tems are likely to identify possibilities for envi-
ronmental improvement and is thus in line with
the findings of other similar studies (Kautto et al.
2000, Ilomäki and Melanen 2001, Zackrisson et
al. 1999). It could therefore be argued that the
greatest positive impacts probably arise when the
system identifies areas of improvement that hith-
erto have not been recognised. The possibility of
such unexpected effects may greatly increase the
motivation to implement management systems.
The risk of bureaucracy within firms can be
minimised as firms gain more expertise and self
confidence in using the system. The risk is great-
est when the systems are set up by external con-
sultants with too little experience of the specific
characteristics of the firm. Under such circum-
stances it is likely that the focus will be on the
formal elements of the system rather than on the
substance.
7.6.3 Effectiveness
Those environmental management systems, such
as EMAS and certified ISO 14000 management,
which include external revision have a built-in
check of effectiveness. This check focuses on the
operation of the system, but it does not ensure
that effects corresponding to the intervention
theory are achieved. Our results have shown that
the perception of continuous improvement var-
ies considerably, from a slightly haphazard col-
lection of things to improve to a systematic and
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comprehensive view of present environmental
effects and possibilities for reducing them (Luo-
ma 1999). The effectiveness can be improved
with the development of environmental networks
between firms, which transmit not only general
information on environmental performance but
also demands on environmental loads. These can
arise from the published goals for improvement
of environmental performance, but hitherto spe-
cific goal-based pressure on e.g. the chemical
industries has been moderate (Section 8.3.3). One
of the main criticisms against the Responsible
Care programme is that it lacks efficient exter-
nal mechanisms for ensuring effectiveness (King
and Lenox 2000).
7.6.4 Efficiency
It is difficult to evaluate the efficiency of envi-
ronmental management systems, as they are based
on the idea of being an integral part of the overall
management. Depending on the structure of the
overall management the environmental manage-
ment can be perceived to be a considerable bur-
den or a minor addition. One Swedish survey of
firms which have adopted EMAS and ISO 14000
indicated remarkable cost efficiency. Half of all
environmental goals had a pay-back period of one
year or less (Zackrisson et al. 1999). These re-
sults may, however, indicate a transitory phase
rather than a sustained efficiency. With time it may
become more difficult to identify areas of im-
provement and significant improvement may re-
quire true innovations, which are unlikely to arise
as the result of a management system, unless it is
supplemented by an active and substantial R&D
effort.
Environmental management systems have been
perceived to be costly, in particular for SMEs (Za-
ckrisson et al. 1999). This agrees with statements
of interviewees in our study. At the same time
environmental management systems have in cer-
tain segments become unavoidable from a mar-
keting point of view (Section 7.5.3). With increas-
ing use of management systems, costs may go
down when firms become less dependent on ex-
ternal consultants in setting up the systems and
when competition among consultants increases.
Use of e.g. the Internet for producing and pub-
lishing environmental reports may also contrib-
ute to a cost reduction.
7.6.5 Acceptability
Acceptability of voluntary management systems
has several different aspects. First there is the ac-
ceptability of the system as perceived by those
firms which consider joining it. In this respect a
system created by the industry itself is likely to
be perceived as the most acceptable. This is part-
ly the explanation for the success of the Respon-
sible Care programme (Section 4.3.6). ISO 14000
has been developed in close co-operation with the
industry, whereas the EMAS is the result of a po-
litical and parliamentary process and can thus be
perceived to be the most difficult to accept from
the point of view of firms considering options for
environmental management systems. This is in
agreement with the observed rate of expansion of
the management systems; EMAS has clearly ex-
panded much more slowly than the industry-based
systems. An additional explanation is that ISO has
a competitive advantage because ISO is a well
established organisation which is already known
worldwide from many standards. EMAS is limit-
ed to environmental management within the Eu-
ropean Union.
From the point of view of authorities and the
public the acceptability order may be opposite to
the view of the companies; the greatest suspicions
are felt for systems entirely run by the industry.
Firms which only use the industries’ own man-
agement principles may be suspected of attempt-
ing to ”green wash” simply for marketing reasons.
A rigorous review system such as that included
in the EMAS may increase public credibility.
Within firms the managerial commitment is the
key to acceptability (Halme 1997). All systems
have commitment of the management as a start-
ing point and an essential part of the intervention
theory. Over time, acceptability within the firm
may be lost if the system is perceived to be bu-
reaucratic and if external verifiers focus on for-
malism rather than issues. On the other hand pos-
itive results of the management may enhance de-
velopment and lead to a genuine shift in the man-
agement paradigm (Halme 1997).
7.6.6 Transparency
The intervention theory of the EMAS aims spe-
cifically towards transparency, whereas transpar-
ency at the firm level is optional with ISO 14000
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and Responsible Care. In practice all systems are
reasonably transparent in Finland at the firm lev-
el, as environmental information is distributed
openly. This is particularly true of the pulp and
paper industries, which have a very well devel-
oped system for environmental reporting at the
firm level (Section 5, Finnish Forest Industries
Federation, http://www.forestindustries.fi/).
The Responsible Care programme produces
aggregate information, whereas the firm level in-
formation displays greater variation. Some rep-
resentatives of the chemical industry have pro-
duced very high quality reporting (Lovio 2000),
but these have generally developed their environ-
mental management according to ISO 14000 or
EMAS.
At a societal level the EMAS is the most trans-
parent, with all key requirements made available
in the public domain. ISO 14000 is available at a
cost, as the standards are subject to copyright and
sold. RC documentation is freely available through
the Internet. Interviewees generally regarded re-
ports produced by the management systems to be
reliable and transparent, although several recog-
nised that firms may choose not to report on some
issues (Section 7.5.2).
7.6.7 Equity
Environmental management systems aim at giv-
ing those firms adopting the systems a competi-
tive advantage. The Responsible Care programme
differs from this in that its purpose is to give chem-
ical industries an equal opportunity to improve
their environmental credibility. This is also indi-
cated by the observation that chemical industries
in the US which have joined the RC tend to be
those with greater discharges than those which
have not subscribed to the system (King and Lenox
2000). In Finland the situation is not comparable,
because all the largest chemical firms have joined
the programme. The majority of non-subscribers
are small firms.
In considering equity, a key issue is the rela-
tion to other policy instruments. In Finland regu-
lations have not formally recognised voluntary
management systems. In the new Environmental
Protection Decree (169/2000, Section 19) the first
cautious reference has been made to the possibil-
ity of some consideration, but there is as yet no
information on what this will mean in practice.
Business representatives have repeatedly stressed
that firms should get some advantages especially
from EMAS, which is the heaviest in terms of re-
source requirements. The dilemma is one of eq-
uity and also of defining the nature of any advan-
tage. Once a firm has a permit its costs are re-
duced to the monitoring costs, which are neces-
sary for a management system as well. In Finland
the firms pay no fees for inspections, in contrast
to e.g. the Norwegian system. The inspections are
not a heavy burden on the activities as they are
limited to superficial site visits.
7.6.8 Flexibility
In principle environmental management systems
are highly flexible because they should fit into
the management structure of the firm. Standard
requirements can also be interpreted in a rigid way.
This risk of rigid interpretation is greater, if ex-
ternal consultants dominate when setting up the
system. The built-in principle of continuous revi-
sion and audit makes the systems reasonably easy
to change and to revise when external conditions
change. An example of this flexibility is that the
sale of a part of a production unit of one EMAS-
registered colour-producing firm led to the devel-
opment of an EMAS for the new unit within a
relatively short time span. This also reflected the
environmental awareness that had developed with-
in the firm. When environmental know-how and
confidence increases, flexibility can also be ex-
pected to increase.
7.6.9 Predictability
From the point of view of the participating firms
the management systems are predictable in the
sense that the firm knows and can influence the
requirements that it has to meet. External verifi-
cation of systems introduce an element of unpre-
dictability at a practical level, as there are few
possibilities for appeal. Instead the systems re-
lies on negotiations.
From the point of view of authorities the envi-
ronmental management systems can be rather
unpredictable (EMAS). There is no formal guar-
antee that a firm will live up to the targets it has
established and authorities are offered no insights
into the system beyond what the firm chooses to
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reveal. In connection with a permit requirement
and permit inspections the management system
may, however, become a mechanism for increas-
ing the predictability of the permitting.
7.6.10 Sustainability
The intervention theories of the environmental
management systems include the idea of sustained
positive effects through the concept of continu-
ous improvement. However, the systems may be-
come non-sustainable due to fatigue and to per-
ceived lack of reward/benefit. This has been sug-
gested as one of the reasons for the slow growth
of EMAS registrations in Europe; firms defect at
a rate close to the entry rate of new firms. In Fin-
land the growth has been slow, but so far only
one firm has been removed from the register, and
only due to practical reasons (sale and split of
activities). Interviews suggest that large firms
which have joined the system are unlikely to quit,
as long as the environment is important on the
marketing agenda (Section 7.5.3). The problem
of sustaining interest in the EMAS is likely to be
greater than for ISO 14000 and RC because the
required effort is greater and the perceived bene-
fits are at the same level, or for firms operating
outside the EU, even smaller. This could change
if demands on e.g. inspections were to become
stricter in the regulatory systems and the links to
the management systems more explicit so that
voluntary external verifications could replace part
of the mandatory ones.
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8 The role of interorganisational
networks
8.1 The analysis
The main network dimensions used in this analy-
sis are: membership (types of actors), the struc-
ture and resources of the environmental adminis-
tration, and intensity (integration) in terms of con-
tacts and conflicts between various actors. The
networks are studied in various stages of the de-
cision-making processes; i.e. the pre-decision,
decision and supervisory stages (Section 3.3 and
Fig. 4). Within these stages four aspects are of
special interest: a) general network characteris-
tics, b) effects on decisions, c) effects on imple-
mentation procedures and d) differences between
the instruments. The following analysis of the
actual networks will be structured according to
these aspects.
The general characteristics of the networks are
based on the results of the thematic interviews and
of the survey of administrators, whereas effects
of decisions and implementation procedures are
also analysed in terms of the permit decisions. The
primary focus lies on regulatory instruments, al-
though energy taxation and environmental man-
agement systems are also discussed briefly. Ba-
sically the analysis is restricted to the interactions
in the permit processes. Sometimes it is extreme-
ly difficult to separate these from general exchange
of information, i.e. interactions existing regard-
less of the permit procedures. These general in-
formation networks are discussed in Section 8.5.
Finally it should be stressed that the focus is on
inter-organisational networks, but henceforth we
shall simply use the word ”network”.
8.2 Regulatory instruments
8.2.1 The pre-decision phase
The importance of discussions before the formal
applications is, by and large, stressed by all the
actors. However, this does not mean that the pre-
liminary discussions necessarily determine the
outcome in terms of decisions, but – when occur-
ring – they have an effect on the interactions
throughout the decision-making process. In terms
of actors, the water permit system appears to be
the most inclusive and the chemical system the
least inclusive one.
8.2.1.1 General network characteristics
The pre-decision phase contains the events oc-
curring before the application is formally handled
by the appropriate authorities (Section 3.3). One
of the main results of the analysis is that the dif-
ference between the pre-decision and decision
phases is in many cases blurred. All actors stress
the importance of the pre-decision phase in gen-
eral, but especially the firms tend to emphasise
the importance of continuous negotiations before
the application and the quality of application for
the result of the permit processes. As one opera-
tor said; the application ”...has to contain almost
everything. It is the largest effort, in which most
of the available knowledge will be gathered. I see
this as quite important, as well as the discussions
with the Environmental centre”. The regional au-
thorities tend to stress the decision phase – pre-
paration of decisions – more than the operators,
although the importance of continuous interactions
is frequently acknowledged. The views of the lo-
cal administrators fall somewhere in between.
They vary depending on whether the municipal
level is the decision-making body or not. The fre-
quency of permit processes also appears to make
a difference. In municipalities with a large number
of industries and extensive permit procedures the
following view is typical: ”the most important
phase is definitely before the application has been
written”.
Concerning main partners of co-operation, the
administration tends to regard the operators as
main actors, whereas the operators to a surpris-
ingly large extent stress the importance of their
’own networks’ such as clients, other firms and
suppliers (Fig. 13); ”... if we are making renew-
als then we contact the suppliers and they always
have good information on what kind of techniques
they have delivered to others”. Such interactions,
although not necessarily related to permit pro-
cesses, of course tend to affect the need for per-
mits as well as the general level of information.
It seems evident that the potential effects of such
general information networks, discussed in Sec-
tion 8.5, should not be underestimated. Specifi-
cally regarding the permit decisions, primary in-
teractions are directed towards the permit grant-
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ing authorities, which for the larger operators nor-
mally are the regional environment centres. The
following statement is a relatively typical percep-
tion by the regional authorities of most important
co-operation parties: ”... it is the local environ-
ment authority /.../ And then of course the opera-
tor, who is also more or less a partner.”
Secondary collaborators of the firms are the
municipal authorities and those affected by the
industry in question. The local environmental au-
thorities appear to be of importance regardless of
whether they are decision-making bodies or not,
but in the latter case mainly on the basis of infor-
mation exchange; ”we have the board of environ-
ment visiting us occasionally, so that we can tell
them where we are going and they have an op-
portunity to ask.”
The mechanisms maintaining the contacts be-
tween actors vary in terms of institutionalisation.
Especially small municipalities with limited ad-
ministration tend to stress discussions and visits
to firms as important means. There are, however,
examples of more permanent solutions, i.e. in-
formal bodies, in larger municipalities for in-
stance informal ”air councils” (ilmaryhmä), con-
taining representatives from various parts of the
local environmental administration. Even more
interesting is the fact that associations in some
cases (association of water protection, associa-
tion of industries) serve as a coordinator between
industries and affected neighbours surrounding,
for instance, a watercourse. As one operator said
in a case in which the local water protection as-
sociation had been the centre of these interac-
tions; ”that is where we meet these people and
deal with the matters, which leaves them the re-
sponsibility for the preparation. But then we of
course act as a steering group and work out what
has to be done. The Water Protection Associa-
tion is a link, or a place where we deal with these
matters.” The picture of the interactions emerg-
ing so far is one in which the local administra-
tive activities appear to be relatively strongly
determined by the administrative resources and
conditions and the industrial ones by the gener-
al co-operation patterns of the operator, region-
ally as well as in terms of the operative field of
the industry in question. The main interactions
are summarised in Fig. 13. The marked (bold)
relations are dominant ones, in the sense that a
majority of the interviewees stressed the impor-
tance of the relationship in question.
Fig. 13. The main interactions during the pre-decision phase in addition to the formal links established by the regulatory
system. Based on interviews with the operators, the regional and the local environmental authorities. An arrow from A to
B indicates that A perceives the interaction with B as important. (Bold arrow = typical interactions, normal arrow = occa-
sional interactions)
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8.2.1.2 Effects on decisions
The effects that the pre-decision interactions have
on the actual decisions are difficult to estimate.
Despite some variations of emphasis, reliance on
these interactions is strong among all actors. The
general assumption is of course that the discus-
sions will simplify the decision-making proce-
dures. As one municipal administrator said; ”if it
is a more experienced operator, he comes to us
for discussions and we go through the procedures
in advance; this and that statements are needed,
hear these neighbours in advance, that makes the
whole thing faster”. However, the importance of
the pre-decision phase does not mean that the op-
erators can dominate the process and pursue
their interests regardless of the interests of the
authorities. Both parties stress the importance of
the discussions as a mutual process and none of
the interviewees indicated conflicts at this stage.
The general impression is non-conflictual rather
than conflictual. It also means that the operators
can make use of the pre-decision interactions in
the subsequent phases of the process.
The preliminary discussions and the relative
unanimosity do not, however, mean that the deci-
sion phase loses its significance. The sample of
permit decisions for which the interactions were
analysed indicates that the permit decisions at least
to some extent deviate from the application in al-
most all cases (see also Similä 2002). The state-
ments from supervisory authorities also require
some kind of additional measures in a majority
of the cases, particularly in the case of the paper
and pulp industry.
8.2.1.3 Effects on implementation
procedures
All actors stress the importance of the pre-deci-
sion phase of the process to a far greater extent
than could be expected on the basis of the inter-
vention theories. The firms stress the importance
of qualitatively ”good” applications and their own
analyses as a background for such applications.
As one representative of a firm put it: ”The au-
thorities really should know when they get a good
application in their hands”. Especially the local
authorities deliver a similar picture in so far as
they rely heavily on discussions with the opera-
tors as the main instrument of the pre-decisional
processes. This also seems to be the case regard-
less of the instrument in question. In that sense
the strong emphasis on the pre-decision phase
tends to reduce the formal differences between the
instruments. This is however also dependent on
the relationship between the contextual factors.
In a context characterised by low complexity –
for example a small municipality with a homoge-
nous industrial structure perhaps dominated by one
large company – the interactions tend to approach
the formal implications of the legislation (Section
8.2.4.).
Moreover, there are reasons for stressing the
importance of more or less institutionalised pat-
terns of co-operation also at the beginning of the
application process. These will be discussed more
thoroughly under the decision phase. All in all,
the features of the pre-decision phase do not nec-
essarily determine the outcome of the other
phases, but the interactions do, when they occur,
affect the subsequent procedures and appear to be
relatively continuous through out the process.
8.2.1.4 Differences between instruments
As for the importance of the pre-decision phase,
the perceived differences between the various in-
struments are small. There are, however, differ-
ences regarding inclusiveness. The number of ac-
tors involved in the preparation of chemical per-
mits is more limited and the contacts between
firms and authorities are – according to the inter-
views with chemical industries – of a more ad hoc
nature than within the other permit systems. Al-
though the importance of the contacts is acknow-
ledged they are ”... pretty occasional. If there is
something on one side or the other then we are in
touch, but not regularly in any way...” These firms
also stress the importance of the local expertise
(local administration): ”...they know the environ-
ment, they know the entity much better than one
[authority] that gets a statement from the local
authorities.”
The impression of a more limited system is also
confirmed by the local authorities, although their
views naturally differ depending on whether or
not they have to do with chemical permits. The
local level implementation of the Chemicals Act
is considered to be complicated, requiring more
knowledge and resources than the other instru-
ments. Furthermore the pre-decision discussions
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are more internal and restricted, which affects the
general openness of the system. Permanent pat-
terns of co-operation cannot be found, apart from
the interest organisations of chemical industries.
The impressions concerning water- and air-
permits are somewhat contradictory. On the one
hand the water permits are, especially by the firms,
considered to be handled in more exact and trans-
parent processes. On the other hand the Water
Courts and the Regional Courts have apparently
not been particularly open to discussions with or
information from local authorities. To some ex-
tent this is quite natural, as the courts are not re-
garded as negotiating bodies. The new permit sys-
tem is expected to develop in a more interactive
direction. By and large, it seems evident that the
transparency of the regulatory processes associ-
ated particularly with the Water Act, as well as
the relative flexibility of the instrument, have pro-
moted continuous interactions. The fact that the
permits have generally been issued for a fixed
period of time is another feature with similar ef-
fects. The same goes for the lengthy permit pro-
cedures. These incentives for interaction were in-
itially less important and less inclusive in air pol-
lution control, as the initiative was left primarily
to the operators.
8.2.2 The decision phase
Especially the operators tend to stress the impor-
tance of continuous interactions also in the deci-
sion phase. In this respect it is obvious that the
Water Act has been the most inclusive one and
an incentive for institutionalising the interactions
between the concerned actors. This does not mean
that all divergent interests would be mediated
through these interactions. Almost all permit de-
cisions deviate in some respect from the applica-
tion and presuppose some kind of additional sub-
stantial measures of the operator. This reflects one
of the key differences between a permit proce-
dure and a pure notification system.
8.2.2.1 General network characteristics
The patterns of cooperation in the decision phase
of the process are partly determined by the legis-
lation. The primary collaborator of the operators,
as well as the authorities, is largely dependent of
what is the decisive level for the application in
question. The ways in which the operators stress
the pre-decision phase became clear above. Their
interactions in the decision phase are primarily
directed towards the permit-granting authority
(Fig. 14). However, the close interconnectedness
between the pre-decision and decision phases
should be borne in mind. All the actors stress the
importance of continuous discussions, which
means that the initial networks have possibilities
to influence throughout the process.
As stated before, the Water Courts have in this
respect been in a special position; ”... the Water
Court has not been able to take part in discus-
sions, as it is clearly a judicial authority...”. In
this sense the new system is expected to bring
about changes: ”... the activities of the Water
Courts and in the future the Environmental Per-
mit Authorities will in the context of the permit
conditions be strongly affected by the regional
environment centres, in many cases also the [re-
gional] supervisory authorities for fisheries,
the [regional] Employment and Development Cen-
tres and the local [municipal] environmental
boards.”
The regional authorities tend to stress the con-
tacts with the local supervisory units, in addition
to discussions with the operator. Especially at the
local level there appears, however, to be consid-
erable differences depending on the size of the
municipality and the administrative structure. In-
tegrated models, for example with integrated tech-
nical and environmental divisions, appear to in-
crease the internal administrative interactions but
also, perhaps contrary to what would be expect-
ed, external interactions with research centres,
local organisations and those affected by the in-
dustry. The municipalities also stress the prepa-
ration of statements and the notification proce-
dures. As one local administrator said: ”The phase
when we collect statements from those who live
here is an important stage, one informs and gets
informed...”
Concerning the other aspects related to the
decision phase it is worth mentioning that one of
the regional environmental centres considered
transparency to be a problem. This is not a domi-
nant feature. Usually the permit systems are re-
garded as fairly open. Neither do the interviews
deliver an impression of conflictual decision-mak-
ing, rather the opposite is the case also in the de-
cision phase. As one regional administrator put
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it: ”There were much more [conflicts] before./.../
it has to be something new to get people excit-
ed.” When conflicts arise they are related to af-
fected actors or local environmental organisations.
Moreover the municipalities have problems of
integrating small – especially chemical – firms in
the procedures, which is one aspect where it can
be questioned whether the spirit of the legislation
is fulfilled.
8.2.2.2 Effects on decisions
An interesting question is to what extent the fea-
tures of the permit systems discussed above are
reflected in the actual decisions. The sample of
permit decisions concerning interactions within
the chemical and pulp and paper industries (Sec-
tion 4.5.1) is relatively limited and does not in-
clude all types of permits analysed in this report,
but it gives at least indications of the importance
of the various mechanisms discussed earlier. In
all cases a regional environment centre is the per-
mit-granting authority. The sample gives an im-
pression of more restricted processes than do the
interviews. Negotiations, for instance, do not ac-
cording to the documents occur between other
parties than the permit-granting authority and the
operator. Statements from the concerned munici-
palities have been requested in all cases, frequently
also from regional authorities. Hitherto the pro-
cedures seem to be relatively neutral administra-
tive processes, which could partly be a result of
more intensive informal discussions in the pre-
decision phase of the processes.
As already noted, divergent interests are not
entirely mediated before the decision stage. The
fact that the statements to a considerable extent
deviate from the applications is one indication of
that. A majority of the statements request either
substantial measures or more thorough investiga-
tions concerning some aspect of the application.
Furthermore municipalities can, when they are not
the decision-making body, use general argumen-
tation based on local perceptions to influence the
decisions. On the basis of the decisions made the
paper and pulp sector appears to be more interac-
tive than the chemical one. It seems, however, that
regional differences in procedures are a strong
explaining factor concerning differences in per-
mit procedures between the chemical and pulp and
paper industries.
8.2.2.3 Effects on implementation
It seems inevitable that especially the water per-
mit systems have generated more or less formal-
Fig. 14. The main interactions during the decision phase in addition to the formal links established by the regulatory
system. Based on interviews with the operators, the regional and the local environmental authorities. An arrow from A to
B indicates that A perceives the interaction with B as important. (Bold arrow = typical interactions, normal arrow = occa-
sional interactions)
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ised patterns of cooperation affecting the process
as a whole. Examples of such mechanisms on the
municipal side are for example regular meetings
between the units within the environmental ad-
ministration, informal ”permit councils” and co-
operation within water protection associations.
Similar examples can to a lesser extent be found
within the air permit system. As noted before, this
feature does not in general increase the conflict
level within the system. When conflicts arise, they
are individual cases primarily related to neigh-
bours concerned, although several firms as well
as administrations stress the importance of envi-
ronmental organisations for the general awareness
concerning protection activities. Only one muni-
cipality mentioned administrative conflicts in re-
lation to the permit systems, apparently due to a
recent administrative reform. Other indications of
administrative conflicts with perceived direct ef-
fects on the permit procedures were not found.
8.2.2.4 Differences between instruments
Both in the pre-decision and decision phases the
systems differ in terms of inclusiveness. In the
case of the actors and cooperation activities the
water permit system appears to be the most in-
clusive and the chemical system the least inclu-
sive. When conflicts arise, they also – partly on
natural grounds – tend to relate to water permits.
Informal patterns of cooperation in the local bu-
reaucracy tend – again naturally – to arise in larger
municipalities with a relatively complex environ-
mental administration (Section 8.2.4), as an ef-
fort to concentrate expertise. In the industry, it is
difficult to find differences between the systems
concerning the ways in which they stress their own
networks. One additional feature related to the
nature of the legislation is, however, important in
this context. Especially the industry appears to
perceive the water permit system as a more defi-
nite and compulsory one, whereas for example the
general regulations and guidelines associated with
the Air Pollution Control Act are seen as impor-
tant in terms of anticipating the development and
thereby affecting the strategic planning of future
activities. Such effects are less immediate and may
reduce the necessity of external networks com-
pared to the water permit system. In such a case
the decision is turned into a matter of negotiations
between the permit granter and the operator.
8.2.3 The post-decision phase
The most important conclusion concerning the
post-decision phase is that there are considerable
regional and local variations in supervisory ac-
tivities. The system is largely dependent on the
activities of the operators (Fig. 15), whereas the
authorities face information and resource prob-
lems in fulfilling their supervisory obligations.
8.2.3.1 General network characteristics
In a formal sense, the supervisory phase includes
several mechanisms; inspections, auditing and
reporting obligations of the firms. Concerning the
regional level authorities, the inspecting and au-
diting activities mentioned deliver a relatively
formal and routinised picture; ”Well, we check that
they have met the permit limits. That’s the first
check. Then we make annual summaries /.../ We
have the same data, the industry, the Federation
of Finnish Forest Industries and ourselves.” Per-
mits granted by the regional environment centres
include an obligation for the operator to deliver
reports on emissions on a yearly basis. As one
operator said: ”...if someone notifies them [the
regional environmental centre] that something has
happened and they have not heard from us, they
will definitely react...”.
The authorities are – mainly due to resource
problems – relying heavily on these reporting
obligations of the firms. Especially municipali-
ties frequently admit that locally initiated follow-
ups and inspections are of an ad hoc nature – some-
times even non existent; ”...we follow the annual
reports/.../ has the change been positive or nega-
tive compared to the previous year?” Problems
of dealing with and utilising the reports are also
acknowledged, which is a problem when related
to the spirit of the legislation; ”...no one catches
you if you put the report in a folder /.../ if you
have an application to prepare it comes first.”
There are indications that the regional and lo-
cal variations are considerable. A study of the re-
gional environment centres’ notifications on en-
vironmental crimes and offences (Aakkula, 2000)
supports that impression. The number of notifi-
cations on offences is low. On the basis of survey
data it is estimated to ”more than 26” in the years
1995–1999, which is about 3 per cent of the total
number of environmental permits granted by the
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same authorities (Aakkula 2000, pp. 21–27). An
important conclusion of the study is that the extent
to which notifications are made or not is depend-
ent on the official’s personal attitudes towards
environmental offences, his motivation and the
traditional practices of the authority. Another sur-
prising result is that several of the environment
centres were not aware of the fact that the legis-
lation concerning notification obligations on en-
vironmental crimes has been strengthened. They
were applying old directives. This indicates in-
sufficient central steering, particularly from the
Ministry of the Environment (Aakkula 2000,
p. 107).
Our findings do not necessarily mean that the
control systems are totally arbitrary, but they do
open the possibility of considerable variation. On
the other hand the control systems especially with-
in large industries are extensive, including for
example supervision plans and supervisory
groups. As for distribution of information, the re-
ports are in general treated by the local environ-
mental boards once a year and thereby also dis-
tributed to the press. However, with regards to the
public attention there appears to be considerable
local variation. In this respect the plants confront
the problem of delay in delivery of information.
In some cases it has taken up to one year before
the information has been distributed. From the
firm’s point of view such information is out of
date and might even be counterproductive.
8.2.3.2 Effects on decisions
A specific question is, to what extent previous
permits – and the extent to which the permit con-
ditions have been met – affect new permit deci-
sions. Such a dependency is stressed especially
by the regional authorities; ”they [the previous
permits] have an enormous effect. If they can make
it essentially below limits, that’s where the next
permit will be”. Or as another administrator said:
”what’s the use of supervision if [the results]
would not have effects. Of course they have.”
8.2.3.3 Effects on implementation
The post decision/supervisory phase is, in terms
of implementation, not just a matter of control of
the permit decisions in an instrumental sense. It
is also a question of how the information systems
are used and of the expectations regarding the ef-
fectiveness of these information systems at vari-
ous administrative levels. In all these respects,
Fig. 15. The main interactions during the post-decision phase in addition to the formal links established by the regulatory
system. Based on interviews with the operators, the regional and the local environmental authorities. An arrow from A to
B indicates that A perceives the interaction with B as important. (Bold arrow = typical interactions, normal arrow = occa-
sional interactions)
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there appear to be important differences between
various actors, especially between the views ex-
pressed by regional actors compared to local ones.
From the point of view of regional actors, the
potential problems are related to information. The
permit systems are considered to be effective, pro-
vided that there is enough information to define
exact emission limits. As the permits are opera-
tive over a relatively long time, such information
does not necessarily exist. In such situations there
are no guarantees that the permits over time are
related to the actual emission problems. One so-
lution in order to achieve long term effects on the
implementation of the instruments is to define
exact limits as well as long term objectives. This
gives the operator at least some information on
the future level of the emission limits and also
means that the information from the supervisory
phase is used continuously in the decision-mak-
ing processes.
This picture of a relatively close connection
between the decisional and supervisory phases is
however not confirmed by the local administra-
tions. As the regional actors face an information
problem, the local administrators suffer from re-
source problems in terms of difficulties in obtain-
ing all the information which the system provides.
A frequent perception is that the permit-granting
activities take up all the available time and that
the supervisory role is restricted to obtaining an
approximate picture of the long term changes. It
is evident that the strong regional and local vari-
ations discussed above question the sprit of the
legislation and the intervention theories. These
variations are also confirmed by the central level
authorities discussed below in Section 8.2.5.
As for supervision, all three permit systems rely
heavily – apart from inspections – on the report-
ing obligations of the industry. The general im-
pression is that there is no conflict in views be-
tween the administrative actors and firms concern-
ing the basic principles. By and large the admin-
istrations seem confident that the industries meet
their obligations and the firms tend to regard the
supervisory activities as a guarantee of the qual-
ity and functioning of the processes.
8.2.3.4 Differences between instruments
One interesting difference between the instruments
relates to the interdependence between water and
air permits. One reason behind the success of Finn-
ish water protection is the relatively intensive
cooperation between industries, authorities and
research institutes, which started already in the
1970s. It seems possible that the system with a
permit-granting authority relatively restricted to
its legal role (Water Courts), along with the fact
that the system was based on individual discre-
tion, increased the informal interactions between
other actors. The recent administrative reform is
also expected to improve the negotiations in rela-
tion to the new permit-granting authorities. As
noted before, the water permit system is more
extensive, whereas the air permits are considered
to be a more direct result of negotiations between
the permit granting authority, the local environ-
mental authorities and the plants. These diffe-
rences of course also affect the utilisation of feed-
back mechanisms and information. The chemical
permit system has been more vertically organised,
also resulting in less intensive local level interac-
tions concerning supervision. The central and re-
gional authorities are of greater importance as in-
formation sources for the local supervisory au-
thorities than within the other permit systems. A
separate question is to what extent the environ-
ment management systems (EMAS, ISO 14001)
have affected the interactions and networks (Sec-
tion 8.4).
8.2.4 The network extremes
The purpose of the analysis in the previous sec-
tions was to deliver a general picture of the inter-
actions surrounding the instruments. It should be
noted that there are deviant cases – or network
extremes (elaborated in more detail in Sjöblom
2001) – which are of interest particularly concern-
ing the following aspects; a) the institutionalisa-
tion of informal contacts, b) the relationship be-
tween the phases of the decision-making process,
and c) the balance of information between vari-
ous actors in the network.
The sample of municipalities used in the ana-
lysis represents a variation in complexity in two
dimensions; administrative and industrial struc-
ture. Administrative complexity characterises the
larger municipalities and occurs within two ad-
ministrative models; one in which the local envi-
ronmental authorities are concentrated under one
division and another in which they are divided
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between several divisions. The extreme form of
industrial complexity would in this context be a
municipality with several relatively important in-
dustries representing both the chemical and pulp
and paper sectors. Mainly the municipalities fall
in the extremes representing relatively high or low
complexity on both dimensions, apart from two
municipalities falling in between the extremes.
Institutionalisation of informal contact patterns
can be observed in complex environments, par-
ticularly within the water permit system. This
concerns both the operator and the administrative
side. In one such example the operator stresses
the importance of a network including the mu-
nicipalities and firms around the watercourse as
a whole and which has applied for a single water
permit for the whole area. The participants in these
interactions vary depending on the agenda. It
should be stressed that these arrangements con-
cern the water permits only, and its relevance with-
in the new system is perceived as unclear. For
instance, one example shows relatively institution-
alised interactions and a network including the
operator, other firms affected neighbours and au-
thorities as well as other municipalities. The Fed-
eration of Forest Industries is also mentioned as
an important source of contacts and information,
as well as of consultants in extensive issues. It is,
however, unclear to what extent the permit-grant-
ing authorities are represented in the operator’s
network, and it is an interesting fact that the net-
work is not mentioned by the local authorities.
Nor is the importance of the pre-decision phase
stressed as such; rather the process as a whole;
”getting through the process so that some kind of
result can be reached.”
The operators tend, as we have seen, to regard
the activities within the various phases of the proc-
ess as highly integrated. The views of the admin-
istrators are slightly more formalistic, although
the importance of the continuous interactions in
general is acknowledged. The perceived obliga-
tions relate to the decision phase. Especially the
local environment authorities acknowledge the
possibility of influencing the permit decisions
even when they are not permit granters. Particu-
larly the examples of more complex administra-
tive structures show that the local authorities try
to promote the resources for such interactions
through more or less informal groups such as ”per-
mit boards” and ”planning groups”, involving the
leading administrators within the environmental
division. Thus high administrative complexity
tends to intensify the interactions of the adminis-
tration internally as well as externally. Within the
limited organisation such interactions are partly
compensated by contacts with other municipali-
ties in the decision phase.
Especially the features of the complex net-
works turn us to the question of a bipartite net-
work and the balance between the industrial and
administrative poles. To some extent they appear
to balance each other and also develop more or
less institutionalised interactions. But if we im-
agine a very limited administrative system con-
fronting a well integrated industrial network, it
could mean that the possibilities of the adminis-
tration to control or question the activities and
information of the firms could be rather limited.
Such a situation would indicate an imbalance with-
in the network, which however does not neces-
sarily result in an imbalance in terms of quality
of decisions. The dominant feature of the Finnish
system – continuous negotiations – might at least
to some extent compensate for such imbalances.
8.2.5 Differences in perceptions
between administrative levels
The above analysis has been strongly focused on
regional and local level interactions. Concerning
the importance of local networks there might be
different conceptions on a central level when com-
pared to regional and local levels. To some ex-
tent that is also the case. Below, the most impor-
tant central level characteristics are summarised
according to the aspects used in the analysis of
the decision phases. Regarding actors and inter-
actions related to the decision-making processes,
the conceptions at central state level (Ministry
of the Environment, Finnish Environment Insti-
tute) confirm the local level picture. The interac-
tions between permit-granting authorities, opera-
tors and control authorities are stressed. Moreo-
ver the superior knowledge of the industries, par-
ticularly at group level, with respect to techno-
logical solutions is acknowledged. These charac-
teristics primarily concern the air and water per-
mit systems. Again the chemical permit system
seems to be a somewhat divergent sector. Apart
from regional co-operation, the central supervi-
sory authority (Safety Technology Authority,
TUKES) also stresses the municipal contacts
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in terms of advisory and consultative activities.
Contrary to the picture delivered at local level,
informal coordination mechanisms are also of im-
portance within this system. Such activities are
maintained through a chemical commission in-
cluding the authorities, as well as representatives
of industry and trade. There are indications that
the interactions as a whole have moved in a more
extensive direction within a previously relatively
restricted and specialised system, with the Safety
Technology Authority and the Ministry of the En-
vironment as crucial actors at the central level.
In terms of mechanisms, several actors argue
that the systems have developed in a more inter-
active direction, particularly the water permit sys-
tem, which relies heavily on the ambition to in-
clude all those concerned in the process by way
of the notification procedures. A similar devel-
opment can be seen within the chemical permit
system. Due to a change in legislation in 1992,
new industrial sectors, particularly the pulp in-
dustry, were included in the chemical permit sys-
tem as users of chemicals harmful to health. This
change widened the networks of the safety author-
ities (now TUKES) in terms of industrial contacts.
The amendments of 1998, strengthening the links
between chemical permits and land use planning
regulations, are also perceived to reinforce the role
of local planning authorities, at least in the future.
Although the interactions have developed in a
more vertical direction, particularly within the
water and chemical permit systems, the central
level authorities rely on their own information
sources rather than on interactions with authori-
ties at other levels. This fact is also confirmed by
the survey data referred to below. The most cru-
cial perceived problems relate to the control pro-
cedures indicating great regional as well as local
variations and overlapping procedures. The prob-
lem is especially related to the water permit sys-
tem. This is a somewhat problematic feature, as
the municipalities frequently refer to resource
problems and rely on the reporting obligations of
the industries, which means that the risk of diver-
gent procedures increases.
In terms of changes over time, the main alter-
ations have occurred within the chemical permit
system in the 1990s, and are related to the legis-
lative changes referred to above, but also to the
strengthening of the perceived consultative role
of TUKES vis-a-vis regional and local authori-
ties. The water permit system has also become
more inclusive over time, partly because of the
adopted practice to engage all potentially con-
cerned parties in the processes.
A crucial difference between the instruments
is that the informal network within the chemical
system is vertically organised to a much larger
extent than those related to the other instruments,
thereby diminishing the importance of horizontal
interactions at local level. Due to the changes re-
ferred to above, it seems obvious that the impor-
tance of horizontal interactions will increase in
the future. Hitherto the informal horizontal net-
works have, with the exception of the chemical
system, been of crucial importance in implement-
ing the instruments. This has lead to regional and
local variations in procedures and resources par-
ticularly concerning the control procedures. Such
differences are materialised above all within the
water permit system. The differences could, at
least in theory, be balanced through intensive ex-
change of information between the various admin-
istrative levels. In that sense it is something of a
problem that the information exchange appears to
be relatively concentrated to contacts within and
not between the administrative levels. Such gen-
eral differences are presumably reflected in the
attitudes of the administrators concerning major
cooperation activities and information sources.
This question relates to the general information
networks discussed in Section 8.5.
8.3 Electricity taxation
No immediate effects of taxation on interactions
and networks can be observed on the basis of the
interviews, apart perhaps from an increased aware-
ness concerning energy use within the industries.
This is natural, as the taxation is only seen as an
additional cost on the inputs and there are no parts
of the taxation that are negotiable. Networks do,
however, arise in the context of voluntary energy
saving agreements and surveys, which can partly
be seen as a result of the societal interest in the
use of energy.
8.4 Environmental management
systems
It seems clear that the voluntary instruments have
had the most immediate effects on the networks
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of the operators, particularly on the relationships
with the main suppliers and customers. As a rep-
resentative for one large paper industry said: ”we
presuppose that a supplier of chemicals has an
environmental management system. If they don’t
have one, then we have a plan and a schedule
when we go auditing that they meet, for instance,
the essential ISO 14001 environment criteria.”
And as for the customers: ”many of our custom-
ers have been developing these systems and I think
that from their point of view they have increased
the reliability”. Beside the relations to suppliers
and customers, the voluntary systems have – from
the operator’s point of view, affected the interac-
tions with other reference groups and the admin-
istration in two respects. One relates to the regis-
tration procedures of the systems and the other
has to do with the fact that the management sys-
tems are used as a ”frame” or ”check list” for deal-
ing with environmental issues with the authori-
ties. Thereby the general assumption appears to
be that the management systems also serve as a
guarantee of quality vis-a-vis the authorities and
the public. ”...if we think about the public in the
neighbourhood /.../ the fact that everything is reg-
istered, also the contacts, if problems occur, then
it means that someone here deals with them and
they are treated in the inspections by the man-
agement...” These appear to be the most common
conceptions of the operators. It should however
be noted that alternative views have also been
expressed ”... I can’t see that they have had any
effects on the pulp industry because they are not
developed for us. They totally lack the idea of a
process industry...”
At the administrative level the immediate net-
work effects of the voluntary systems are per-
ceived as relatively limited. As one representa-
tive of the regional authorities said ”...the pat-
terns of co-operation have been formed before
these EMAS and others, they just confirm the pre-
vailing procedures.” Primarily the systems are
perceived to improve the acknowledgement of
environmental issues among the personnel and the
implementation of environmental standards within
the industry.
At local level the view is slightly different. The
voluntary instruments are regarded as useful tools
especially for supervision. ”... personally I believe
strongly in these environmental quality systems,
especially regarding the process, if we need to
know something we just look in the table of con-
tents...”. Or as another local administrator put it:
”... they make our work easier, but I don’t think
that they have affected our cooperation...”. By
and large the effects of the voluntary systems re-
garding interactions can be described as indirect
rather than direct.
8.5 General information networks
In addition to the interactions directly related to
the permit processes, the analysis so far gives
cause for underlining the importance of the gen-
eral information networks of the various actors.
These are not necessarily directly related to the
permit processes but their potential influence on
the decisions may of course be considerable.
Sometimes they materialise in more or less insti-
tutionalised and rather inclusive contact patterns.
Particularly this has been the case within the wa-
ter permit system. Concerning chemical permits
such interactions are more vertically organised,
whereas the feature is less tangible in the air per-
mit system. Despite such integrative features,
which are largely dependent on local industrial
and administrative conditions, there are on the
basis of the interviews some indications that the
general exchange of information is most intensive
in rather than between the administrative levels,
and – concerning the operators – within the oper-
ative field. The questionnaire that was sent in 1997
to civil servants within the environmental admin-
istration and Water Courts in Finland delivers a
similar impression. It clearly stresses the impor-
tance of the internal contacts within the various
administrative bodies.
The main interactions of the operators are not
in general directed towards the administration and
they do not get their information from the admin-
istrative actors. Their main interactions are with-
in their operative field and are of an external as
well as internal nature. The competitors are one
important source; ”...we observe our competitors
all the time, what kind of solutions others adopt ,
monitoring and benchmarking of our emissions,
to see how we are situated compared to others./
.../ And in Finland the exchange of information
has been quite open...” Consultants and own ini-
tiatives are also important sources. As one opera-
tor said; ”The consulting firms have a considera-
ble role today. And then we have our own plan-
ning division, which observes the development of
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technical devices and participates in it. But to-
day we buy a considerable part from the consult-
ing firms, from outside.”
Other sources are research centres (especially
TEKES and VTT) and their own firms. ”... re-
search is done mainly at group level and within
research centres, I would expect. And then the
suppliers of technical devices on their part. But
we don’t develop technical devices, we apply
available devices and undertake applied re-
search.” Professionalisation can also be observed
within the industries in that environmental spe-
cialists are considered to be important actors, es-
pecially at the group level. The administrators are
not mentioned in this context. They are regarded
as important specifically in relation to the permit
procedures.
The differences in contact patterns between the
administrations was quite congruent with the level
of decentralisation of the specific administrations.
For the Environmental Administration as a whole,
the most important contacts were perceived to be
the Regional Environment Centres, the ministries,
the public and the municipal administrations.
However, there were major differences between
the different environmental administrations. For
example, the civil servants of the Ministry of the
Environment most often mentioned other minis-
tries, Regional Environment Centres and directo-
rates and boards on a national level as important
contacts, whereas employees of the Finnish En-
vironment Institute, in addition to Ministries and
Regional Environment Centres, more often per-
ceived universities and research institutes to be
important. Civil servants at the Regional Environ-
ment Centres were more interested in contacts with
the public, municipal administrations and in con-
tacts within their own structure, as well as other
Regional Environment Centres, whereas admin-
istrators at Water Courts perceived regional agri-
cultural authorities to be important, in addition to
the Regional Environment Centres and the pub-
lic.
Looking exclusively at the permit-authorising
civil servants, both employees at the Water Courts
and the Regional Environment Centres perceived
internal contacts, or contacts with civil servants
at other Regional Environment Centres, to be the
most important contacts, followed at the Region-
al Environment Centres by municipal civil serv-
ants. At the Regional Environment Centres the
municipalities were particularly important for the
permit-authorising civil servants at the centres.
Permit-authorising civil servants at the Water
Courts perceived regional agricultural authorities
– nowadays the department of Agriculture at the
Employment and Economic Development Centres
– to be the second most important contact. Fur-
thermore, more than 50 per cent of the permit-
authorising civil servants mentioned the public as
important contacts, whereas the permit-authoris-
ing civil servants at the Regional Environment
Centres also seemed to find Ministries and con-
sulting firms to be important. Overall, the survey
indicated that permit-authorising civil servants at
the Regional Environment Centres perceived ex-
ternal contacts to be more important than their
counterparts in the Water Courts. This is also con-
firmed by the interviews.
According to the results of the questionnaire
to civil servants, personal experience, professional
literature and professional colleagues were per-
ceived to be the main sources of information. In
the Regional Environment Centres 66 per cent,
and 82 per cent of their permit-authorising civil
servants, mentioned courses to be an additional
source of knowledge. At the Water Courts 92 per
cent perceived their own training to be a source
of information, although courses were, to a lesser
extent, also mentioned.
Permit-authorising civil servants at the Region-
al Environment Centres viewed contacts with cli-
ents as an important source of knowledge, whereas
they did not see actors that not are a part of the
environmental administration, such as the public,
the media, environmental organisations and indus-
trial branch organisations as sources of informa-
tion. Interestingly, these groups were more often
perceived as sources of information by civil serv-
ants at the Ministry of the Environment.
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9 Innovations, and adaptations and
policy instruments
9.1 Innovations considered to be
important
The interviewees mentioned many innovations and
their diffusion that have had major environmen-
tal impacts during the past three decades. Some
have been primarily environmental innovations,
whereas others have primarily been production
innovations with important environmental im-
pacts. A detailed listing of all the innovative
changes is outside the scope of this report, but
the general direction of the innovations is clear.
The development has generally increased resource
efficiency and reduced emissions, especially in the
development of specific processes.
The diffusion of the sulphate process and the
gradual abandoning of the sulphite process had
major effects on the BOD discharges. In pulp and
paper mills, improved recycling of water, recov-
ery and recycling of solids, improved combustion
and dry barking have also contributed to improved
environmental performance, but they have also,
and in many cases primarily, been innovations
driven by gains in resource efficiency. In the
chemical industry, reduced use of solvents and
more efficient use of water are related to compa-
rable innovations. The abandoning of mercury
cells in the production of bleaching chemicals has
also been an important step.
Chlorine-free bleaching of pulp, storage tanks
for accidental discharges, improved safety de-
vices, replacement or containment of volatile
compounds, collection of toxic waste, activated
sludge waste water treatment or pretreatment of
waste water before sending it to municipal plants,
and electrostatic precipitators and scrubbers have
been the result of environmental demands and
have in most cases increased the production
costs.
Most interviewees only mentioned the recy-
cling of water and the decreased water consump-
tion in the context of reduced water discharges,
whereas some also connected it to the dry solid
matters of the sludge. Drier sludge was argued to
have improved the energy efficiency and de-
creased sulphur dioxide emissions.
In addition to specific technologies, many in-
terviewees made general references to improved
processes and recycling. These represent incre-
mental improvements rather than radical innova-
tions but may nevertheless improve environmen-
tal performance. In fact, many interviewees stat-
ed that the most important changes have been in
the values and approaches of the companies. The
values and approaches are then reflected in their
managerial processes.
9.2 The effects of regulatory
instruments on innovations and their
diffusion
There are three main ways in which the water and
air permits could affect innovations and their dif-
fusion. First, emission limits or other strict de-
mands on the operations could force technologies
to emerge or spread. Second, operators could be
required to carry out R&D work to achieve im-
proved environmental performance. Third, the
permitting process could reshape networks, there-
by exposing operators to new information. The
network effects were dealt with in Section 8.5.
To be exact, the regulatory approach under the
Air Pollution Act gradually developed from a
notification system to a permit system between
1992 and1995 as explained in section 5.3.2.1.
What here has been said about permits applies in
principle to the notification system as well.
Regulation of emissions through emission limit
values has been the core of the permits. In the case
of pulp and paper production the inputs have not
been regulated at all in the water permits. Pro-
cesses are in practice regulated with a gentle hand,
e.g. through demands on risk management, and
thus effects on technology are of minor impor-
tance. The air permits contain input as well as
process requirements in addition to the output lim-
its (Section 5.3.2.2). In addition, permits often
contain R&D-obligations, which directly require
operators to carry out R&D-projects. These are
considered, due to their explicit link to new tech-
nology, although their role was not emphasised
in the interviews.
Regulatory instruments may affect innovations
and diffusion by changing the participants in the
networks as well as the interaction patterns (in-
tensity, frequency, form etc.) and thus making new
information available to the polluting company.
This could affect access to information on tech-
nological solutions and environmental conse-
quences of the production. The networks can also
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distribute information on the views of the admin-
istration, e.g. concerning technical solutions or the
importance they give to different environmental
effects. Our results indicate that the role of the
administration in the networks is primarily to pro-
vide environmental information. The information
on technical solutions is distributed effectively
through the industry by industry networks and is
based on a general openness (see Section 8).
9.2.1 Emission limit values and
comparable strict demands
In principle, quantitative emission limits or com-
parable demands may be designed so that they
force firms to innovate, encourage or enforce the
diffusion of innovations, or allow firms to con-
tinue with business as usual. As noted in Section
3.3, the distinction between innovation and dif-
fusion is not always sharp. Once emission limit
values have been set up, the industry is free to
choose the means to comply with the values.
Limit values in Finland have not been aimed
at forcing operators to innovate in order to achieve
the emission limits, but rather to assist the diffu-
sion of innovations. In specifying limit values the
administration considers the links leading to re-
duced emissions (Fig. 16). As emphasised earli-
er, investments may take place before limit val-
ues are issued and still be caused by the limit val-
ues, due to anticipation. There is thus no tempo-
ral dimension in Fig. 16, only a description of in-
fluence. The limit values and other features of the
permits have thus been designed on the basis of
technological solutions considered available to the
operators (see also Box 2). The firm’s strategy
depends strongly on the other factors (Sections
3.4.2 and 9.2.2 ) which influence the choice of
solution and investment.
Emission limit values or safety regulations that
an operator can achieve with available technolo-
gy do not as such create additional economic in-
centives for the operators to innovate (Derzko
1996). However, an individual emission limit val-
ue is not set up in a vacuum. Even though an in-
dividual limit value may appear not to provide
incentives for innovation, the existence of the reg-
ulatory system creates markets for innovations that
help industries meet permit limits and other envi-
ronmental requirements at the lowest possible cost
(Section 7.2.4).
The industry is aware of the fact that emission
limit values are tightening with each permit and
they are set up partly on the basis of the so-called
general ”policy line” (see Section 5.3.1 and Mick-
witz 2000a). This gives a further implicit incen-
tive to innovate technological solutions which
fulfil anticipated future emission limits. This an-
ticipatory effect may be important in a system with
a high degree of transparency. However, the in-
centive to invest significantly in research and de-
velopment that would change the production proc-
esses purely from an environmental point of view
is weak, because environmental authorities judge
each production process primarily on its own
merits (Section 9.2.2 below).
The anticipated effects of a limit value in a
permit on the diffusion of technology (Fig. 16) is
based on the assumption that the administration
knows the technological possibilities available at
reasonable cost and that the permit decision is
made or known before the crucial investment de-
cisions have been made by the operator. Although
the technological solutions are proposed by the
industry in its application for a permit, it is the
task of administration to assess the acceptability
of the proposal. The asymmetry of information
on the technological possibilities between the ad-
ministration and industry is generally acknowl-
Fig. 16. A model of the logic of the effects of permit limit values on the diffusion of innovations (Mickwitz 2000b)
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edged by the administration. As one interviewee
put it: ”As a whole the administration does not
know the technological solutions as well as the
industry, because who else could know how to
manage the mill as well as the operator. The op-
erator always has the best know-how.” (Similä
2000)
Due to the reactive nature of the permitting
process the administration is bound to the time
schedule of the industry. According to a decision
by the Supreme Administrative Court (Box 2) the
emission limit values must be designed on the
basis of existing process technology, even when
the administration could foresee developments of
process technology. Although it is possible, in
principle, to set emission limit values which force
the operator to adopt new end-of-pipe solutions,
the process technological solutions are usually
already in place and they may have a much great-
er effect on the final outcome (see Box 3).
Both the Water Court material and the inter-
views showed the impact on the diffusion of end-
of-pipe technology. With the respect to 6 mills,
Similä (2002) evaluated the coercive impact using
two criteria:
(1)Did the final limit values and other conditions
of a permit become more stringent than origi-
nally proposed by the operator in the applica-
tion or agreed during the administrative pro-
cess; and
(2)Did the more stringent conditions force
the operator to adopt a new technological so-
lution.
The coercive impact was observed in approxi-
mately half of the cases studied. The coercive
impact is stronger for end-of-pipe technology than
for process technology, although the distinction
Box 2. An example illustrating the reactive nature of permitting.
(Similä 2000)
The case concerns the establishment of a new production line in a sulphate mill. The plan of
the operator included, among other things, the establishment of a new sulphate pulp line (the
so called 2nd sulphate pulp line) . During the administrative process, which lasted several years,
the environmental authorities pointed out that the technology may improve significantly in the
coming years.
The Water Court gave its decision in 1994 and in that decision concluded that, due to a
variety of technical and other reasons, the 2nd sulphate pulp line would not start operating be-
fore the year 2000. The Water Court refused to issue a permit for the 2nd sulphate pulp line on
the grounds that the technology of sulphate pulp production and wastewater treatment may
develop significantly in the coming years. The Court explicitly referred to a closed waste water
treatment process. The Court argued that if a permit had been issued, the conditions of the
permit would possibly already be out of date before the 2nd sulphate pulp line was taken into
operation.
The operator appealed to the Water Court of Appeal, which did not change the part of the
decision dealing with technological change. Thereafter, the operator made a petition for leave
of appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, which was granted. In its decision (KHO
2.10.1996 t. 3085) the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the decision of the Water Court
of Appeal and returned the matter to the Water Court. The Supreme Administrative Court con-
sidered that it is not justifiable to refuse to issue a permit on the grounds that the technology
may improve in the future. This exemplifies the reactive nature of the permitting, the per-
mitting process only reacts on the development that has already taken place, it neither
predicts nor tries to force technological development. In addition, the Court pointed out
that in a permit the operator may be imposed to make a revision application after a short peri-
od of time.
Despite the problems related to permitting, e.g. asymmetric information and its reactive na-
ture, the previous sections (Sections 6 and 7) show that there has been significant reduction of
discharges despite the increase in production during the past 30 years. The statistical data
and the interviews show that the permits have clearly been one, but only one factor affecting
this development. It is also possible to find examples of diffusion of technology at a concrete
level, i.e. at the level of an individual permit, both on the basis of court material and interview
material.
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is not always very clear. Four of the five mills for
which Similä (2002) could make a judgement per-
mit by permit were once forced to adopt a new
major end-of-pipe solution. Three times a new
purification plant was established and once the
operator solved the problem by leading its waste-
water to a municipal wastewater treatment plant.
The impact of permitting on the sixth mill, where
no major coercive impact on end-of-pipe technol-
ogy was found, is discussed in Box 3.
Box 3. A mill for which no coercive major impact on the end-of-pipe
technology was found. (Similä 2000)
The case is an industrial integrate including several mills (e.g. a sulphate mill, a paper mill, a
cardboard mill). Two mills (a sulphite and a sulphate mill), which were in operation before the
new permit was granted, were closed and replaced by a sulphate mill with greater capacity
than that of the old mills together. In addition, the production capacity of other mills, e.g. of a
paper mill, was increased. Thus in this case a major technological reform was carried out. The
permitting procedure lasted several years from the end of 1977 until 1985.
Fig. 17. Proposals and decided BOD7 limit values as well as discharges of a case concerning major techno-
logical reform. ”Permit limit” refers to the limit value in force, ”operator” to the operator’s response to the
draft permit prepared by the ad hoc Inspection Board and ”National Board of Waters” to the response of the
supervisionary authority to the draft permit.
As a result of the major technological changes the BOD load, which at that time was con-
sidered the critical parameter, was reduced remarkably as can seen from Fig. 17. As a reac-
tion to the draft permit prepared by the ad hoc Inspection Board, the operator accepted radical
tightening of the BOD limit; according to the operator the BOD7 limit should have been decided
so that it would have gradually tightened to 12 t/d instead of BOD5 40 t/d in the preceding
permit. The radical tightening was partly possible due to improvements in environmental tech-
nology. However, another factor, the change of the general production method from sulphite to
sulphate pulping was also crucial. The sulphate pulping process resulted in a remarkable re-
duction of the BOD load.
According to one interviewee, who is an employee of the company concerned, permitting
had an impact on the environmental technology adopted by the operator. The interviewee men-
tioned that the limit value on oxygen consumption forced the operator to adopt an activated
sludge plant technology. It is also worth noticing that – according to the interviewee – the puri-
fication plant was the first activated sludge plant in a pulp mill in Finland. The impact on the
diffusion of technology can be confirmed on the basis of documents. According to the Water
Court material the supervisory authorities required emission limit values based on an activated
sludge plant instead of an aerial lagoon as originally planned by the operator. However, in its
response to the draft permit prepared by the ad hoc Inspection Board, the operator communi-
cated its willingness to adopt an activated sludge plant as well as to improve the process tech-
nology by extended pulping and more efficient washing. These changes in technology were
the basis for the emission limit value which the operator considered reasonable (BOD7 12 t/d).
Thus diffusion of the technology was based on anticipation.
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The diffusion of activated sludge treatment
plants is seen by most of the interviewees from
the industry as a result of permit limits that were
based on an implicit standard technology. An ex-
ample of such a statement is: ”...the permit limit
was determined so that it was at the level which
is reached by an activated sludge treatment plant,
since it is currently considered that everyone
should have one of that kind...”. Some, however,
viewed the role of the permits as less direct for
their decision to build an activated sludge treat-
ment plant at a particular point in time, and
stressed the role of customer demands. (Mickwitz
2000b, Similä 2002)
Although we have found cases in which per-
mit limits have reduced discharges through the
diffusion of new waste water treatment plants, the
situation has not been the same for all mills. Cases
have been found in which the permit limits have
had no effect on the reduction of the discharges.
Combining the finding that 8 mills have only had
one or two different BOD limits (one mill got its
first limit value in 1995) with the fact that many
mills have been far below the limit levels years
before the limits have come into force and with
the modelling results and the analyses of the in-
terviews justifies this claim. (Mickwitz 2000a,
Section 7)
Compared with the water permits the air per-
mits contain more input and technology require-
ments (Section 5.3.2.2.). The technology require-
ments generally specified the type of filter to be
used for emission control or the height of the chim-
ney. The input conditions determined some char-
acteristic of the fuel that could be used, e.g. an
upper limit on the sulphur content of heavy fuel
oil. Air permits could thus have affected diffu-
sion and innovations through output limit values
or input conditions requiring the adoption of new
technology, or directly by the technology require-
ments. A requirement to use a particular technol-
ogy may in theory also slow down the diffusion
of more efficient technologies.
All interviewees representing the industry saw
the investment in electric filters as clearly induced
by the air regulations. The investments were gen-
erally said to be caused by the emission limits,
mainly on sulphur and nitrogen oxides. That in-
vestments in new filters which had been required
for old combustion boilers was sometimes ques-
tioned. ”...it is sometimes a little questionable for
some old boiler, when the permit requirements
state that from a particular day an emission must
be no more than a particular limit, and if the boiler
has only some years left and it requires some ten
millions in investments, then it might be a situa-
tion in which the required investment is not nec-
essarily very wise.”
No interviewee mentioned any investments that
had been made because of the input conditions or
technological requirement, which does not mean
that such investments have not been made. One
interviewee mentioned that a mill had changed
over to natural gas because of the input limit val-
ues in its permit.
One central question is how often the Finnish
permitting systems have just confirmed the prac-
tices already adopted by the industries and thus
allowed them to continue as before without adopt-
ing innovations they would otherwise not have
adopted. One indicator of this is the frequency of
permit decisions, in which the future permit lim-
its have been higher than the emissions at the time
of decision-making. Mickwitz (2000b) shows that,
for example, in the case of BOD the average pol-
lution at the time of the decision was less than
the future permit limit in 109 out of 162 cases.
However, the interpretation is not straightforward,
since even if the discharges have on average been
below a limit the firm may have to take some ac-
tion in order to ensure that the highest discharges
remain below the limit. This is important, since
most permit limits have been defined for average
monthly or quarterly discharges (Section 4.4.1).
Another difficult issue is anticipation; in many
cases the discharges have been below the future
permit levels because investments have already
been made to achieve the limit at the time of for-
mal decision-making. Anticipated increases in
production may also in some cases lead authori-
ties to set future emission limits higher than cur-
rent emissions.
In this context it is worth noting that the inter-
vention theory of the Air Pollution Control Act
has gradually developed from a notification sys-
tem to a permit system between 1992 and 1995
as explained in section 5.3.2.1. The basic differ-
ence between a notification system and a real per-
mit system is that under a notification regime the
regulated activity may have been in operation
while the environmental requirements were set up
by the authorities but a permit is granted before a
mill, or in the case of an existing mill, a new in-
vestment, is taken into operation. It is far more
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difficult for a decision-maker under a notification
regime to influence the process technology. The
decision-maker must always take into considera-
tion the costs of environmental investments and
the cost varies depending on the moment of deci-
sion. It is usually cheaper to make adjustments
before construction than during operation of an
activity. Because operators know this they may
be reluctant to anticipate the requirements of au-
thorities. Thus a notification system has weaker
influence on the process technology than a per-
mit mechanism. This observation is crucial with
respect to the Air Pollution Control Act, because
the change from a notification system to a permit
system has not yet had full impact on the admin-
istrative practice. Those mills which have made a
notification before 1992 were not obliged to ac-
quire a permit unless they do not make an invest-
ment which requires a permit. Thus, in practice
there are many mills which were not regulated by
an air pollution control permit at any moment
during the existence of the Act.
9.2.2 Market forces, regulation and
innovations
The adoption of new bleaching processes for pulp
in order to reduce the discharges of chlorine com-
pounds is used by all representatives from the mills
as an example in which the diffusion of new pro-
cesses has been driven mainly by the demand and
in which the actual use of limit values in the per-
mit system has had no, or a very minor, role.
”When the customer wants chlorine-free pulp, the
customer gets chlorine-free pulp” was a phrase
used by one mill representative. Another one ex-
pressed the same idea ”The chlorine question is,
in my opinion, a schoolbook example of what it
means when we say that markets affect the devel-
opment.” (Mickwitz 2000a) This is in sharp con-
trast with the view expressed by some, but not
all, working for the environmental administration,
who have stressed the role of the decision taken
by the Ministry of the Environment in June 1989
in inducing the adoption of new bleaching pro-
cesses. This shows the difficulty of attributing caus-
es and effects. It is clear that chlorine became a
societal problem that was addressed in different
ways. Authorities played a role in the societal dis-
cussions, but our results show that the regulatory
system reacted slowly and its direct contribution
to the solution of the problem through specified
permit conditions was small at best. The exist-
ence of the regulatory system may, however, have
contributed, because it could at some point have
been used to force the industry to abandon chlo-
rine bleaching. This effect on the anticipation of
the industry may have been a contributing factor
to the rapid abandoning of chlorine bleaching.
Although there is a general consensus concern-
ing the role of market demand for the reduced use
of chlorine, some variations were observed in how
the role of the permit system was described. One
interviewee stated that they got a permit limit only
recently, even though they had been working on
reducing discharges for years. At another mill the
interviewee said that ”although the water permit
now contains organic chlorine compounds, it came
so late as a permit limit that we had already for
other reasons abandoned the use of chlorine”. A
third interviewee, although first stating that the
permit limit did not directly affect their invest-
ments since their AOX limit was ”loose enough”,
pointed out that the possibility of a stricter limit
in the future was a factor restricting the options.
(Mickwitz 2000a)
The representatives of the industry cited ex-
amples of inventions of process technology, al-
though none of them indicated that operators have
adopted a process technological solution only in
order to fulfill the requirements of a permit. This
is an indication that coercive impact is not strong
with respect to the process technological solutions.
According to the interviewees a decision to adopt
a new process technological solution is typically
motivated by several reasons. An emission limit
value is only one of these. However, there is an
economic link between end-of-pipe technology
and process technology. Interviewees pointed out
that e.g. improved water recycling has made acti-
vated sludge plants cheaper to establish. Thus, an
operator is motivated to improve process technol-
ogy in order to avoid increase in the cost of end-
of-pipe technology.
The amount of discharges does not depend only
on the environmental technology, but also on the
general technological structure of the industry. The
general technological structure in this context
means e.g. different kinds of methods to produce
pulp. Similä (2000) was not able to find any sup-
port for a hypothesis that the general technologi-
cal structure had been affected by permitting. In-
stead, counter arguments were found. No exam-
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ple of an impact on the general structure of the
technology was given in interviews, although an
example of closing of a mill mainly on environ-
mental grounds was mentioned. However, the
decision to close the mill was not made by the
administration or during the permitting process,
but by the company itself.
Basically the design of quantitative limit val-
ues is based on an assessment of each type of tech-
nology on its own merits. The question of the au-
thorities is thus: When this kind of general tech-
nology is used, what kind of environmental mea-
sures should be considered reasonable?
The Water Courts have only once refused to
issue a permit for a mill in the field of pulp and
paper industry, although in other fields of regu-
lated activities a refusal has been ”more than a
statistical exception” as one of the interviewees
put it. The permit application was refused because
the operator wanted a future option to expand pro-
duction using what was then current technology.
The Water Court decided that such permits could
not be granted, because it could mean excessive
pollution in the future in relation to what the Court
considered likely to be achieved with process
improvement. This indicates that permit authori-
ties do not wish to tie their hands, but wish to have
a theoretical possibility to affect the choice of tech-
nology.
The relationship between regulations, innova-
tions and competitive advantage of firms is com-
plex. It is a common misunderstanding that firms
always oppose regulations. This is clearly not the
case. Some firms can gain competitive advantag-
es when regulations are introduced and these firms
are likely support or even sometimes actively de-
mand new regulations. It is obvious that produ-
cers of a certain environmental technology, e.g. a
filter, will experience increased demand if the
technology they sell becomes a mandatory stand-
ard or if limits are tightened on such emissions
that can be reduced by the technology in ques-
tion. In addition firms that already have invested
in environmental solutions and whose production
has less emissions than those of competitors could
benefit from regulations. This is one key aspect
of the Porter hypothesis (Porter and Linde 1995b).
These indirect competitive benefits are, howev-
er, limited if the regulation is national but the
market is global. This is largely the case for the
pulp and paper industry but also for many firms
in the chemical sector. The structure and func-
tioning of the regulatory system also affects the
degree to which it may contribute to a competi-
tive advantage of some firms. Thus a system such
as the Finnish Water permit regulation which lacks
uniform standards has limited effects on compe-
tition. Standardised limits on pollution such as the
air norms are likely to have stronger effect, for
example standard emission limits that affect the
choice and cost of fuel may provide firms which
have already adopted low emission fuels and re-
lated technologies a certain advantage.
In addition to the incentives possibly provid-
ed by the environmental policy instruments for
the regulated operators to innovate, it is clear that
the existence of an environmental policy and tight-
ening demands over time will affect the market
for environmental technology. It is thus possible
that permitting systems and electricity taxation
have been factors behind an increased demand for
more efficient and cheaper environmental tech-
nology. The existence of these policy instruments
as well as the tightening policy might even be cru-
cial for new innovations, although equipment pro-
viders only recognise the demand from the com-
panies using the environmental technology, and
regulated operators primarily see the innovations
provided by the suppliers. The present study pro-
vides several indications that such indirect links
exist between policy instruments and innovations.
A more detailed analysis of these links would have
required an in-depth examination of the whole
innovation system, which was outside the scope
of this study.
9.2.3 Research and development
obligations
As it is possible to regulate directly substantial
environmental requirements, it is also possible to
regulate directly the research and development
activities of an operator. A permit authority may
require that certain kinds of research and devel-
opment activities must be carried out and the au-
thority may take into account the outcome of the
activities when issuing the next permit.
In order for the R&D requirements to have ef-
fects on innovations or the adoption of innova-
tions by the operators they must increase or redi-
rect the R&D efforts by the regulated firm. New
R&D is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for the R&D requirements to have an effect. If
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R&D efforts are redistributed according to the
requirement this could have positive or negative
effects on the environment. Adverse effects arise
if the required R&D tasks have no or only small
environmental effects, while diverting resources
from real environmental improvements. To be
effective the R&D requirements must lead to new
findings which make new environmental improve-
ments possible. The findings must further lead to
investments either directly or due to more strin-
gent limit values based on the findings. Only then
will the diffusion or innovation initiated by a
R&D requirement have an effect on the discharges
(Fig. 18).
Even where R&D requirements have not had
the anticipated effects, it is possible that they have
contributed in some rather loose way to techno-
logical development. Some of interviewees point-
ed out that R&D-obligations have improved the
common know-how of the administration and the
industry. Because interviewees were not able to
give concrete examples of the relevance of im-
proved know-how, it is still an open question
whether there has been such an impact.
Similä (2000, p. 17) gives an example in which
a water permit limit for phosphorus issued in 1994
had been preceded, a decade earlier, by a R&D
requirement to reduce the phosphorus discharges
below such a limit. However, in this case it is ev-
ident that the R&D requirement did not cause the
adoption of the new solution. Although the phos-
phorus discharges were reduced as a consequence
of the new technology, which was adopted after
the permit limit had been issued, it cannot have
been due to the particular R&D effort undertak-
en. This is shown by the fact that the results of
the R&D indicated – wrongly as we know with
hindsight – that it was not possible to reduce the
phosphorus discharge to the proposed level.
R&D requirements have been included in some
water permits since the beginning of the 1970s.
There has been an increase in the R&D require-
ments without quantitative goals in the 1990s (Ta-
ble 15). There has been no clear tendency for the
R&D requirements with quantitative goals. There
were, for example, six years in the 1970s during
which no R&D requirements with quantitative
goals were included in the permit decisions, while
there were four such years in the 1980s and five
between 1990 and 1998.
Seven out of thirty-one examined air permits
for paper or pulp mills included R&D require-
ments (Table 16). An example of a R&D require-
ment in an air permit without a quantitative goal
Fig. 18. Anticipated effects of the R&D requirements contained in the water permits (Mickwitz 2000b).
Table 15. R&D requirements in the water permits of the pulp and paper mills (Mickwitz 2000b).
1970s 1980s 1990–1998
Number of permits (N) 73 58 71
Share with R&D requirement without a
quantitative goal 13.7 % 34.5 % 43.5 %
Share with R&D requirement with a
quantitative goal 9.6 % 19.0 % 14.1 %
Share with R&D requirement for
phosphorous without a quantitative goal 2.7 % 8.6 % 13.0 %
Share with R&D requirement for
phosphorous with a quantitative goal 2.7 % 12.1 % 14.1 %
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is: ”The applicants should determine the meth-
ods, costs and timetable by which it is possible to
further reduce the untreated odorous gases from
the pulp mill.” (Lapland Regional Environment
Centre, Permit 15.06.1999) An example of a R&D
requirement with a quantitative goal from the same
air permit is: ”The applicants should determine
the methods, costs and timetable by which the
emissions of particulate matter from the k-10 boil-
er can be reduced to the level 50 mg/m3 (n).”
Most of the R&D obligations in the permits
examined by Similä (2000) were imprecise and
unspecified. However, their quality had improved
in the course of time. The most developed obli-
gation defined the exact target to be achieved.
There is no reason to over-emphasize the relevance
of the research and development obligations. Well
developed obligations are seldom used and they
are difficult to implement. There is no mechanism
which ensures that the operator invests significant-
ly in the projects. There is no proof that research
and development obligations have resulted in new
innovations, even in cases where more informa-
tion has been produced.
Some representatives of the administration
suggested that R&D obligations are used as a sig-
nal of a new parameter or a tighter level of emis-
sion limit values in the next permit cycle. This
could motivate an operator to take the obligation
into account. In the case of phosphorus limits the
years 1987–93 were the period when the policy
changed – before this period phosphorus limits
were only included in exceptional cases, after-
wards almost all permits had a phosphorus limit.
Mickwitz (2000a) modelled the permit decisions
during this period in order to find which varia-
bles explain whether a phosphorus limit was in-
cluded or not. In order to test whether R&D re-
quirements indicate new parameters in coming
permits, Mickwitz (2000b) expanded the models
to include a dummy variable, with the value of
one if the previous permit included a R&D re-
quirement for phosphorus and zero otherwise. Of
the 56 decisions during 1987–93 there were eight
that had been preceded by a R&D requirement
mentioning phosphorus. The results of the Logit
and Probit models clearly showed that the inclu-
sion of a R&D requirement for phosphorus in a
permit did not explain in any way the inclusion
of phosphorous limits in the following permit. Of
course this does not mean that there are no indi-
vidual cases for which a R&D requirement has
been a signal that a phosphorus limit will be in-
cluded.
9.3 Electricity taxation and innovations
High and fluctuating energy prices and uncertain-
ties with respect to future energy policies are likely
to create incentives for energy efficient innova-
tions and to motivate industries to carry out ener-
gy auditing. In this context the electricity taxa-
tion is a minor factor. It may, however, indicate
that electricity or energy in general could be sub-
ject to increasing tax rates, especially in the light
of demands to shift taxation from labour to other
sources of fiscal income. In this indirect way the
energy taxation may have contributed to the dif-
fusion of energy audits and voluntary energy
agreements.
9.4 Environmental management
systems and innovations
Environmental management systems are prima-
rily instruments for everyday improvements and
management of operations. Thus they cannot be
expected to produce innovations on their own.
They may, however, identify promising areas of
significant environmental improvements. Our in-
terviews show that this kind of ”innovation scan-
ning” takes place. It is not a new phenomenon,
Table 16. R&D requirements in the air permits included in the VAHTI-database for pulp and paper mills.
1991–2000
Number of permits (N) 31
Share with R&D requirement without a quantitative goal 12.9 %
Share with R&D requirement with a quantitative goal 16.1 %
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but the management systems have made it more
systematic and also engaged a larger proportion
of the employees. One Swedish study suggested
that the management systems frequently pay at-
tention to transports. Other important issues have
been energy, waste management and the use of
raw materials (Zackrisson et al. 1999).
This study has highlighted significant differ-
ences between different firms in their approach
to environmental management systems (Luoma
2000). Ilomäki and Melanen (2001) and Kautto
and Melanen (2000) have made similar findings.
Ambitious goals of improvement could create
pressure to innovate but the interviews suggest
that actors outside the firm have hitherto paid rel-
atively little attention to the goals. Our interview-
ees considered it interesting but too laborious to
follow up the firms’ goal setting (Palosaari 2002).
Critical views on the hype surrounding envi-
ronmental management systems have also been
expressed. One interviewee working for a client
of chemical firms suggested that too much atten-
tion is put on the systems, thus diverting resourc-
es and attention from the reduction of emissions.
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PART 4
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
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10 General evaluation of the policy
instruments
10.1 Regulatory instruments
There are five important elements in the interven-
tion theory of the examined regulatory instru-
ments. First: all are based on the assumption that
it is possible to improve the environmental per-
formance of operators by external regulation of
activities. Second: specific goals can be set for
improvement in environmental performance, and
for air and water pollution control, also for the
state of the environment. Third: regulatory instru-
ments will have to be adapted to the particular
setting of the operator and his activity. Fourth:
transparency and public participation ensure that
public interests are taken into account. Fifth: reg-
ular contacts between operators and authorities are
necessary for the functioning of the regulation.
The importance of the different elements varies
somewhat from instrument to instrument. In the
following we will examine the elements one by
one. Finally we examine the implicit assumptions
of the intervention theories concerning the socio-
political environment within which the instru-
ments are implemented.
10.1.1 Environmental improvements are
partly – but only partly – due to the
regulatory instruments
The claim that it is possible to achieve environ-
mental improvements through regulations is sup-
ported by our study, but not unconditionally. Pol-
lution from the pulp and paper industry and chem-
ical industry has decreased significantly during
the last 30 years. The development is a result of
many factors. The regulatory instruments, which
have had a dominant role in the environmental
policy during the period examined, have clearly
had an impact on the emissions, but it is not pos-
sible to attribute the whole development to the
policy instruments.
The role of different factors explaining the
overall development varies. This can be exempli-
fied by water discharges. Resource efficiency is
a basic interest of any operator, but its importance
has increased when inputs or the treatment of ex-
ternalities have become more expensive. Resource
efficiency has thus been at least as important as
the policy instruments with respect to many proc-
ess changes that have improved the use of raw
materials and increased recycling of substances.
The demands of customers, especially during the
last 15 years, have become more important. One
example is provided by the reduced chlorine dis-
charges in pulp production. It is nevertheless clear
that both the Water Act and the Air Pollution
Control Act have had significant impact on some
of the pollutants which have been selected as tar-
gets for the regulation. There are, however, also
examples of difficulties in regulating new prob-
lems which have emerged and become new tar-
gets (Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.8).
Markku Ollikainen (1995, p. 313) does not give
the Finnish permitting system much credit for the
reduced discharges. He writes ”the majority of the
water permit limits are non-binding5, i.e. the true
discharges are less than the limits. ...The author-
ities have dragged behind the development with-
out any special honour of steering the polluters,
not to speak of cost efficient control. The signifi-
cant results achieved by the pulp and paper in-
dustry in water protection are due to other fac-
tors: it makes the production more efficient and
it adjusts actively to the emphasizing of environ-
mental issues on the side of demand for paper.”
Our study has shown that the observation that
permit limits for most mills are, and most of the
time have been, non-binding is correct if one looks
at the annual values. However, most limits are set
as monthly values and the monthly discharges
from the mills are highly variable. The partly sto-
chastic nature of the discharges gives the mills
an incentive to reduce discharges, even when they
are on average below the permit limit. Brännlund
and Löfgren (1996, p. 230) also found that in the
case of stochastic pollution the risk of exceeding
the limit is reduced if the pollution is reduced fur-
ther than the limit, and therefore permits may have
5 Non-binding is here used in the mathematical sense,
i.e. as the concept is used in optimisation theory. A
constraint is a condition that narrows the range of the
objective function. A non-binding constraint is a con-
straint that in fact does not affect the maximum of the
objective function because of other constraints or the
shape of the objective function. The exact mathemati-
cal definition is: in a problem max f(x); s.t. gi(x) ≤ 0,
for i = 1, ... ,k. ”If, at a particular x*, a constraint gj =
0, then the jth constraint is said to be binding” (Varian
1984, p. 319). Otherwise it is called non-binding. In
this sense a permit limit can well be non-binding even
if it is legally binding.
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impacts even if emissions are observed to be be-
low their limits.
Our study clearly shows that permit limits
generally become tighter over time – as abso-
lute discharges, as well as in relation to produc-
tion. Thus, a mill that has reduced its discharges
even more than required is prepared for the next,
tighter limits and will have an easier task to in-
crease its production, without the permit limits
becoming a restriction. This ”dynamic incentive”
is, however, reduced by the observation, made
by many interviewees, that discharges far below
the permit limits are more likely to result in tight-
er permit limits in the future, than discharges
close to the present permit limits. (Mickwitz
2000a, Similä 2000).
In addition and above all, the impact of per-
mitting cannot be assessed simply by comparing
permit limits and discharges. As this study shows,
the permitting process may have an impact on the
discharges although the permit limits are non-
binding at any given moment. The mill operators
themselves have often stated that in practice their
permit content had forced them to adopt e.g. a new
and more effective type of a purification plant,
although afterwards it may not be possible to find
permit limits to have been binding because the
technological solutions have been adopted before
the new limits entered into force.
10.1.2 Goal achievement effectiveness
of regulatory instruments is high, but
who sets the goals
The achievement of many environmental goals
supports the assumption that environmental poli-
cy and its instruments have been effective. Effec-
tiveness defined as goal achievement is, howev-
er, not the only possible definition; in addition
effectiveness could be assessed compared to the
achievements in other countries or over time. Goal
achievement is a kind of ”static effectiveness”,
while it is also possible to examine a ”dynamic
effectiveness” which not only achieves goals but
creates new opportunities through innovations and
their diffusion. This issue will be discussed in
Section 11.
Implementation problems have decreased the
effectiveness of the examined policy instruments.
It took a decade after the Water Act entered into
force in 1962 before the permits started to con-
tain quantitative limits. The last pulp mill to re-
ceive quantitative limits became regulated as late
as 1995. Although the Air Pollution Control Act
entered into force two decades later than the Wa-
ter Act it again took more than a decade before
permits started to spread. Implementation prob-
lems also arise when the permit processes are de-
layed. Even in the 1990s, several water as well as
air permit decisions have been based on applica-
tions made ten or even fifteen years earlier.
Despite implementation problems it is reassur-
ing to find that the goals of environmental pro-
grammes have been approached and several have
been met in due time (Section 7.2.3, Fig. 11 and
Fig. 12). The observed effectiveness could be a
result of the level of ambition in goal-setting. A
key civil servant from the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment has stated that: ”In Finland the politi-
cally decided goals for the environmental admin-
istration and environmental protection have gen-
erally been realistic or actually cautious. Accord-
ingly, accomplishing them has seldom imposed big
problems.” (Ojala 1997, p. 75) One should there-
fore not conclude that in cases or countries where
goals are not achieved the policy is less success-
ful; it might instead reflect higher ambitions. It is
worth noting that with respect to the newest Wa-
ter Protection Programme (in force until 2005)
some of interviewees – both from the industry and
the administration – viewed the goals as ambi-
tious and thus difficult to meet.
The effectiveness of the policy instruments
may also be determined in relative terms. In a
comparison of the permitting procedures in Can-
ada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the Unit-
ed States (OECD 1999b, p.18) it is concluded that:
”Despite the differences in permitting approach-
es, the available information on effluent quality,
from kraft mills in the five countries reviewed,
show similarities with respect to BOD and AOX
discharges.” The decoupling between emissions
of BOD and pulp production occurred approxi-
mately five years later in Finland than in Swe-
den. Bressers (1988) has also shown that until the
beginning of the 1970s industrial production and
oxygen-consuming industrial wastewater pollution
grew hand in hand in the Netherlands, but a dra-
matic decoupling took place in the early 1970s,
i.e. at the same time as in Finland for the pulp
and paper industry.
The observations of almost simultaneous de-
couplings of certain emissions and production
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suggest two alternative but equally provocative
conclusions. The first is that emission reductions
occur when emissions have been recognised as a
problem and a policy instrument is applied. The
exact form of the instrument does not matter great-
ly as long as there are suitable mechanisms of
implementation. The second provocative conclu-
sion follows that of Ollikainen (1995): regulation
merely registers what would have happened in any
case in a market economy. Our findings of genu-
ine effects of the regulatory instruments and small
but significant lags between emission reductions
that match those of the introduction of policy in-
struments tend to support the former conclusion.
10.1.3 Flexibility of permitting – an
opportunity and a threat
Our study has confirmed the flexibility of the Finn-
ish regulatory instruments and the fact that oper-
ators and authorities consider flexibility to be
important. The instruments, particularly the Wa-
ter Act, have been very flexible, with large
amounts of discretion. Flexibility has meant dif-
ferentiation of requirements according to local
conditions and features of the industrial site con-
cerned. The differentiated requirements have been
set up on the basis of negotiation, which stresses
the importance of networks. With respect to the
Air Pollution Control Act, the amount of flexi-
bility allowed by the law has been smaller in com-
parison to the Water Act. This largely reflects the
nature of the environmental problem.
The environmental effects of the water dis-
charges are far more local, whereas air emissions
are often spread even to other countries and some-
times, e.g. in the case of CO2 are truly global. In
practice this has meant smaller variation in pa-
rameters and strictness of emission limit values
between different mills and environments. The
Chemicals Act was originally not particularly flex-
ible, but the development towards regulation of
safety plans rather than technical details has in-
creased the flexibility. At the same time pan-Eu-
ropean or global requirements concerning indi-
vidual substances has reduced the possibilities for
site-specific variations.
The practised flexibility has strengths as well
as weaknesses. The strengths relate to potential
efficiency gains in comparison to uniform require-
ments. With differentiated requirements, deter-
mined on the basis of informed negotiations and
consultations, the abatement and damage costs
may be smaller and, thus, the efficiency greater,
in comparison to uniform requirements, even
though administrative costs are higher. Such ef-
ficiency gains require that abatement costs or ben-
efits from abatement vary between sites. Most of
the Finnish pulp and paper mills discharge their
waste water into lakes or rivers. For these it is clear
that the sensitivity of the recipient water body to
for example phosphorus and nitrogen as well as
other discharges vary from one mill to another. For
example, phosphorus contents of the watercourses
immediately receiving the discharges varied from
17 to 190 µg/l during 1975–80 and from 9 to 58
µg/l during 1994–97. However, the analysis of the
inclusion of phosphorus limits into the permits did
show that the phosphorus content had no effect on
whether a phosphorus limit was included or not.
Mills situated along the shore and discharging
into the Baltic Sea, however, had a reduced prob-
ability of being allocated a phosphorus limit. This
has been the result of the mill specific decision-
making, that has treated mills along the shore dif-
ferently during specific periods and in particular
issues. An interesting comparison to Sweden can
be made. In Sweden, mills located by the Baltic
Sea have had different requirements based on an
explicit policy decision (OECD 1999a, p. 62). The
Swedish system has resulted in systematic differ-
ences in discharges between pulp mills along the
shore and those situated inland, which cannot be
found in Finland (OECD 1999b, p. 67).
Although economists often criticise regulato-
ry instruments they recognise that especially when
some of the effects of the pollutants depend on
the locality of the polluting resource rather than
only on the total amount of pollution, regulations
may be the most appropriate type of instrument
to use (Oates, Portney and McGartland 1989). Our
recognition of efficiency gains of permits designed
case-by-case is in line with the conclusion of
Brännlund, Hetemäki, Kirström and Romstad
(1996, p. 30) who for waste water permits used
in the Nordic countries stated that ”Under these
two conditions [varying marginal abatement costs
and largely local impact], the reduced costs from
applying incentive based regulations over firm
specific command and control may be far less than
those indicated in previous studies”.
Another major strength of the flexibility in
addition to efficiency gains is that it allows for
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local and site-specific negotiations, which have
reduced the risk of major conflicts of a politico-
administrative nature at high political levels that
would undermine the general premises of the per-
mit systems. The studied regulatory instruments
have largely been able to avoid the full blown
political conflicts that have recently characterised
for example nature conservation planning in the
context of the Natura 2000 network (Hildén et al.
1998). Thus flexibility to deal with local concerns
one at a time has increased the acceptability of
the regulatory instruments.
The weakness of the flexibility is the risk for
regulatory capture (Section 3.1.4) at the level of
individual decisions. When one recognises sev-
eral decision variables and the possibility of dif-
ferent legitimate preferences it is difficult, even
theoretically, to determine when a particular in-
terest has been prioritised over the public inter-
est. Some clear cases can, however, be recognised.
An example is the restarting of an obsolete pulp
mill in the early 1970s, when short term econom-
ic interests clearly dominated over environmen-
tal concerns and made it possible to restart the
mill without even a permit process. (Haila et al.
1971). The handling of mercury pollution in Fin-
land as described by Nuorteva (1976) also shows
many characteristics of regulatory capture. An
important finding with respect to regulatory cap-
ture is that the power of an interest group not only
depends on its stakes but also on the kind of in-
fluence it tries to obtain. Groups aiming at mak-
ing regulations less efficient are generally more
powerful than those aiming to make them more
efficient (Laffont and Tirole 1993, p. 492).
The data on which a permit is based are al-
ways to some extent uncertain and open to vari-
ous interpretations. Not only the industry but also
the administration pointed out that the operators
have the best information on the possibilities to
reduce emissions. Thus, the authorities must to a
large extent rely upon the information – particu-
larly on technological solutions and their costs –
given by the operator. The resources of the ad-
ministration to acquire information are small in
comparison to those of the industry. It is rational
to assume that any actor, including the operator,
takes into account its own interests while assem-
bling and presenting information. The frequent
contacts between the operators and the adminis-
tration, shown by the network analysis, imply that
life is easier for an individual regional or local
civil servant if conflicts can be avoided. Conflict
avoidance may lead to regulatory capture by the
more powerful actors.
Theoretical analyses have established that the
power of industry to capture environmental regu-
lations is reduced when environmental interests
are organised (Laffont and Tirole 1993, p. 488ff).
The pulp and paper and the chemical industry are
among the industries in which the focus of envi-
ronmental NGOs have been greatest. An impor-
tant feature generally reducing the risk of regula-
tory capture is transparency (see next section).
10.1.4 Transparency strengthens the
effectiveness of regulatory instruments
The regulatory instruments have been rather trans-
parent and the public has considerable rights to
take part in decision-making in water and air pol-
lution issues. Chemical regulation is more tech-
nical and expert based. The unrestricted access to
permit decisions and partly also their background
material and the availability of factory-specific
emissions is in Finland self-evident. It is an im-
portant explanation of why regulatory capture is
difficult despite many features that seem to make
regulatory capture likely. Internationally, a com-
parable degree of transparency is far from the rule.
There are different kinds of mechanisms aim-
ing at strengthening transparency and participa-
tory rights. The principle that the public has ac-
cess to the information held by the authorities has
a long tradition in Finland and is not restricted to
environmental matters. Authorities are obliged by
law to inform the public on permit applications
and hearings. In the latest reform of the environ-
mental protection legislation in 2000, non-gov-
ernmental organisations were given the right to
start administrative proceedings against an oper-
ator who violates the law.
The amount of influence of transparency and
participatory rights on an individual decision is
difficult to measure. Our results strongly suggest
that the transparency and the participatory rights
have been crucial for the formulation of the so
called consistent ”policy line” appreciated by the
industry as well as the administration. In addition,
the participatory rights have enabled those affected
to defend their rights. Asymmetry of information
and resources means, however, that the partici-
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patory system is unlikely to completely balance
problems related to regulatory capture. Our study
has clearly revealed differences in resources and
networks between authorities, particularly at the
local level. In addition, the crucial pre-decision
phase is not very transparent due to its informal
nature. Involved actors may in advance discuss
strategies for coping with external demands in the
subsequent phases of the process, thus reducing
somewhat the effects of ”formal” transparency.
The findings of this study thus support that of
the OECD (1999a, p. 16) which stresses the role
of transparency and participation: ”an otherwise
sound permitting programme will be inefficient if
it has not been designed to encourage public par-
ticipation and involvement. /.../ experience has
shown that permittee compliance and environmen-
tal performance is substantially improved when
the public is sufficiently informed about and as-
sociated with the permitting process. Permitting
processes should be made as transparent as pos-
sible...” Furthermore the role of Pollutant Release
and Transfer Registers and transparent monitor-
ing and compliance data is stressed (OECD 1999a,
p. 89). It has actually been argued (e.g. Fung and
O’Rourke 2000) that sometimes much of the im-
pacts of environmental policy instruments is due
to them making information public that has not
been available before. This effect could even over-
ride the effects of other requirements that policy
instruments impose on operators.
10.1.5 Interactions outside those
formally required are important
All intervention theories of the studied instruments
assume regular contacts between operators and
authorities either through regular revision of per-
mits and/or through some form of inspections or
other reporting to the authorities. The official jus-
tifications and the examined laws largely lack
explicit reference to the pre-decision phase, which
in our study is also identified as critical with re-
spect to conflict resolution.
Our results show strong linkages between the
three phases of the decision-making processes of
regulatory instruments. Especially the operators
stress the importance of continuous exchange of
information throughout the process, but the fac-
tors affecting the nature of the various phases are
different. Incentives for continuous interactions
have been strongest within the water permit sys-
tem. When such interactions are well established,
in some cases even informally institutionalised as
”Councils” or ”Boards” in which authorities can
participate to a varying degree, they may affect
and influence the outputs and the outcomes of the
regulatory instruments.
It is obvious that the pre-decision interactions
do not reduce the decision phase to administrative
ritual. Not all divergent interests are mediated
through the discussions in the pre-decision phase.
The decision phase does as a rule lead to requests
for additional environmental measures. These de-
mands may be raised by the same actors who par-
ticipate in the pre-decision phase.
10.1.6 The implementation environment
is characterised by low conflict
There are several reasons for describing the
present interactions related to the permit systems
as nonconflictual rather than conflictual. This can
be seen by examining the different actors’ views
of the regulatory systems and their acceptability,
the nature of conflicts that have been observed
and the actors’ perception of these.
There do not seem to be major divergencies in
the perceptions of operators and the administra-
tions concerning the general goals and premises
of the permit systems. Conflicts have generally –
when they have occurred – not been of a broad
politico-administrative nature that would have
questioned the foundations of the systems. They
relate primarily to those immediately concerned
in the target area. In this the situation has changed
compared with that in the 1960s and 1970s, when
environmental issues were first introduced on the
political agenda. The long birth of a Ministry of
the Environment is a case in point. Now even the
number of conflicts is perceived to be relatively
low. Especially administrators perceive that the
conflict level has been decreasing rather than in-
creasing during recent years.
The interactive features of the systems has
probably reduced conflicts, although the extent of
that impact is difficult to estimate. Increasing com-
plexity could pave the way for conflictual inter-
actions, but our interviews do not indicate that
administrative or industrial complexity as such has
increased the conflict levels. Interviewees do,
however, perceive that the usefulness of the in-
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teractions are related to the administrative clarity
and the transparency of the instruments.
The examined regulatory instruments implic-
itly assume a socio-cultural environment which
combines low levels of conflict with low ambi-
guity concerning e.g. decision-making structures
and roles of actors. This is indicated by the com-
pletely dominant role of the administration in all
the examined regulatory instruments. There is no
direct political involvement as in the regulation
of e.g. nuclear power, in which all key decisions
are made by politically elected bodies (Council
of State and Parliament, Act on Nuclear Energy
990/1987). Our evaluation suggests that the im-
plicit assumptions concerning the implementation
environment have by and large been valid during
the period covered by our study, from 1962 until
2000. As indicated above, conflict levels appear
to be low at present. This suggests that the main
determinant of the success of the policy instru-
ments would be related to the availability of re-
sources (Section 3.3). We find that this has large-
ly been the case and that several of the implemen-
tation problems can be referred back to a discrep-
ancy between the tasks created and the availabil-
ity of resources. Although the resources of the
specialised environmental administration have
increased in real terms (Section 5.2), there have
been several cases of serious resource deficits. The
Inspection procedure of the Water Act and the
implementation of Air Pollution Permits show this
clearly. Obvious resource problems have also been
encountered at the local (municipal) level and
more generally in the supervision of environmen-
tal requirements (Section 8.2.3).
Although the characterisation of the implemen-
tation environment as administrative appears to
capture key features of the examined policy in-
struments, other kinds of environments have arisen
during the history of the instruments. The regula-
tion of mercury is an example of a high conflict
case in which political power in the form of pub-
lic pressure played a crucial role and forced the
industry to change its practices (Nuorteva 1976).
Chlorine regulation can be characterised as a case
of high ambiguity and high conflict. It lead to
public discussions that also involved authorities,
but the role of the Water Act was mainly symbol-
ic, because market mechanisms that caused tech-
nological change solved the problem much faster
than the regulatory decisions could be made (Sec-
tion 7.2.1). Of the new issues the regulation of
greenhouse gases can clearly be characterised as
a high ambiguity, high conflict issue in which
symbolic implementation is likely and where the
real implementation will depend on the strength
of coalitions. Entirely new types of policy instru-
ments may arise in the process and the role of the
regulatory instruments may be greatly reduced.
The same may be true for issues related to inte-
grated product policies and regulation of new
chemical substances.
10.2 Weak environmental signals from
the electricity tax
The basic feature of the intervention theory of
economic instruments such as taxes is that the
instruments shift the cost curves so that environ-
mental effects are internalised to a greater extent.
From a theoretical point of view even a small tax
may have effects, if it changes the marginal costs
and behaviour is cost sensitive. To have an ob-
servable impact the signal must be sufficiently
strong that a significant share of the operators
takes the cost element into account.
The available data on the electricity tax and its
implementation suggest that it has not given a
strong signal to the operators. Thus, the main im-
pact relates to increase of the revenue of the tax.
Environmental impacts have been mainly indirect.
The main reason for the lack of direct impact re-
lates to design of the instrument. The tax level has
been low; it has been lower for industry than for
other electricity users and the system has included
various exemptions and subsidies. One of the main
goals of Finnish energy taxation has been not to
damage the international competitiveness of Finn-
ish export industries (Määttä 2000, p. 151ff.)
Similar results were obtained in a recent anal-
ysis of the Swedish carbon tax. Johansson (2000,
p. 88) found several reasons for the small effects
on industry: the lower tax level for industry; the
small share of energy supply to industry based on
fossil fuels already when the tax was introduced;
the reduction of the total taxation level on fossil
fuels for industry in the 1991 tax reform; and the
fact that for most industries fuel costs are only a
small share of the total costs and thus have low
priority. Actually the different tax rates for dif-
ferent sectors resulted in industry selling their by-
products to district heating while using fossil fu-
els themselves (Johansson 2000, p. 89).
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Energy taxes could in principle result in re-
duced competitiveness. Brack, Grubb and Win-
dram (2000, p. 72ff), however, argued that this is
seldom a major issue in practice since due to po-
litical realities energy taxes have been accompa-
nied with measures that offset real or perceived
effects on competitiveness. Such measures are
exemptions or rebates for specific sectors, recy-
cling of revenues and border tax adjustments. This
conclusion is in line with many other studies of
environmental taxes put into practice (e.g. Bress-
ers and Huitema 1999).
Although few effects were found of the elec-
tricity taxation in the studied sectors, this does
not imply that environmental taxes could not be
effective. A recent assessment of the Finnish en-
ergy taxation concluded that the CO2 emissions
would have been 7 per cent higher in 1998 with-
out the tax instrument (PMOPS 2000, p. 47. Sec-
tion 7.4.2). There are several international exam-
ples on the effectiveness of environmental taxes.
The effects of fuel taxes on fuel consumption and
the effects of differentiated tax rates on the diffu-
sion of cars with engines using unleaded petrol
are frequently used examples (EEA 2000). It must
thus be stressed that the impacts observed in this
study do not make taxation an irrelevant instru-
ment with regard to CO2 emissions. Energy taxa-
tion has clear advantages in dealing with green-
house gases over regulatory instruments for the
same purpose. The tax rates and the tax collec-
tion, including recycling of excess tax revenues,
would have to be designed, but as there are no
problems related to excessive local pollution (hot-
spots) there is no need for local negotiations. It is
the total amount of CO2 emission that counts and
a CO2 tax would be a cost-efficient instrument to
reduce emissions. A tax would also provide the
industry with continuous incentives to develop en-
ergy-saving technology and technology based on
renewable energy. The problems of using taxes to
address global environmental issues are related to
the political problems involved in designing a glo-
bal, or even international, tax and the problems for
small open economies to use taxes unilaterally.
10.3 Environmental management
systems
Crucial questions concerning environmental man-
agement systems are whether they actually lead
to improved environmental performance, have any
detrimental or perverse effects, and whether the
information they provide about activities actual-
ly has any significance.
10.3.1 Environmental management
systems help firms to find no-cost or
low cost improvements
Our study has demonstrated that management sys-
tems are likely to identify possibilities for envi-
ronmental improvement and is thus in line with
the findings of other similar studies (Kautto and
Melanen 2000, Ilomäki and Melanen 2001, Za-
ckrisson et al. 1999). It could be argued that the
greatest positive impacts arise when the system
identifies areas of improvement that hitherto have
not been recognised. The potential for such find-
ings are greatest where the interests of the opera-
tor and the public environmental interest are in
line, i.e. in win-win situations, since then the
mechanisms of the environmental management
systems are supported with other incentives. The
possibility of such unexpected effects may great-
ly increase the motivation to implement manage-
ment systems.
However, our study has also shown consider-
able variation in the perception of key concepts
such as ”continuous improvement” (Luoma 1999).
The management systems are furthermore not the
sole or even the main explanation for the envi-
ronmental awareness in firms, but they enforce
the awareness and may be one way of translating
a general awareness to concrete improvements.
The effects of environmental management sys-
tems on other actors, such as subcontractors, are
common and important. Major customers, such
as a pulp and paper mill or large chemical facto-
ry, may force not only a producer, but through a
domino effect also those delivering components
or raw material to the producer, to adopt manage-
ment systems. This chain effect was seen in some
of our case firms. Similar findings have been made
by Ilomäki and Melanen (2001) and Kautto et al.
(2000). The increased availability of commercial
environmental management consultants is also
likely to contribute to a positive environmental
development as they bring in new views that dif-
fer from those of traditional environmental con-
sultants. An adverse effect is the increase of bu-
reaucracy within firms in certain circumstances.
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10.3.2 Environmental management
systems could have detrimental effects
The lack of real sanctions may in theory attract
poor environmental performers to environmental
management systems. This could happen if man-
agement systems would appear to provide an easy
way of increasing public credibility on a green-
ing market without having to change general en-
vironmental attitudes or actions in practice. Our
study has not been able to identify this kind of
effects of the environmental management systems
because generally high standards prevail. Other
studies suggest that in fact top environmental per-
formers are likely to join the systems first (Kuis-
ma et al. 2001). In the US King and Lenox (2000)
observed that the Responsible Care programme
has lead to certain opportunism in the US, with
poor environmental performers joining the pro-
gramme simply to gain credibility. They also
found that environmental improvement among the
companies that had joined was slower than among
those not members of Responsible Care.
The risk of free riders may for many reasons
be relatively small in Finland. We have identi-
fied close networks of operators and the contacts
between authorities and operators are also rela-
tively close. Thus beneficial effects seem to dom-
inate. Environmental management systems have
had immediate effects on the networks of the op-
erators, particularly on the relationships with the
main suppliers and customers. Moreover, espe-
cially local authorities see environmental manage-
ment systems also as useful tools supporting su-
pervision.
10.3.3 The value of environmental
reports is their existence
Many firms have become less dependent on ex-
ternal consultants for their environmental report-
ing. In general the interviewees considered reports
to be reliable, although several recognised the
possibility that the reports are not a completely
unbiased account of all environmentally relevant
issues. The results of this study indicate that many
view the main role of the environmental reports
to be provision of some background information.
In many cases just their existence, not their de-
tailed contents, is important. This supports the
view that environmental reports should not be
judged in isolation but rather as a part of the total
information provided by a firm of its activity. The
success of the management system should conse-
quently not be judged on the basis of only one of
its outputs, but rather in relation to the overall
environmental performance and the totality of
environmentally relevant information provided
through the management system.
10.4 Interaction between the
instruments
10.4.1 Overlapping regulations may
cause problems
The approach based on environmental media (wa-
ter, air, soil) in pollution control has been consid-
ered to be problematic when the aim is to reduce
all negative environmental effects (Rosén 1971).
The introduction of the Finnish Environmental
Protection Act in 2000 has in principle solved this
problem at the policy instrument level. The prac-
tice of integration has not yet developed, but pi-
lot studies give guidance for authorities and op-
erators (Silvo et al. 2000). Seen in this perspec-
tive, it was interesting to find that the industry
presented more often and more clearly practical
solutions to integration problems than the admin-
istration. This confirms the assumption that there
has been asymmetry of information between au-
thorities and the industry. The development of new
networks around the Best Available Techniques
concept may help in overcoming some of these
asymmetries.
The focuses of the Chemicals Act and the other
regulatory instruments on pollution control are
becoming closer to each other. Best available tech-
nique concepts have been introduced in the Chem-
icals Act and the safety plans that are demanded
are closely related to environmental management
systems. There are also formal links to land use
planning through demands to protect groundwa-
ter resources. On the other hand, a risk analysis
requirement is becoming a standard condition in
pollution permits. It was more often the represent-
atives of the industry than those of the adminis-
tration, who pointed out the link between two in-
struments.
If the links and overlaps between instruments
are not recognised sufficiently in the practical
implementation, a waste of resources may be an
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unfortunate consequence. The changing situation
clearly puts new demands on the networks be-
tween authorities as well as the networks between
authorities and operators.
10.4.2 Environmental management
systems supplement regulatory
instruments
The interaction between regulatory instruments
and the environmental management system can
be seen from two perspectives. First, the costs of
managerial obligations related to both may be re-
duced if they are co-ordinated. Second, the two
instruments may complement each other function-
ally. The environmental performance is often re-
ported in environmental management reports in
relation to permit conditions. Without a point of
reference, such as a permit condition, the envi-
ronmental management system is less credible. In
addition, environmental management systems may
also motivate the operators to continuous improve-
ment between permit cycles. Our interviews
showed that the very nature of the environmental
management systems make them suitable for iden-
tifying win-win situations. Under these circum-
stances the interest of an operator agrees with that
of the public environmental policy. As all envi-
ronmental improvements are unlikely to represent
win-win solutions (Palmer et al. 1995), too great
reliance on environmental management systems
could be problematic. Problems of freeridership
are also likely to be aggravated if environmental
management systems are used as a justification
for not developing and revising regulatory instru-
ments to meet changing demands.
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11 Fostering or obstructing innova-
tion through policy instruments
11.1Regulatory instruments and
innovations
The studied regulatory instruments have not been
developed for or used as instruments that would force
innovations at the level of individual operators. How-
ever, the use of the instruments has not been found
to obstruct innovations either. This ”innovation neu-
trality” has been a consequence of the reactive na-
ture of the regulatory action combined with flexible
permitting practice. With respect to innovations the
main purpose of the policy instruments has been to
enhance diffusion, which can be seen in the intro-
duction of the BAT concept. It is, however, impor-
tant to distinguish between the instrumental use of
a policy instrument and the effect of its existence as
part of the environmental policy. The environmen-
tal regulatory instruments and the possibility of reg-
ulation have clearly contributed to the technologi-
cal development and improved environmental per-
formance (Sections 9 and 10.1.2).
In some cases the diffusion of end-of-pipe tech-
nology has been clearly accelerated by specific regu-
latory decisions at the operator level, whereas in oth-
er cases no or very little impacts were found. It seems
clear that the diffusion of for example modern water
purification plants and air filters was faster with the
regulations in place than it would have been other-
wise, whereas the diffusion of chlorine-free bleach-
ing would have taken place at the same rate anyway.
The abandoning of mercury is an intermediate case:
the existence of regulatory instruments gave a signal,
but the rate of the development was not greatly ac-
celerated in the pulp and paper industry.
Authorities developing and implementing reg-
ulatory instruments in Finland have not subscribed
to the idea of technology forcing. Thus the water
protection programme for the pulp and paper in-
dustry of 1970 did not foresee the abandonment
of the sulphite process, but only indicated a need
to improve the environmental performance of the
process (Sitra 1970).
11.1.1 The regulatory instruments have
indirectly contributed to technological
innovations
Economists have claimed that regulations might
be set so that they directly deter innovations (Fish-
er et al. 1996, 413). Porter and van der Linde
(1995a,b) argued that regulations should focus on
outcomes, not processes, be stringent and be de-
veloped in close collaboration with industry; that
industry should be given time to make fundamen-
tal innovations instead of just adding existing end-
of-pipe solutions; and that there should be flexi-
bility to allow trials and demonstration projects.
Our results in Section 9 indicate that the pur-
pose of the limit values of water and air permits
has been to foster the diffusion of existing tech-
nology to reduce water discharges and air emis-
sions (alternative b in Fig. 19). The technical reg-
ulations according to the Chemicals Act have had
a similar function. In practice, however, limit val-
ues have often been set at such a level that the
firm could have continued as before, without
adopting new technology (alternative c in Fig. 19).
This is in conflict with the Porter and van der
Linde recommendations (1995a,b), which instead
are based on the idea that limit values should force
companies to innovate (alternative a in Fig. 19).
Our results are thus in line with those of many
other studies, which indicate that although regu-
lations could be used to encourage innovations
they seldom do. For example Kemp (2000, p. 41)
writes ”Emission requirements were often based
on available end-of-pipe technologies and pro-
vided little incentive for the development of new,
more effective technologies; they merely stimu-
lated the diffusion of existing technologies.” This
does not mean that there are no links between reg-
ulation and innovations: the regulatory systems
enhance competition among suppliers of technol-
ogy by creating and improving markets for end-
of-pipe technologies and this provides incentives
for innovations. Competition may also develop
between firms providing process solutions and
those providing end-of-pipe technologies. A full
analysis of the innovation system is, however,
outside the scope of this study.
The finding that the conditions of the Finnish
waste water permits have been tightening over
time means that there have been some incentives
for the operators to innovate, especially since op-
erators wish to increase production over time (Sec-
tion 9.2). Short term fluctuations of discharges
may have similar effects because measures by the
operator to ensure that it is able to stay within lim-
its even during peak discharges also reduce the
average discharges. These incentives are howev-
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er reduced by some features of the applied prac-
tices. First, many interviewees expressed the view
that voluntarily reduced discharges could only lead
to tighter limits in the next permit negotiation.
Second, although almost all permit limits have
become tighter over time, some industries obtained
their first quantitative limits as late as in the 1990s.
Eight pulp and paper mills have had no more than
two quantitative limits on any parameter until the
end of the year 2000, which means that the regu-
latory systems have given weak signals to inno-
vate.
The flexibility of the Finnish permitting prac-
tice has made it easy for operators to obtain tem-
porary reliefs in their permit conditions during
demonstration periods or pilot phases of new end-
of-pipe technology. This explains why innovations
have not been hindered in a way that limit values
in theory could do. The Finnish system has thus
had informal ”innovation waivers”, which have
avoided the bureaucratic traps that have made the
formal innovation waivers in the US inefficient
(Derzko 1996).
In theory environmental regulations can also
hinder technology innovations and diffusions that
could increase the production without increasing
the emissions, if a production increase triggers a
new permitting process that leads to tighter and
more expensive permit conditions. Similä (2000)
showed that the practice of the Finnish Water
Courts has been much ”lighter” for applications
by the operator to increase production but leave
all other conditions unchanged. These processes
have not resulted in changes in emission limits or
other conditions related to absolute environmen-
tal performance.
Innovations that have been made or introduced
for economic reasons despite or independently of
regulatory instruments have contributed to better
resource use and lower emissions. The chlorine-
free bleaching is a borderline case: public discus-
sions and market demands created economic in-
centives to innovate, but the possibility of future
regulation also played a role. However, there are
also some examples in which permit requirements
may have helped operators to identify potential
cost savings. Recycling of water and materials are
among these. One interviewee described the path
leading to recycling of materials in the following
way ”it is more and more a question of raw mate-
rial economics[...], if we think about the question
of fibre, first came the requirement based on leg-
islation, which results in an external sedimenta-
tion basin, if one exaggerates slightly, and the
recovered material is taken to the dump, which
at that time was much easier than today. After that
someone starts to think why on earth do we take
it to the dump...”. It does, however, remain an open
question whether the mill would have noticed this
cost saving if the regulations had not have required
Fig. 19. Possible effects of limit values on innovations and diffusion.
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treatment in the first place. It could be interpret-
ed as a weak support for innovation induced by
regulation in line with the Porter-hypothesis, but
the critics of the Porter-hypothesis also acknowl-
edge that there are instances when regulations re-
sult in efficiency gains (Palmer et al. 1995). The
disagreement concerns the frequency and magni-
tude of the effect. A deeper analysis would have
to consider the type of markets and competitive
conditions faced by the firms (see 9.2.2). Our
present empirical material cannot settle the dis-
pute.
Our conclusion is that the permits of the Finn-
ish regulatory instruments have features that could
be used to foster innovations even at the level of
individual operators, but we find little evidence
that these features have actually been used actively
by the regulators. One important explanation is
that the basic technological choices of the indus-
try have been taken for granted by the adminis-
tration and thus each technology has been assessed
on its own merits. The existence of regulatory in-
struments and an active environmental policy
more generally has, however, indirectly contrib-
uted to innovations.
11.1.2 Regulatory instruments have had
observable effects on diffusion of
innovations
Diffusion of end-of-pipe technology has in many
instances been promoted by both water and air
regulations (Section 9.2.1). The diffusion has,
however, often been slow and reduced by the re-
active nature of the permitting. This is also due
to the nature of the industry. The pulp and paper
industry is a typical heavy industry with large in-
vestments and long-term perspectives. As already
discussed in the section on impacts on emissions
(Section 10.1.1), the regulatory instruments are
far from the only factors that have affected the
diffusion of environmental technology. Other
important aspects are cost savings for the opera-
tor resulting from improved resource utilisation
and customer pressures. The fact that some mills
have adopted end-of-pipe solutions several years
before they have been required to do so by per-
mit conditions suggests that other benefits have
justified the extra costs.
An interesting observation is that although our
results show that the regulatory instruments have
affected diffusion of technologies, more or less
the same technologies have also been adopted in
other countries using other policy instruments or
implementing regulations and especially permits
differently (OECD 1999b). Both Bressers (1988,
1995) and Kemp (1997, 1998) have studied the
diffusion of waste water treatment plants in the
Netherlands and have found diffusion during about
the same time as in Finland but mainly caused by
effluent charges and not the regulatory instru-
ments.
The diffusion of chlorine-free bleaching is an
example of a process in which public environmen-
tal concern lead to a market driven development
which individual permit limit values only con-
firmed. This is in line with the assessment of the
OECD that kraft mills in Canada, Finland, New
Zealand and Sweden all discharged very small
amounts of AOX, some mills even below 0.1 kg
per ton, although permit limits generally were 1–
2 kg per ton. The report states ”The above per-
formance is believed to be due to companies
adopting technologies for economic and market
reasons.” (OECD 1999b, p.68). In an assessment
of the Finnish and Swedish chlorine negotiations
in the late 1980s, Auer (1996, p. 695) concluded
that ”this smashing success can not be credited
directly to either the content of the HELCOM rec-
ommendation nor the process of reaching consen-
sus. Steep declines in chlorine consumption and
AOX emissions are driven by ever-expanding Eu-
ropean markets for various ’chlorinefree’ pulp
and paper products.” The 1989 decision by the
Finnish Ministry of the Environment on the re-
duction of the discharges of chlorine compounds,
as well as similar decisions in e.g. Sweden and
HELCOM, helped to reinforce the demand pres-
sures by showing that the authorities also took the
issue seriously and were prepared to take action.
The adoption of end-of-pipe technology, es-
pecially waste water treatment plants and air fil-
ters, cost millions for the operators. While some
innovations and diffusions induced by the regu-
lations have resulted in net-cost savings, the over-
all impacts appears to have involved costs.
Brännlund et al. (1996, p. 31) have earlier made
the same observation: ”Most of the current envi-
ronmental regulations in the pulp and paper in-
dustry have led to increased production costs.”
These costs do provide an incentive to innovate
and to use innovations that achieve the same re-
sult at lower costs.
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11.1.3 No direct effects of R&D require-
ments on innovation and diffusion
Research and development requirements have
been included in water as well as air permits. Many
of these requirements have been imprecise but
there have also been some R&D requirements with
quantitative targets. No direct effects on either
innovation or on diffusion could be found. It is,
however, possible that the R&D requirements have
had an indirect effect by helping to generate ca-
pacity to deal with environmental issues within
the companies.
The lack of impact of the R&D requirements
in permit conditions is not surprising, consider-
ing the fact that the decisions generally only spec-
ify the research question without demanding ad-
equate resources. Systematic follow-up on the part
of authorities is also virtually absent. Thus there
are few incentives for the firms to invest signifi-
cant resources in the R&D tasks, unless the firm
can expect other benefits than those associated
with the permit procedure. The R&D requirements
could have a greater role if they were clearly fo-
cused on specific questions and also had a con-
nection to future permit conditions. Too strong
direct links to specific permit conditions may,
however, create strong incentives to bias results.
11.1.4 Environmental authorities are not
gate keepers in the dissemination of
information on innovations
In principle it is possible that the existence of reg-
ulations reshapes interorganisational networks in
such a way that they enhance the spreading of
knowledge and the diffusion of innovations. Our
analysis clearly established that the companies do
not get their information on available environmen-
tal technology primarily from authorities or
through processes related to permitting. Compa-
nies do not even mention authorities in the con-
text of innovations. The information on environ-
mental technology is considered to be freely avail-
able and spreading rapidly among the companies
and this openness has been important in improv-
ing the environmental performance of individual
factories. Other important actors in the knowledge
network of the companies are the customers, the
equipment providers, consultants, research insti-
tutes and universities. Sometimes part of the fi-
nancing has been obtained through public pro-
grammes or institutions, e.g. the National Tech-
nology Agency (TEKES). Especially equipment
providers seem to play an important role in the
diffusion of environmental innovations.
The IPPC directive (1996/61) and the Best
Available Techniques reference documents aim
at enhancing the diffusion of knowledge of envi-
ronmental technology and its performance levels.
Our findings indicate that authorities are the main
beneficiaries of this enhanced information distri-
bution. The industry has an incentive to partici-
pate in the network primarily because it provides
an efficient forum for airing the points of view of
the industries and also for obtaining early infor-
mation on new developments in regulation.
The existence and development of the major
regulations have clearly increased the demand for
research and expertise in these fields. The supply
of degrees from universities in the relevant areas
has increased to meet this demand as the result of
a conscious effort (Sitra 1970). Indirectly, this has
promoted the width as well as quality of the par-
ticipants in the interorganisational networks that
the operators utilise to find information on envi-
ronmental technology.
11.2 The electricity taxation has not
been a strong driving force for
innovations
Most theoretical studies argue that taxes and oth-
er market-based approaches provide most incen-
tives for innovations and diffusion, because they
provide continuous incentives to reduce emissions
and thereby save costs. (e.g. Milliman and Prince
1989, Jaffe and Stavins 1995) They are also less
dependent than regulations on the present availa-
bility of pollution control technology (Kemp
2000). Finally, economic instruments stimulate
process innovations as well as technological in-
novations.
Astonishingly, our interviews showed that no
one representing the industry gave the electricity
tax any role in either promoting innovations or in
enhancing the diffusion of energy-efficient solu-
tions (Sections 7.3, 7.4, 9.5 and 10.2). This result
could of course be false. It is easy to argue that
industry will oppose environmental taxes (e.g.
Keohane et. al. 1998) and thus their answers may
be tactical. It is also possible that the picture we
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got was incorrect because the people we inter-
viewed were less familiar with energy issues than
with discharges and emissions. The interviewees
did not directly handle tax payments, whereas they
were directly involved in making permit applica-
tions. These factors could explain part of the re-
sults, but we believe they only explain a small
fraction, and that the main answer lies elsewhere.
Many empirical as well as theoretical studies
that take the political process of tax setting into
account reveal that the effects of taxes in gener-
al, as well as on innovation and diffusion, are of-
ten far smaller than anticipated (e.g. Bressers and
Huitema 1999, Brack et al. 2000). In practice,
environmental tax rates are almost always far low-
er than suggested by theory. They include exemp-
tions for sectors they otherwise would affect and
they may be combined with subsidies, indirectly
reducing their effects. Taxes are also often intro-
duced without removing already existing regula-
tions, which reduces the potential of flexibility
gains. These designs are a consequence of the low
political feasibility of theoretically ”optimal” en-
vironmental taxes in the real world. (Bressers and
Huitema 1999). Consequently there will also be
attempts to show that the issue of energy use is
taken care of by the industry on a voluntary basis
such as voluntary energy saving programmes.
The Finnish electricity taxation fits this pat-
tern very well. As was shown in Section 4.3.5,
the tax rates have been low – they have been low-
er for industry than for other electricity users –
and the system includes various exemptions and
subsidies. It is thus our interpretation that the con-
clusion that the electricity taxation has not had
any major effect on innovation and diffusion is
correct and that this is mainly due to design of
the tax and its low level. The main argument for
the actual design has been ”not to damage the in-
ternational competitiveness” (e.g. Määttä 2000),
i.e. the interests of the exporting industry, of which
pulp and paper is a large fraction. This does not
imply that all environmental taxes in Finland have
been without influence on innovations; neither
does it imply that future taxes could not enhance
innovations in the industry.
Almost identical results to ours have been ob-
tained for Sweden. In a recent analysis of the
Swedish carbon tax Johansson (2000, p. 91) con-
cluded: ”there are reasons to believe that the rel-
atively low taxes on industrial energy use have
resulted in only minor improvements in energy
efficiency within the industry.”
11.3 Environmental management
systems generate incremental
innovations
The systematic approaches contained in the envi-
ronmental management systems are assumed to
increase the probability that cost saving or income
increasing changes in the processes will be found.
Some examples of market innovations with envi-
ronmental benefits were found in the study. Ex-
amples in which the systematic treatment of com-
plaints made it possible to find ways to reduce
negative environmental externalities are also re-
ported. However, all the cases found were incre-
mental changes, whereas there was no clear evi-
dence of innovations or diffusion resulting in
major environmental improvements resulting from
environmental management systems. Similar con-
clusions can be drawn from the study of Zackris-
son et. al. (1999), although some of the possibili-
ties for improvement were very impressive in an
economic sense.
In a longer time perspective the environmen-
tal management systems may also turn out to be
important for innovative processes. Halme (1997)
suggested that a learning process needs change-
agents who are able to engage in discussions with
interest groups that have different ideas on how
activities can and should be carried out. If man-
agement systems are successful in increasing con-
structive dialogues between firms and interest
groups, they could increase the likelihood of ma-
jor innovations. It is, however, unlikely that the
management systems would on their own lead to
significant innovations. A new ”theory for action”
that can be transferred to new settings and situa-
tions must emerge in the firm (Halme 1997). If it
does not emerge there is a risk that the manage-
ment system will become a bureaucratic burden
that may even hinder innovations and their diffu-
sion.
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12 Methodological aspects
12.1 Only multiple methods can cope
with the impact problem
Establishment of the role of one factor when many
factors change and interact is a difficult task com-
mon to almost all policy evaluations. This empir-
ical difficulty has been coined ”the impact prob-
lem” (Scriven 1991). Emissions of several sub-
stances, the general state of waters and air close
to factories and the risk management in handling
of chemicals have all developed favourably, but
what is the role of the environmental policy in-
struments? The problem is particularly difficult in
the context of environmental policy, because of the
complexity, uncertainty, time lags and strong in-
teractions between different policy instruments as
well as between policy instruments and external
signals from the market and society at large.
Approaches in which several methods are used
instead of just one have been recommended for
addressing the impact problem (Bartlett 1994).
Our study strongly supports this argument. A sin-
gle method, e.g. the statistical analysis of permit
conditions, was not able to demonstrate for ex-
ample the importance of the networks and discus-
sions that precede a permit application and that
constitute an important part of the impact of the
examined regulatory instruments. The detailed
analysis of legal documents was then able to sub-
stantiate the evolution of the permit procedure.
Thus a phenomenon can be better understood
when several methods are used, because these can
illuminate different aspects of a policy instrument.
Our approach has, for example, provided new in-
sights into how emission limit values affect a com-
pany’s decision-making in environmental matters.
On the other hand multiple methods are also dif-
ficult, because different methods may yield con-
flicting results and weighing different explanations
may depend on the availability of information rath-
er than providing a fully neutral examination of
”all” relevant evidence.
Multiple methods have contributed to the eval-
uation of the innovation effects of regulatory de-
cisions. A case-by-case examination of all factors
affecting innovations was impossible due to part-
ly insufficient material and prohibitive resource
demands. Interviews can identify the importance
of economic and in particular marketing consid-
erations, and a general environmental awareness
that is linked to the development of environmen-
tal policy instruments, but the experience of the
interviewees does not cover the whole period ex-
amined. It is furthermore unlikely that the inter-
viewees remember all details of the cases in which
they have been involved. The documented deci-
sion-making material also has its limits as a source
of information.
It is possible to examine the coercive impact
by studying the court material, but the examina-
tion of noncoercive impact is difficult because the
motives behind the anticipation are not easy to
identify. Indirect innovation effects are also dif-
ficult to document when the focus of the study is
on specific instruments, the operators and the ad-
ministration. Some operators may have their own
research and development activities, but many
innovations are often made by suppliers of tech-
nology. For them the existence of regulatory sys-
tems may be vital in creating markets, although
they are not directly affected by the individual
decisions. For example, suppliers of environmen-
tal technology have demanded stricter environ-
mental policies (EUCETSA 2001). These effects
of the regulatory systems have only been partly
captured by the material of our study.
In some cases one method can identify an in-
teresting hypothesis, which can be tested by oth-
er methods. An example is the claim arising from
interviews that research obligations have signalled
future emission limits. In the case of phosphorous
this hypothesis could be rejected using the statis-
tical analysis.
Our conclusion is that complex evaluations
should be undertaken not using only qualitative
and quantitative methods but also by employing
truly different scientific disciplines in examining
policy instruments. At the same time we recog-
nise and acknowledge the difficulties this entails.
Sufficient information is difficult to gather and
individual parts of a multi- or interdisciplinary
study can be criticised for not being deep enough
when viewed from the viewpoint of a single dis-
cipline (Rosenhead 1989).
12.2 The broad analysis of effects
deepens the understanding of policy
instruments
Many important effects of environmental policy
instruments occur outside the main explicit tar-
122 Mikael Hildén et al. Monographs of the Boreal Environment Research No. 21
get area of the instrument, but these effects have
often been neglected in evaluations (Vedung 1997,
p. 45 ff). Our findings show that a broad effects
approach is able to deal with many of the key is-
sues in a comprehensive evaluation of environ-
mental policy instruments. One example is the link
between the policy instruments and innovations.
Fostering innovations has not been a major ob-
jective of the environmental policy instruments
used so far, but some effects become obvious
when the evaluation is based on a broad under-
standing of the different types of effects that can
arise. The diffusion of innovations has been an
explicit part of the intervention theory of the more
recent policy instruments, but individual exam-
ples indicating an impact of a permit on the dif-
fusion of technology do not reveal how often this
kind impact has occurred.
12.3 Multiple criteria must be used to
capture the complexity of effects
In judging the merit, worth or value of policy in-
struments a single criterion can easily be used for
rhetoric purposes, for example administrative
costs can be related to output as an argument for
inefficiency (Hildén 2000). Multiple criteria give
a broader understanding of the effects. They also
support a more balanced discussion of key issues
concerning the implementation of the policy in-
struments (Baldwin and Cave 1999). Using mul-
tiple criteria it is not possible to identify an in-
strument which is best with respect to all criteria,
because there will always be trade-offs. Our pur-
pose has been to highlight characteristics of poli-
cy instruments that are relevant for a policy dis-
cussion without proclaiming a ”winner”.
The difficulties in using multiple criteria are
related to the availability of data and also to the
complexity of many criteria. Availability of data
hampers especially the use of quantitative crite-
ria such as detailed measurements of cost effec-
tiveness. It can, however, be claimed that in a
policy discussion general information viewed from
many different angles is more useful than extreme-
ly detailed data viewed from a very narrow point
of view.
The complexity of many criteria demands a
systematic approach to the available data, because
several criteria can be used for many different
purposes. For example flexibility can be viewed
as a characteristic that allows the adjustment of
outputs in relation to local needs and conditions,
as when taking into account social and economic
conditions in setting permit requirements, or it can
be viewed as a characteristic that allows adjust-
ment of the outcome, e.g. the state of the envi-
ronment, in response to changing societal prefer-
ences. These two different interpretations of flex-
ibility may lead to conflicting conclusions con-
cerning the merit, worth and value of a policy in-
strument.
12.4 Intervention theories are important
tools in focussing evaluations
The contrast between actual practice and the in-
tervention theories as deduced from official doc-
uments is one of the clues to identifying effects
and the examination of effects in relation to eval-
uation criteria. The differences between these in-
tervention theories and different actors’ percep-
tion of how the instruments should work or have
worked are also important in understanding im-
plementation practices and difficulties. Several
authors have argued that early evaluations were
not sufficiently based on theory, but approached
the evaluation task from an entirely empirical point
of view (Shadish et al. 1995).
Intervention theories have a special role in
evaluations of environmental policy instruments
due to the complexity of issues (Mickwitz
2000c). An extensive collection of empirical data
without a foundation in the intervention theory
of the instruments is likely to lead to haphazard
conclusions (Rossi et al. 1999). Ideally interven-
tion theories of environmental policy instruments
should be based on science and an understand-
ing of key cause-effect relationships. However,
this is challenging in many ways, especially when
it comes to complex ecological issues for which
there may be several and partly conflicting the-
ories. Then it is not immediately obvious which
assumptions have been used in developing an
instrument. Due to the long time frames of many
environmental problems, data on final outcomes
may also not be available. The intervention the-
ories can in these cases nevertheless be used to
identify analogies with other situations for which
outcomes are known. The use of information-
based policy instruments is a simple example.
In the environmental field they are relatively new
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but they have been extensively used in other
fields.
12.5 Interorganisational networks and
their variation should be recognised
A part of the methodological debate concerning
networks has dealt with the question to what ex-
tent ”policy networks” can become more than a
metaphor. It seems evident that the strength of
network approaches hitherto has been in describ-
ing rather than explaining policy making (Daug-
bjerg 1998, p. 26). Our study supports the view
that network analysis is a useful descriptive tool.
The network metaphor has played down the im-
portance of formal/constitutional differences be-
tween societal actors, thereby recognising sever-
al features of contemporary public administration
such as the increased mobilisation of competing
interests, increased scope of state policy making,
the fragmentation of the state and the blurring
boundaries between public and private ( Jordan
& Schubert 1992, p. 11). Our study shows that
the network analysis can, in combination with oth-
er sources of data, become more than a simple
illustration of the relationship between actors. It
can, for example, explain why the risk of regula-
tory capture would be significant in a regulatory
instrument based on case-by-case negotiations, un-
less the transparency and opportunities to partic-
ipate were well developed. Thus the network anal-
ysis supports the use of several important evalua-
tion criteria (transparency, equity, acceptability).
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13 Conclusions
We defined four main objectives for this study
(Section 2): to conduct a general evaluation of
specific environmental policy instruments; to ex-
plore the relationship between the environmental
policy instruments and innovations; to investigate
the role of interorganisational networks; and to
examine appropriate evaluation methods for en-
vironmental policy instruments. What are the find-
ings?
Our conclusion on the general evaluation of
the policy instruments is that they have had sev-
eral positive effects in the context of directing
major industrial point source polluters towards
solving environmental problems. The environmen-
tal policy has, however, been only one of the fac-
tors reducing emissions. There have also been
serious effectiveness problems, in particular in the
early years of introducing the regulatory instru-
ments. Some of these have been caused by inade-
quate resources of the administration to cope with
the tasks created by the instruments, whereas oth-
ers can be traced to a lack of political will to pro-
ceed with environmental protection at a rate that
would otherwise have been technically and eco-
nomically feasible. The principle of granting en-
vironmental permits for an indefinite time has re-
duced the effectiveness of air pollution control
permits. The regulatory instruments have in gen-
eral been rather flexible in dealing with increas-
ing environmental demands, but have had obvi-
ous difficulties with respect to qualitatively new
kinds of environmental problems and demands.
In electricity taxation the deliberate reduction of
effectiveness is seen in the low taxation rates. The
transparency has been an important factor ensur-
ing the success of the policy instruments and in
avoiding the regulatory capture that could have
thrived in a system largely based on negotiations
between operators and authorities. The transpar-
ency has made it easy for Finnish firms to adopt
environmental management systems and an open
attitude to environmental reporting.
Our conclusion concerning the relationship
between the environmental policy instruments and
innovations is that the permits based on regulato-
ry instruments have neither fostered nor hindered
the discovery of new innovations to a large ex-
tent, but that they have contributed to the diffu-
sion of end-of-pipe innovations. The instruments
have contributed to innovations by expanding the
market for environmentally better technical solu-
tions. In addition they have also indirectly con-
tributed to innovations by creating a demand for
environmental experts and environmental educa-
tion in universities and polytechnics. The electric-
ity tax has not at its present level fostered inno-
vations, but it has probably contributed to the dif-
fusion of voluntary energy saving commitments
by contributing to a societal discussion on ener-
gy and energy policy. Voluntary management sys-
tems are by themselves innovations that have dif-
fused rapidly in the late 1990s and they have clear-
ly contributed to incremental improvements of
environmental performance. It is too early to say
whether they will contribute to radical innovations,
but on their own they are unlikely to do so. They
may make a contribution, if there are functioning
links between the management systems and the
R&D work of the firms so that problems identi-
fied within the management systems become ob-
jects of systematic R&D work and not only a
management notification.
In our investigation on the role of interorgan-
isational networks we have found that networks
have clearly developed as a consequence of and
in response to regulatory instruments. We con-
clude that these networks appear to have their
greatest significance prior to the permit procedures
and that the success of the communication in the
networks prior to the presentation of an applica-
tion is a key to smoothly functioning permit proc-
esses. We have further found that authorities are
largely outsiders in the networks contributing to
innovations and the diffusion of innovations, ex-
cept when an innovation becomes a de facto stand-
ard for permit conditions. The introduction of for-
malised BAT networks is unlikely to change this
situation fundamentally, although the BAT net-
works probably will reduce the information im-
balance between authorities and operators. The
electricity tax has not created any significant net-
works and is unlikely to do so. The networks re-
lated to energy savings are, however, important
for the energy discussion. Environmental manage-
ment systems have by contrast created new ac-
tors and also introduced new actors in the envi-
ronmental field. These actors, management con-
sultants and verifiers of management systems may
in the future be increasingly important for the dif-
fusion of environmental innovations.
In the course of the evaluation, elements of
appropriate evaluation methods for environmen-
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tal policy instruments have emerged. The differ-
ent kind of effects, the complexity of consequenc-
es and the uncertainties with respect to causes and
effects mean that evaluations aiming at evaluat-
ing the overall worth and merit of an environmen-
tal policy instrument should never be structured
from a single point of view using only one meth-
od. Multiple criteria should be used. The draw-
back of the multiple approach principle in evalu-
ation is that the evaluations will run into data prob-
lems and all the difficulties of multi- and inter-
disciplinary research, thus putting the scientific
credibility at risk when viewed from the point of
view of a single discipline. Our conclusion is that
the risk is worth taking.
126 Mikael Hildén et al. Monographs of the Boreal Environment Research No. 21
Acknowledgements
This is the final report of a project was financed
by the Finnish Environmental Cluster Research
Programme, the Finnish Environment Institute and
the Swedish School of Social Science at the Uni-
versity of Helsinki. During the entire project we
have received valuable comments from Antero
Honkasalo, Meeri Palosaari and Mervi Salmin-
en. We have benefited from discussions with Tors-
ti Loikkanen and Mikko Hongisto from the Tech-
nical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) and Petri
Vasara and Katja Lillandt from Jaakko Pöyry
Consulting, who have undertaken their own re-
search projects on innovations in parallel with our
project. We have also received many useful com-
ments on preliminary drafts of the report from
Emelie Enckell, Alec Estlander, Marianne Lind-
ström Matti Melanen, Seppo Rekolainen and
Pekka Vihervuori. Advice and information was
also provided among others by Helena Valve,
Magnus Nyström, Esa Nikunen, Timo Jouttijärvi,
Elina Karhu, Jonna Sahala at our various research
institutes. In the final stages of the reporting Sep-
po Ruonala and Airi Karvonen read the entire draft
and contributed with several critical and useful
comments. After this the comments by two refe-
rees helped in further improving the final manu-
script. Heidi Vuoristo assisted us by compiling
the water quality data. Kirsti Hamberg helped us
to find all the documents needed from the archives
of the Finnish Environmental Institute. Jarmo Suni
assisted in compiling data on environmental per-
mits. Päivi Luoma and Anja Kiviluoto carried out
research tasks in the early phases of the project.
Michael Bailey checked the English language of
the manuscript. Johanna Koivu assisted in the fi-
nal editing of the manuscript.
127Evaluation of environmental policy instruments
Yhteenveto
Yhteiskunnallisen ohjauksen arviointiin on kiin-
nitetty enenevässä määrin huomiota 1990-luvul-
ta lähtien. Vuosituhannen vaihteessa on Suomes-
sa julkaistu useita nimenomaan ympäristöpoliit-
tiseen ohjaukseen keskittyviä tutkimuksia. Tämä
tutkimus jatkaa tätä ympäristöpoliittiseen ohjauk-
seen keskittyvää arviointia. Tavoitteena on ollut:
• tehdä yleinen arviointi valikoiduista ympäris-
töpoliittisista ohjauskeinoista. Arvioinnissa
ohjausta ja sen vaikutuksia tarkastellaan yleis-
ten arviointikriteerien valossa. Tarkastelun
kohteena on sekä tavoitellut että muut vaiku-
tukset.
• tutkia ohjauskeinojen ja innovaatioiden suhdet-
ta. Kiinnostuksen kohteena on missä määrin
ohjaus edistää tai estää innovaation syntymis-
tä ja innovaatioiden leviämistä.
• selvittää organisaatioiden välisten verkostojen
merkitystä ohjauksen toteuttamisessa. Verkos-
totutkimus tarkastelee eri verkostojen merki-
tystä ja kehittymistä ohjauksen seurauksena ja
osana sitä.
• pohtia ja kehittää ympäristöpoliittisten ohjaus-
keinojen arviointimetodiikkaa. Erityisesti on
pyritty tekemään johtopäätöksiä ympäristöoh-
jauksen erityispiirteiden vaikutuksesta arvioin-
titutkimukseen.
Tutkimuksen kohteeksi valitut ohjauskeinot
ovat: vesilain, ilmansuojelulain ja kemikaalilain
sääntelemät ennakolliset valvontajärjestelmät sekä
sähkövero ja yritysten vapaaehtoiset ympäristö-
asioiden hallintajärjestelmät (EMAS ja ISO
14000). Tutkimuksessa on keskitytty massa- ja
paperiteollisuuteen sekä kemian väriteollisuuteen.
Tutkimus pohjautuu erilaisiin metodologisiin lä-
hestymistapoihin: lupa-ehtoja ja ympäristön tilaa
koskevien tietojen analysointiin tilastollisten mal-
lien avulla, lupapäätösten laadulliseen analyysiin
sekä teollisuuden ja hallinnon edustajien haastat-
telujen laadulliseen analyysiin. Tutkimuksessa on
pyritty valottamaan ohjauksen historiallista kehi-
tystä, joskin päähuomio erityisesti haastattelutut-
kimuksessa on kohdistettu aikaan juuri ennen uu-
den ympäristönsuojelulain voimaantuloa.
Johtopäätös tutkittujen ohjauskeinojen yleises-
tä arvioinnista on, että merkittäviin pistekuormit-
tajiin kohdistunut ohjaus on saavuttanut eräitä
keskeisiä tavoitteita. Ohjaus on myötävaikuttanut
päästöjen vähentämiseen ja pilaantumisen estämi-
seen. Isoista teollisuuslaitoksista peräisin olevi-
en päästöjen merkittävään vähentymiseen viimeis-
ten 20–30 vuoden aikana ovat ohjauskeinojen
ohella vaikuttaneet myös muut, vain välillisesti
ympäristöpolitiikkaan liittyvät tekijät, kuten mark-
kinat ja teknologian yleinen kehitys. Tarkastelu
on kuitenkin myös osoittanut, että ympäristöasi-
oiden ohjaus ei lupajärjestelmissä aina ole ollut
helppoa.
Tutkimuksessa on myös voitu havaita vakavia
vaikuttavuusongelmia, erityisesti uuden ohjauk-
sen käyttöönoton jälkeen. Tämä ”sisäänajovaihe”
on vesiensuojelussa ja ilmansuojelussa ollut var-
sin pitkä, jopa yli vuosikymmenen. Osa ongelmis-
ta on johtunut puutteellisista voimavaroista huo-
lehtia niistä tehtävistä, joita uusi ohjauskeino on
edellyttänyt. Tämä on näkynyt mm. lupakäsitte-
lyn ruuhkautumisena. Osa ongelmista on johtu-
nut omaksutuista lainsäädännöllistä ratkaisuista.
Esimerkiksi ilmansuojelulain täytäntöönpanon
hitaus palautuu osaltaan alkuperäisen lain ilmoi-
tusmenettelyyn perustuvaan heikkoon ohjaukseen.
Osa ongelmista on johtunut poliittisesta halutto-
muudesta edetä ympäristönsuojelussa niin nope-
asti kuin se olisi ollut teknisesti ja taloudellisesti
mahdollista. Tämä näkyy mm. siinä, että eräiden
keskeisten päästölähteiden rajoittamisessa oltiin
mm. ilmansuojelussa selvästi jäljessä verrattuna
Ruotsiin. Esimerkiksi toistaiseksi voimassa ole-
vat luvat ilmansuojelussa rajoittivat lupajärjestel-
män vaikuttavuutta.
Lupiin perustuvat järjestelmät ovat olleet ver-
rattain joustavia ja ovat kyenneet mukautumaan
tiukkeneviin ympäristövaatimuksiin. Joustavuut-
ta voidaan todeta myös muissa tarkastelluissa oh-
jauskeinoissa. Sähkövero on periaatteessa erittäin
joustava, mutta nopeat muutokset ovat siinä vä-
hentäneet verotuksen ympäristönsuojelullista vai-
kuttavuutta, vaikka verokertymätavoitteet ovatkin
toteutuneet. Sekä verotuksellista että ympäristön-
suojelullista vaikuttavuutta on kuitenkin tietoisesti
rajoitettu alhaisilla ja suurkuluttajia suosivilla
veroporrastuksilla ja veron palautejärjestelmällä.
Johtopäätöksemme ympäristöohjauksen ja in-
novaatioiden välisestä suhteesta on, että yksittäi-
sissä lupapäätöksissä ei ole pyritty pakottamaan
esiin innovaatioita. Lupamääräykset eivät kuiten-
kaan ole estäneet uusien innovaatioiden syntymis-
tä. Sen sijaan ne ovat edistäneet erityisesti puh-
distusteknologian käyttöönottoa ja luoneet mark-
kinoita ympäristöystävällisemmille ratkaisuille.
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Tällä tavoin ne ovat epäsuorasti tukeneet inno-
vaatiotoimintaa. Ohjaus on myös epäsuorasti edis-
tänyt innovaatiotoimintaa luomalla kysyntää ym-
päristöasiantuntijoista, joka on heijastunut yliopis-
tojen ja korkeakoulujen koulutusohjelmiin ja tut-
kimukseen. Emme havainneet lupiin sisältyvien
tutkimusvelvoitteiden synnyttäneen varsinaisia
innovaatioita. Tutkimusvelvoitteet olivat usein
myös muotoiltu siten, että tällaisen vaikutuksen
syntymistä ei voida pitää todennäköisenä.
Sähkövero ei ole nykytasolla edistänyt inno-
vaatioita, mutta se on todennäköisesti myötävai-
kuttanut vapaaehtoisten energiansäästösopimus-
ten syntymiseen, koska se on osaltaan ylläpitänyt
yhteiskunnallista keskustelua energiasta ja ener-
giapolitiikasta. Teoriassa oikealle tasolle asetettu
vero muodostaa teollisuudelle tehokkaan kannus-
timen uusien innovaatioiden tekemiselle.
Vapaaehtoisia hallintajärjestelmiä on otettu
laajasti käyttöön. Ne ovat nostaneet yritysten
ympäristönsuojelun tasoa tunnistamalla yksittäi-
siä parannuskohteita. Niiden tavoitteena ei ole
ollut innovaatioiden tuottaminen emmekä löytä-
neet esimerkkejä siitä, että hallintajärjestelmien
käyttöönotto olisi johtanut uusien merkittävien
ympäristönsuojelua edistävien innovaatioiden
syntymiseen. Vapaaehtoiset hallintajärjestelmät
saattavat kuitenkin myötävaikuttaa innovaatioiden
syntymiseen, jos ympäristöasioiden hallinnan ja
yrityksen T&K toiminnan välille luodaan yrityk-
sessä kiinteä yhteys, joka huolehtii siitä, että
hallintajärjestelmän havaitsemat parannuskohteet
tulevat yrityksen systemaattisen T&K toiminnan
kohteeksi. Riittävä ja systemaattinen panostus
T&K toimintaan on olennaista.
Organisaatioiden väliset verkostot ovat tärkeitä
ympäristönsuojelun ohjauksessa. Verkostot kehit-
tyvät ja muuttuvat ohjauksen myötä. Epävirallis-
ten verkostojen merkitys on lupajärjestelmissä
suuri, koska ne tukevat lakisääteisten menettelyi-
den sujuvaa soveltamista ja yritys- ja paikkakun-
takohtaisten asioiden huomioonottamista. Mitä
innovaatioihin tulee tutkimus osoittaa, että viran-
omaiset eivät näyttele merkittävää roolia, paitsi
kun jokin innovaatio saavuttaa tosiasiallisen stan-
dardin aseman. Näissä tapauksissa viranomaisten
toiminta ja viranomaisten ja yritysten väliset ver-
kostot edistävät innovaation leviämistä. Parhaim-
man käytettävissä olevan tekniikan (BAT)-verkos-
ton ansiosta viranomaisten tietotaso voi kohota.
Suurteollisuudessa tieto prosessi-innovaatioista
kulkenee kuitenkin edelleen ennen kaikkea tutki-
muksessa todetuissa tärkeissä yritysten välisissä
verkostoissa ennen kuin lupaviranomaiset voivat
käyttää ja jakaa sitä edelleen. PK-yrityksissä ti-
lanne voi olla toinen.
Sähköveroon liittyen ei ole syntynyt mitään
varsinaisia organisaatioiden välisiä verkostoja,
eikä niitä todennäköisesti synnykään. Sen sijaan
energiasäästösopimusten ympärille syntyneet ver-
kostot ja niissä käytävä keskustelu on tärkeä ener-
giapoliittiselle keskustelulle. Ympäristöasioiden
hallintajärjestelmät ovat tuoneet uusia toimijoita
ympäristönsuojelun kenttään ja luoneet aivan uu-
sia verkostoja.
Johtopäätöksemme arviointitutkimuksesta on,
että ympäristöohjausta tulisi aina arvioida käyt-
tämällä useita menetelmiä ja aineistoja. Ympäris-
töpoliittisilla ohjauskeinoilla on lähes aina monen-
laisia merkittäviä vaikutuksia. Samalla vaikutuk-
siin liittyy epävarmuutta ja syy-seuraussuhteiden
yksiselitteinen osoittaminen on erityisen vaikeaa,
jos arvioinnissa käytetään vain yhtä menetelmää,
esimerkiksi tilastollista mallintamista tai haastat-
teluja. Ohjauskeinon arviointi on perusteltua teh-
dä monen kriteerin avulla, koska näin saadaan
monipuolisempi ja laaja-alaisempi näkemys. Pää-
töksenteko, joka perustuu vain yhteen kriteeriin,
johtaa todennäköisesti vääristymiin ja erilaisiin
ongelmiin. Todellisuudessa päätöksenteko ei pe-
rustukaan yhteen vaan useampaan kriteeriin, vaik-
ka näitä ei aina avoimesti lausuta julki tai edes
tiedosteta.
Monitieteisen lähestymistavan ongelmana on,
että arvioinnissa kohdataan vaikeuksia aineiston
keruussa. Tutkimuksessa havaittiin, että tietojär-
jestelmät eivät vielä ole sillä tasolla, että niitä
voitaisiin helposti käyttää arvioinnissa. Monitie-
teellisissä tarkasteluissa joudutaan paneutumaan
laajasti monentyyppisiin aineistoihin. On luonnol-
lista, että silloin ei voida paneutua kaikkiin yksi-
tyiskohtiin. Toisaalta erityiskysymykseen paneu-
tunut tutkimus tuottaa aina rajoitetun näkökulman.
Johtopäätöksemme tutkimuksessa havaittujen
monenlaisten vaikutusten perusteella on, että oh-
jauskeinojen kehittämisen tulisi pohjautua mah-
dollisimman kokonaisvaltaiseen näkemykseen.
Tällaisen näkemyksen kehittymistä voidaan edis-
tää laaja-alaisilla arvioinneilla, joita yksityiskoh-
taiset tarkastelut voivat täydentää.
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